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Abstract 
 This dissertation describes the development of a networked gatekeeping theory 
for the study of an increasingly internet-mediated news diffusion process.  Prior gate-
keeping research provides a rich theoretical and methodological framework for investi-
gating and illuminating the process through which certain events and issues on an inter-
national, national, and local level become the mediated messages that reach the public.  
Towards a framework for reconceptualizing gatekeeping theory in which I incorporate 
principles of graph theory and social network analysis, I describe the development of a 
more participatory but still asymmetrically structured networked gatekeeping process that 
is forming according to the communication infrastructure afforded by the internet and its 
associated technologies.  In particular, this dissertation focuses on the implications of 
these developments for both the practice of and research about news diffusion, journal-
ism, internet-mediated communication, and democracy.  In an empirical study of the 
Twitter-based news ecology of a large Midwestern metropolitan area, I conduct a case 
study using primarily social network analysis methods that uncovers insights about the 
patterns that emerge within this dynamic participatory news construction and diffusion 
process.  The findings of this dissertation can be useful for media scholars, media practi-
tioners, and for anyone with an interest in understanding the evolution of the new media 
of the public sphere. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: FROM INDUSTRIAL-CONTROLLED TO 
NETWORKED GATEKEEPING PROCESS 
1.1 THE BANALITY OF TWITTER 
In the mid-19th century, the invention of the telegraph was set to drastically 
change the speed at which information could travel across geographic spaces.  Its inven-
tors and developers had high hopes that the new technology would develop into “a tool to 
serve business and the public interest” (Van Riper, 2011, p. 64).  In the popular view of at 
least one writer, however, telegraph technology “was soon co-opted (as the telephone and 
the Internet would be) for romance and other ‘frivolous’ purposes” (p. 64).  Indeed, this 
sentiment was not uncommon at the time of the telegraph’s development.  The famed 
transcendentalist author Henry David Thoreau, for one, wrote the following about the tel-
egraph in his Walden: Life in the Woods, published in 1854: 
Our inventions are wont to be pretty toys, which distract our attention 
from serious things. They are but improved means to an unimproved end, 
an end which it was already but too easy to arrive at; as railroads lead to 
Boston or New York. We are in great haste to construct a magnetic 
telegraph from Maine to Texas; but Maine and Texas, it may be, have 
nothing important to communicate. Either is in such a predicament as the 
man who was earnest to be introduced to a distinguished deaf woman, but 
when he was presented, and one end of her ear trumpet was put into his 
hand, had nothing to say. As if the main object were to talk fast and not to 
talk sensibly. We are eager to tunnel under the Atlantic and bring the Old 
World some weeks nearer to the New; but perchance the first news that 
will leak through into the broad, flapping American ear will be that the 
Princess Adelaide has the whooping cough. After all, the man whose horse 
trots a mile in a minute does not carry the most important messages 
(Thoreau, 1854/1910, p. 57-58). 
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A series of recent developments in communication technologies and concurrent 
processes to shape these technologies have enabled the development of a public commu-
nication system with almost none of the constraints of time and space that existed even 
after the development of the telegraph, the telephone, and broadcast media.  Further, un-
like the telegraph or other broadcast communication, the internet gives the power of 
broadcast to the public.  Thus, the development of the internet and its associated technol-
ogies have enabled a new level of speed in the travel of messages among an ever expand-
ing network of people and organizations.  One of the quintessential digital personifica-
tions of this more connected world within the modern media environment is the mi-
croblog and social network site known as Twitter.  Like the telegraph and other commu-
nications mediums before it, Twitter—with its 140 character per-post limit and minimal-
ist interface that eschews the focus that some social network sites have on the individual 
in favor of whole—has enabled a new level of rapidness in what Thoreau would probably 
consider the flow of trivial communication.  Indeed, in a modern version of Thoreau’s la-
ment, the New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd (2009) has suggested that the site is 
nothing more than “a toy for bored celebrities and high-school girls.”  And in an inter-
view with the founders of Twitter, Dowd suggested that they should have instead called 
the site “Clutter.”  And of course, Dowd is partly correct—Twitter does contain a lot of 
communication that is inconsequential for the public as a whole.   
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But is this thesis that our communications technologies have been consistently hi-
jacked for trifling purposes valid?  On the one hand, it is impossible to deny the sugges-
tion that Twitter and other modern communications technologies offer a dizzying array of 
banality, a seemingly endless look into the most mundane aspects of the lives of people 
around the world.  And yet this argument taken by itself ignores a simple truth: most of 
the daily conversation happening among people around the world would likely be judged 
as relatively inconsequential in the context of anyone outside of a close circle of ac-
quaintances.  Thus, the high quantity of communication via internet-media communica-
tion that we might see as frivolous on the one hand can also be seen as a manifestation of 
the overall patterns of human communication that have always existed.  Indeed, the pub-
lic conversation made observable on social network sites like Twitter—the Twitter “fire 
hose” as some call it—can also be viewed as the manifestation of a new kind of public 
record of human interactions that is more comprehensive and natural than we have previ-
ously been able to observe and empirically study. 
Furthermore, within this massive network of public communication, there is argu-
ably more than meets the superficial eye.  That is, as Murthy (2012) argues, much of the 
interaction among private groups of people that might be inconsequential for the public at 
large may represent significant expressions of social cohesiveness.  To this point, Murthy 
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(2012), writes that “we should recall Bourdieu’s argument that the daily, sometimes ‘ba-
nal’ is pregnant with meaning.  In the case of Twitter, ‘banal’ social media posts serve as 
an important vehicle of self-affirmation (p. 1062). 
Indeed, to some extent this acknowledgement that all social interaction can be 
meaningful is the rationale behind the analysis of patterns of communication that is ob-
servable in the form of what is often called “metadata” or the “data about data.”   The 
sharing of information that occurs via the internet may involve discussion of news of an 
important election or event or it may involve the sharing of a video of a cat playing a pi-
ano.  In and of themselves, all forms of communication, both “socially important” and 
“banal” can have sub-textual meaning.  And more than this, through the creative and 
careful application of social science methods, researchers can isolate metadata patterns in 
public communication that help us to understand common characteristics in the flow of 
certain types of information through certain types of people.  This is the fundamental pro-
ject of this dissertation: specifically, to identify and give meaning to patterns in internet-
mediated communication, especially patterns that can help us to understand the changing 
role of journalism and changing structure of news diffusion in a media environment that 
is increasingly mediated by internet-connected technologies. 
1.2 UNDERSTANDING THE CHANGING MEDIA ENVIRONMENT 
Years ago, at a time when the internet was merely an idea in development by the 
US government, social scientist Roger Brown (1965) suggested that we might eventually 
  
                 5 
 
reach a point in which we can observe an organically developed social structure.  He 
wrote: 
Social structure becomes actually visible in an anthill; the movements and 
contacts one sees are not random but patterned. We should also be able to 
see structure in the life of an American community if we have a 
sufficiently remote vantage point, a point from which persons would 
appear to be small moving dots. We should see those dots mobile by day 
and immobile for much of the night. We should see that these dots do not 
randomly wander over the terrain but follow fixed paths and return 
regularly to what appear to be family territories. We should see that these 
dots do not randomly approach one another, that some are usually 
together, some meet often, some never. The determinants of perceptual 
structure called ‘proximity’ and ‘common fate’ would group the dots for us 
into cohering dyads, families, and strata. The determinant of perceptual 
structure called similarity’ would cause us to notice that dots with trousers 
lift their hats to dots with skirts, that dots in blue uniforms stand in the 
street blowing whistles and waving their arms at dots in cars. If one could 
get far enough away from it human social life would become pure pattern 
(p. 47). 
The challenge in almost any piece of social science research is to sift through all of the 
human and social behavior that seems to represent an unordered array of actions and 
interactions and to find patterns that can contribute to improving our knowledge of 
ourselves.  Within the exchange of both “frivolous” and “important” information via 
social network sites like Twitter, then, we are offered the kind of distance from human 
social life that Brown suggested would better help us to see some of the overarching 
patterns in our social structure. 
In the social science method that has come to be known as “social network 
analysis,” the metadata of communication patterns between people can be represented as 
a social network or “social graph” in which people are represented by dots (also known 
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as nodes or vertices) and their connections to one another can be represented by 
connecting lines between them (also called ties or edges). Taken together, the overall 
structure of these nodes and ties—the cumulative absence or existence of different kinds 
of connections between various people or groups in the world—make up a social 
network. 
Dating back many years now, social network analysis scholars have recognized 
the increasing importance of communications technologies to the formation and 
stabilization of social network ties and overall social structure.  For instance, Ronald Burt 
wrote in 1976 that “with the growth of technology and its concomitant division of labor, 
the determination of actors in society as a function of their relations with other actors is 
likely to increase rather than decrease. (p. 93).  Indeed, as Haythornwaite and Wellman 
(1998) write, “when a computer connects people (or organizations), it is a social 
network” (p. 1101).  The job of social science and particularly, of social network analysis 
of online spaces in an evolving media environment is to develop theoretically driven 
ways of finding important and meaningful patterns within the seemingly disordered flow 
of internet-mediated communication that comprises what some call the “social media 
firehose” (see Hendrickson, 2012; Kietzmann, Silvestre, McCarthy, & Pitt, 2012). 
Over the past few decades, communications technologies have become 
increasingly integrated into human life.  In the 1980s, it became increasingly common for 
homes around the world to have a single desktop computer in one of the rooms in the 
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house.  Within a decade, personal home computers had become widely diffused and a 
relatively rapid public-wide diffusion of the internet as a new information resource began.  
A decade or so later, after the turn of the 3rd millennium, the development and diffusion 
of increasingly portable computers connected together by social network sites brought 
greater density and definition still to the global social network of internet-mediated 
connectedness. 
Through these changes, the passive audiences of the 20th century model of media 
became what media scholar Jay Rosen (2009) calls “the people formerly known as the 
audience.”  That is, he writes, the internet-mediated communication technologies that 
now connect the formerly atomized public have forever disrupted old models for 
understanding the role of mediated public communication in society.  Today, people in 
advanced nations and even many in third world countries today have internet-connected 
computers that they can carry around in their pockets.  With the early development of 
wearable devices such as Google Glass upon us today, Marshall McLuhan’s (1964) 
suggestion that our communications technologies have become “an extension of our 
central nervous systems” is really no longer much of an exaggeration.  The 
interconnected “global village” that McLuhan described, with all of the favorable and 
unfavorable characteristics that can make up a community, is upon us. 
 In this dissertation, at the most basic level I seek to better understand the new 
patterns of communication that our communications technologies have helped to make 
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possible.  More specifically, I seek to better understand the evolving role of journalism 
and the changing structure of news diffusion within this changing media environment as 
it becomes a collective and networked process that plays out amongst professional and 
paraprofessional journalists, various elites, private and governmental entities, and 
citizens.  
In the early years of the internet’s widespread public diffusion in the 1990s, 
visions of the internet as a democratizing media form took hold of the popular 
imagination (see Rheingold, 1993; Negroponte, 1995; Grossman, 1995; Barlow, 1996).  
Others offered rather cautious views of the internet’s impact on the media and society, 
with Stoll writing in 1995 that "lacking editors, reviewers or critics, the Internet has 
become a wasteland of unfiltered data.”  But discussions about the role of mediated 
communication in society today are not very well-served by futurism—neither utopian 
nor dystopian—nor by normative visions at all of what the internet could be or should be.  
Instead, in this dissertation I seek to provide a theoretically driven empirical approach 
towards better understanding the evolution of the media environment and the place of 
journalism and news diffusion within it through the lens of a reconceptualized, networked 
gatekeeping theory. 
1.3 NETWORKED GATEKEEPING THEORY 
In a widely cited article in 1996, at a time when excessively romantic discussions 
about the democratic promise of the internet abounded, Morris and Ogan (1996) offered 
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the simple but fundamentally sound suggestion that our efforts to understand the shift to-
wards an increasingly internet-mediated communication environment must begin with a 
careful orientation to theory.  In part, they wrote: 
If mass communications researchers continue to largely disregard the 
research potential of the Internet, their theories about communication will 
become less useful. Not only will the discipline be left behind, it will also 
miss an opportunity to explore and rethink answers to some of the central 
questions of mass communications research, questions that go to the heart 
of the model of source-message-receiver with which the field has 
struggled (p. 39) 
Indeed, much of the research about the internet at that time continued to be based upon 
old models and theories for understanding the place of media in society when fundamen-
tally different mass broadcast and print mediums were the norm.  Among their ideas for 
moving forward, Morris and Ogan suggested that the body of literature that has devel-
oped to understand the structure of social networks would be useful for the development 
of new media research.  That is, specifically, they argued that the study of social network 
structure offers a fruitful basis for reorganizing the study of mediated communication to 
account for the development of internet and its associated technologies. 
Still, in order to find the way forward for understanding the place of the internet 
and journalism in the modern media environment, it is important to understand what past 
theorizing about the media model of the 20th century can tell us about the changing media 
environment today.  Towards this end, I discuss in this paper the development of a “net-
worked gatekeeping process” that is based upon the intersection of gatekeeping theory 
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(White, 1950; Shoemaker, 1991; Shoemaker and Vos, 2009) and social network analysis 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Knoke and Yang, 2008).  
Within the 20th century linear media model, David Manning White suggested in 
1950 that mass media organizations and the journalists who worked for them took on the 
role of society’s news “gatekeepers.”  Gatekeeping by mass media organizations within 
that media system involved the total process of observing current events around the 
world, sorting through those events, constructing media messages to report the events that 
were most newsworthy, and disseminating the news about those events to the public.  For 
some, including Jones (2009) and Baker (A New Age for Newspapers, 2009), the collapse 
of the economic model for the newspaper journalism that has come with the development 
of the internet has become a clear crisis for democracy.  This sensibility regarding these 
ongoing changes is also clearly part of the logic that leads a professional, “old school” 
journalist such as Maureen Dowd of the venerable New York Times to dismiss a popular 
internet-based communication platform such as Twitter for the superficial interactions 
that it facilitates.  Such views of the media system see the place of journalism through a 
“social responsibility” model of democracy, or what sociologist Herbert Gans (1998) 
calls a “journalistic theory of democracy.”  Within a journalistic theory of democracy, 
journalists are “ethical gatekeepers” and without journalists “democracy falls apart” 
(Singer, 2008). 
My approach in this dissertation seeks to move past questions of whether or not 
  
                 11 
 
the collapse of newspapers is a problem for democracy.  After all, the reality is that the 
economic collapse of newspapers has become part of the new normal in the media 
landscape and there are no signs of significant recovery back to the 20 or 30 percent 
profit margins that newspapers once enjoyed (Anderson, Bell, and Shirky, 2012).  Still, 
this research shares with media observers like Jones and Baker a fundamental interest and 
belief in the importance of journalism for democracy.  But in what form?  The changing 
role of journalism and the news diffusion process in the modern media system today can 
be understood as the result of a shift in the proverbial center of gravity in the gatekeeping 
process.  This process that once revolved around the news messages and mediums 
constructed by the traditional news organizations who once almost entirely controlled the 
public’s only efficient points of access to daily public affairs news has been transformed 
through the affordances of new communications technologies.  Today, the emerging news 
construction process can now be understood to be revolving around news and information 
itself (Lewis, 2010) and the various internet-based technological platforms that facilitate 
the flow of information.  As a result of this shift, the sole gatekeepers of the past—
professional news organizations—have lost their former control of information, forcing 
them to adapt to a new role within what has become a more shared, networked 
gatekeeping process. 
This dissertation has three general objectives for the study of media, including: (a) 
to reconsider and extend gatekeeping theory in an effort to better account for the way that 
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the internet and its associated technologies have changed the news construction and 
diffusion processes; (b) to offer a basic conceptual justification and methodological 
approach for incorporating social network analysis methods into the toolkit of methods 
that are vital for the study of the networked gatekeeping process in the 21st century; and 
finally, (c) to identify the implications of this reimagined conceptualization of the 
gatekeeping process for journalism and the broader public sphere. 
1.4 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
Towards describing a reconsidered framework for understanding the gatekeeping 
process which can account for the actual shifting role of journalism within the 21st 
century media environment, in Chapter 2 I first describe the evolution of gatekeeping 
theory as it became understood over the second half of the 20th century.  As Pamela 
Shoemaker (1991) and Stephen Reese (see Shoemaker and Reese, 1991) described the 
news construction process in 1991, the gatekeeping process over time became understood 
over several decades of mass communication research as a multivariate process involving 
not only decisions by individual journalism professionals but also various mezzo and 
macro level influences on the production of media content.  Shoemaker noted the 
consequential place of the pioneering social-psychologist Kurt Lewin as foundational 
scholar in the development of our understanding of gatekeeping as a more complex and 
systematic process.  But with the development of a media environment that is 
increasingly based upon new technologies that connect people through the internet, there 
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are new challenges for understanding the gatekeeping process and its implications for 
journalism and news diffusion. 
In Chapter 3 then, I describe the theoretical basis for understanding the ongoing 
changes in the gatekeeping process as these technologies are being used to transform the 
underlying structure of mediated-communication in the modern media environment.   A 
return to the foundational place of Kurt Lewin’s work in the development of both 
gatekeeping theory and social network analysis offers a fruitful starting point for 
recognizing how to conceptualize and operationalize the study of gatekeeping as it 
becomes a networked process.  As van Dijk (2012) notes, it is in part through the 
development of new communication technologies that the social structure of society has 
shifted from a model of “mass society” towards a “network society.”  This shift is 
intricately intertwined with the changing structure and function of media and journalism 
in democracy.  
In Chapter 4, I review some of the essential perspectives and developments in 
previous research that have sought to describe and in some cases normatively prescribe 
the purpose of journalism and news in democracy.   I provide an overview and 
assessment of a body of literature that includes some of the major normative arguments 
and about the role of journalism in democracy, along with various suggestions and 
practical efforts that some scholars and media professionals have pursued in search of a 
media system that can better serve society (Habermas, 1989; Carey, 1995; Rosen, 1999; 
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Glasser, 1999; McChesney, 2004; Baker, 2007).  Ultimately, I problematize the utility of 
these perspectives that have sought to provide a normative basis for the purpose of 
journalism in democracy, especially those that derive from a “social responsibility model 
of journalism.”  Specifically, I suggest that various scholars from sociology, economics, 
political science, and journalism studies research including Lippmann (1922), Downs 
(1957) Dahl (1989), Gans (1998), Schudson (1999), and Bimber (2003) have offered 
better, more pragmatic arguments for understanding the concept of citizenship and the 
purpose of journalism and the media in democracy. 
In Chapter 5 then, I review the literature that has sought to understand the 
changing place of journalism in a media environment that has come to be increasingly 
structured according to the internet and its associated technologies.  The sociology of 
professions literature is helpful for understanding the challenges within the evolving 
media environment that call for the journalism profession to adapt new operational 
practices and norms.  Journalism is necessarily becoming an increasingly participatory 
process in a period of significant transition (Shirky, 2008; Singer, 2008; Lewis, 2012) as 
social network sites like Twitter are becoming what computer scientists have called 
“awareness systems” (Markopoulos, Ruyter, and Mackey, 2009; Hermida, 2010).  Today 
then, a mixture of traditional journalists, non-traditional media workers, other kinds of 
prominent people and groups, and even some citizens are becoming a collective body of 
relatively influential “network gatekeepers” within the modern networked media ecology 
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(Meraz and Papacharissi, 2013) as their place in the structure of social networks drives 
the construction of the media that reaches the public. 
 In the empirical study that I outline in Chapter 6 then, I describe a set of methods 
I have used to more fully address questions about how Twitter as a social network site 
plays a role in the networked gatekeeping process for news that is relevant within a 
geographically fixed local community.  Since Twitter’s introduction in 2006, it has 
become probably the most frequently used online social network by professional 
journalists and news organizations in the US for disseminating their journalistic 
professional work and engaging with the public.  A series of social network analyses of 
Twitter’s role in the media ecology for a large US metropolitan area reveals patterns in 
the ways that online social networks facilitate journalism as a more participatory process.   
As I will show, a variety of established and start-up news organizations, bloggers, and 
other thought leaders have become among a new set of central voices of influence 
alongside traditional media organizations and professional journalists within the 
networked public sphere (Benkler, 2006). 
In Chapter 7, I consider the implications of these findings for media scholarship, 
offering some ideas about how this research can be helpful for understanding the ongoing 
development of journalism within this new media ecology.  And in Chapter 8, I draw 
some conclusions and discuss some of the broader implications of this research. 
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CHAPTER 2. - THE HISTORY OF GATEKEEPING THEORY 
 
“There is nothing so practical as a good theory.” – Kurt Lewin, 1943 
2.1 THE TRANSMISSION MODEL OF COMMUNICATION 
At the end of the 20th century, more than a half-century of research and theory 
since the early development of the journalism and mass communication discipline in the 
1940s had been based primarily around a “transmission” model of media first described 
by Shannon and Weaver (1949) (see Figure 2.1).  Within this dominant model of the pre-  
 
Figure 2.1 - Shannon and Weaver (1949) model of communication 
 
Source: Shannon, C., & Weaver, W (1949) The mathematical theory of communication. Urbana, Univ. of 
Illinois Press. 
 
 
digital media era, publicly mediated communication could be understood as a one-way, 
linear process in which centralized information “transmitters” would determine the media 
messages that could be transmitted through mass media to the passive “receivers”—the 
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audience.  Westley and MacLean (1957) later offered a slightly modified model of com-
munication that provided at least the implicit basis of much of the research of the 20th 
century about the role of mediated communication in society (see Figure 2.2).  This  
 
Figure 2.2 - Westley and MacLean’s (1957) model of communication 
 
Source: Westley, B. H. & McLean, M. S., Jr. (1957). A conceptual model for communications research. 
Journalism Quarterly, 34, 31-38. 
 
model departed from the Shannon and Weaver model slightly in that it acknowledged that 
the public communication process through the mass media included a chain of multiple 
mass media outlets distributing media messages to the public.  Further, this model recog-
nized a basic but limited capacity for the public to give limited feedback to professional 
media outlets through letters to the editor and other such public voice options that were 
curated by traditional media outlets.  Still, the basic linear, mostly one-way and thus non-
interactive mass communication model for understanding media became entrenched and 
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had significant inertia as a central model for the development of journalism and mass 
communication theory.  Among the most well-known theories about the role of mediated 
communication society that developed around this linear model is gatekeeping theory. 
2.2  “GATE KEEPERS” IN THE 20TH CENTURY MEDIA ENVIRONMENT 
 According to the most recent full discussion of gatekeeping theory by Shoemaker 
and Vos (2009), gatekeeping can be understood as “the process of culling and crafting 
countless bits of information into the limited number of messages that reach people every 
day” (p. 1).  Given that gatekeeping is the process of constructing the available media 
messages that make up the daily news, gatekeeping is thusly also “the overall process 
through which the social reality transmitted by the news media is constructed” 
(Shoemaker, Eichholz, Kim, and Wrigley, 2001, p. 233).  But discussions of gatekeeping 
as a process and theory have gone through significant revisions since the first 
gatekeeping study within the mass communication research tradition that appeared in 
1950.   
 In that original study entitled “The Gate Keeper”, David Manning White 
conceived of the function of newswire editors as society’s gate keepers given the central 
roles they played in the selection of the current events information that would appear on 
the day’s newswire as the publically accessible news.  Having been acquainted with the 
pioneering social psychologist Kurt Lewin while White was a student at the University of 
Iowa and Lewin was on the faculty there, White co-opted the gate keeper concept (later 
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becoming the “gatekeeper” concept) from an article Lewin (1947) had written in which 
he described his field theory.   
 With his field theory, Lewin had approached the study of human behavior “as a 
physicist and viewed decisions resulting from the interplay of psychological “forces” that 
could be studied mathematically” (Reese and Ballinger, 2001).  In an example that Lewin 
had used to illustrate field theory, Lewin identified housewives as extremely influential 
gatekeepers within a family when it came to their food consumption decisions and habits.  
White thought that this idea of influential gatekeepers could also be applicable for 
understanding the role that a newswire editor had in determining the news that would 
become accessible to the public each day. 
 In his original empirical study which introduced the gatekeeper concept to mass 
communication research, White had focused his attention on the selection decisions made 
by a single newswire editor who he gave the pseudonym Mr. Gates.  White specifically 
asked Mr. Gates to save a copy of all wires received at his AP office during a one-week 
period during the election season of 1949.  White also requested that Mr. Gates describe 
the decision-making process he used to eliminate certain stories over others that would 
reach the newspaper.   White then compared the news items that were reported about with 
the 90 percent that were not reported on, writing in his findings that Mr. Gates’ editorial 
decisions of the newsworthiness of various pieces of information were “highly 
subjective” (1950, p. 386) and mostly based upon his perception of truthfulness of the 
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content. 
Notably, White’s study was particularly groundbreaking in its day in that it 
represented a departure from the dominant approach in the mass communication research 
discipline at that time in which scholars had primarily attempted to address the effects of 
mass media on the public.  With this original gatekeeping study, David Manning White 
had seen that it was also important to study the processes that affect the creation of media 
messages in the first place, important because the content of the mass media does not 
necessarily—as it had been previously—reflect the totality of actual social reality.  As 
Reese and Ballinger (2001) describe White’s fundamental contribution: 
As we have seen, early U.S. communication research did not treat the 
creation and control of media content as a central issue. The available 
messages were assumed to flow from the environment, keeping the 
community in a relatively harmonious balance.  By identifying 
gatekeepers, White brought into focus the intuitive notion that not all that 
happens in the world gets into the news. Not only that, these gatekeepers 
were thought to choose what got in based on their own subjectivity, adding 
a troubling challenge to the benign view of a well-tuned surveillance-
providing media system. Acknowledging that news is what gatekeepers 
say it is brings the entire role of the news media themselves into question, 
and we can no longer assume that news is an unproblematic reflection of 
societal events, helping maintain the entire system in equilibrium (p. 647). 
But White’s study was only a beginning for gatekeeping research.  Given that this 
original gatekeeping research was focused on a single editor’s subjective decision making 
about the newsworthiness of the current events reports that came across his desk, White 
had ignored the potentially numerous other people and factors beyond these subjective 
decisions that contribute to the selection and creation of media messages by news 
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organizations.  After White’s original gatekeeping study then, several scholars in the 
following decades conducted studies that identified additional micro, mezzo, and macro 
level influences on the construction of media messages that White had not considered 
(see Gieber, 1956, Westley and Maclean, 1957; McNelly, 1959; Bass, 1969; Halloran, 
Elliot, and Murdock, 1970; Donahue, Tichenor, and Olien, 1972; Wackman, Gillmor, 
Gaziano, and Dennis, 1975; Gans, 1979, Bagdikian, 1983; Herman and Chomsky, 1988 
and numerous others). 
Then, in a 1979 article, Richard Brown observed that gatekeeping studies within 
the journalism and mass communication literature until that time had offered “a 
tantalizing approach to publication decision-making but, to date, have produced a rather 
limited return” (p. 595).  Brown suggested that the limitations of gatekeeping research 
began with flaws in the way that White co-opted Kurt Lewin’s original conception of 
gatekeepers for the purposes of studying the social function of mass media while leaving 
behind Lewin’s broader field theory. Brown wrote: 
From the point at which David Manning White transposed Kurt Lewin’s 
gatekeeper concept to communications situations, elements of the original 
concept have been ignored or interpreted in a manner that renders some of 
the findings questionable….  While White’s pioneering study represents a 
brilliant recognition of a new avenue for exploration, his methodological 
departures from Lewin’s concept obscured rather than delineated some 
aspects of the process (p. 595). 
Brown did not fully articulate a theory in that article for understanding the many varied 
types of influence in the gatekeeping process.  But as Shoemaker (1991) would later find, 
Brown’s suggestion was pivotal in recognizing that Lewin’s entire “field theory” would 
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be essential towards the development of a complex and cohesive gatekeeping theory for 
better understanding the multivariate individuals, organizations, and other sociological 
components involved in the process through which media messages get constructed.  To 
understand more precisely how Lewin’s field theory would be useful for understanding 
gatekeeping in the context of studying the mass media, a brief description of Lewin’s 
background and the theory is useful. 
2.3 KURT LEWIN AND HIS FIELD THEORY FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE 
 In the 1940s, Kurt Lewin had lead an empirical research project for the Child 
Welfare Research Station at the University of Iowa to investigate how people might be 
persuaded to adapt healthy food consumption habits (see Lewin, 1943) while trying to 
deal with food shortages during World War II.  This research reflected Lewin’s already 
established but as-yet little developed notion of what would become his field theory.  
Lewin’s field theory articulated and systematized his most basic and important 
suggestion, derived from the principles of gestalt psychology that he had learned at the 
University of Berlin under several pioneering gestalt scholars, that human behavior is 
influenced by a person’s “life space”—factors in his social environment.  Lewin’s 
approach departed from the previously dominant behavioralist approach to psychology in 
that he viewed human behavior “as a physicist and viewed decisions resulting from the 
interplay of psychological ‘forces’ that could be studied mathematically” (Reese and 
Ballinger, 2001).    
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In a 1947 article that Shoemaker and Vos (2009) cite as the clearest explanation of 
Lewin’s field theory, Lewin used his food consumption research as an illustrative basis 
for his description of field theory.  This example provided a salient analogical model for 
describing how a confluence of people and environmental factors that interact with a 
person—that person’s “psychological field”—can be seen as influencing a person’s 
behavioral actions or habits.  In the context of his food consumption study, Lewin 
theorized that there are multiple “channels” through which food must successfully travel 
before reaching people.  Within each of these channels, he said, there are “sections” with 
“gates” that are “governed either by impartial rules or by ‘gate keepers’” (p. 145).  These 
channels and sections and gates were the collection of variables that could be understood 
as preceding the development of habitual dietary choices including things like the way a 
grocery store is laid out, how food gets from its source to the home, where and how food 
is stored, who buys food for a family, whether or not a person has a garden, and who 
tends to that garden, how food is cooked, and how the food is presented on a plate for 
consumption.  The gates in this process, then, are the potentially limitless environmental 
factors or decision points at which “impartial rules or gatekeepers” can influence the final 
outcome of the food consumption process.  The gatekeepers, Lewin said, could be 
individual people or groups that hold influence over the decisions about whether a given 
food item passes through given gates.  And these other “impartial rules” are non-human 
conditions of the environment that influence the process too, such as demands on time or 
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space for procuring and transporting the food.   
 The results of Lewin’s research revealed what was then a groundbreaking finding.  
First, and contrary to what strict behavioral psychologists had previously suggested, our 
efforts to understand how people make decisions and develop habits should not focus 
only on the analysis of their personal cognitive characteristics.  In addition, he found, a 
person’s behaviors and habits could also be understood through their interactions with 
multiple “gatekeepers” and other “impartial rules” within one’s social-psychological field 
which influence the ultimate development of habits and decision-making (Figure 2.3 is 
Lewin’s field theory in a graphical visualization using this food example).  Notably, too, 
Lewin acknowledged that there are more potential channels and sections than just the 
buying and gardening channels and the various sections within these channels, just as 
there are many potential channels, sections, and gates in the news diffusion process). 
Put in a more generalized context for our study of psychological and social 
behavior, Lewin found that our understanding of the habits and behaviors of people must 
involve recognizing the multivariate structural factors within a person’s own social 
environment that influence the ongoing development of their behaviors and habits.  Since 
Lewin’s objective was to understand how strategic intervention could influence peoples’ 
decisions and habits, he noted then that pivotal actors in the social field can have some 
influence even as there are certain unavoidable environmental factors (the impartial 
rules” that also influence the overall process. Lewin’s findings became important as he 
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Figure 2.3 - Lewin’s illustration of field theory applied to food consumption 
 
From: Lewin, K. (1947). Frontiers in Group Dynamics II. Channels of group life; social planning and 
action research. Human relations, 1(2), 143-153. 
 
recognized that strategic efforts to influence peoples’ food consumption decisions should 
be targeted at housewives who were by far the most significant decision makers or “gate 
keepers” in the food consumption behaviors of families all around the country. 
2.4 THE SYNTHESIS AND SYSTEMATIZATION OF GATEKEEPING THEORY 
In 1991, Pamela Shoemaker set out to describe a full gatekeeping theory that 
would provide a way of understanding the construction of media messages as being the 
product of a multivariate set of forces that precede the actual presentation of those 
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messages in mass media outlets.  In doing so, she followed the same logic as Brown in 
his suggestion that Kurt Lewin’s full field theory provided the key framework for 
understanding the complete gatekeeping process.  First, in a book called “Gatekeeping,” 
Shoemaker described media gatekeeping as a process that follows the principles of 
Lewin’s field theory in which a holistic, multivariate set of influences drives the 
construction of media messages that appear in mass media outlets.  That is, Shoemaker 
wrote, the construction of media messages about current events could be understood as 
the product of numerous, simultaneously occurring types of holistic influence from 
numerous micro, mezzo, and macro level “gatekeepers” and “impartial rules.”  As 
Shoemaker noted then, when White had chosen to focus only on the role of editors in the 
gatekeeping process, he had effectively overlooked the multitudes of people and 
structural factors at work in the mass media message construction process.  These 
impartial rules in the context of the news construction process refer to all of the various 
non-human influences on the process that could be understood to exist, including such 
factors as the routine practices developed by professional journalists, space limitations, 
and the publication deadlines that force media workers to make rapid and regular 
decisions about their gathering, writing, editing, and publishing of news.  Beyond this, 
she noted, there are numerous people and groups who can be considered among the 
multiple gatekeepers in the total process. 
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2.4a THE HIERARCHY OF INFLUENCES 
In a separate book also released in 1991, Mediating the Message, Shoemaker was 
joined by Stephen Reese as they synthesized decades of scholarship by researchers who 
had identified various kinds of influence on the construction of media messages that went 
beyond White’s original narrow conception of gatekeeping.  They expanded upon the 
taxonomy of multivariate influences that Shoemaker had already described in her 1991 
book, discussing five different micro, mezzo, and macro level layers of influence that 
could be understood as comprising a “hierarchy of influences” that collectively affect the 
production of the media messages that reach the public. From that original 1991 
formulation of the hierarchy of influences until Shoemaker’s and Vos’s (2009) recent 
book “Gatekeeping Theory,” the hierarchy of influences model went relatively 
unchanged, with tweaks to the names of the levels of analysis and some updating of the 
explanations of each level.  Each of these levels of influence have stood as a category of 
analysis for the type of influence on the gatekeeping process that the researcher must 
consider and may want to observe and analyze as part of understanding the overall 
gatekeeping process.  Figure 2.4 is Shoemaker and Reese’s visual representation of the 
hierarchy of influences model that which was somewhat updated by Shoemaker and Vos 
(2009) while preserving the basic conceptual framework of the model. 
Briefly, the first level, (1) the individual level of analysis, acknowledges that 
individual journalists and editors make some subjective decisions in deciding what’s  
  
                 28 
 
Figure 2.4 - The hierarchy of influences model as it was visualized in 1991 
 
 
From: Shoemaker, P. & Reese, S. (1991). Mediating the message: Theories of influences on mass media 
content. New York: Longman 
 
news.  This was the level of the gatekeeping process that White had identified in his 
original study.  The second level, (2) the media routines level of analysis, recognizes in 
that there are also factors related to the demands of publication deadlines and 
professional writing and editing routines that influence the process that determines what 
is newsworthy. Gieber (1956), had long ago recognized this second level of influence in 
which recognized that news editors are “caught in a strait jacket of mechanical details” 
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(1956, p. 432) in the form of institutional pressures that make the editors’ own personal 
views less significant than they may seem to be on the surface. Shoemaker (1991) later 
offered a more complete description of the psychological factors that influence the 
decisions that media workers make in deciding what’s news, including things like the 
media worker’s values, attitudes, and ethics; the particular type of media work job; how 
the worker is socialized within his or her organizations; plus several other personal 
psychological characteristics. 
The third level, (3) the organizational level of analysis, involves the influences 
that derive from the particular news organization—influences that are unique from one 
organization to another.  Westley and MacLean (1957) and McNelly (1959) had been 
among the first scholars to recognize that the influences on the process of deciding the 
news that would appear in a particular news organization’s access outlet were to some 
extent influenced by the particular conditions within the particular news organization. In 
effect, their findings recognized that the information filtering process happens somewhat 
differently across organizations. 
The fourth level, (4) updated by Shoemaker and Vos (2009) as the social 
institution level of analysis (previously called the extramedia level), recognized that to 
some extent all organizations have some of the same kinds of influence on the 
gatekeeping process.  These constant influences across all news organizations can be seen 
as deriving from profit maximization pressures including demands from advertisers and 
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stockholders as well as pressures from official government sources or interest groups 
about what should or should not be disclosed in news reports.  Shoemaker and Vos (2009) 
cite Ben Bagdikian’s work in which he has tracked the increased concentration of US 
media ownership over the last several decades as representative of this level of analysis. 
The fifth level of analysis, (5) the social system level of analysis (previously the 
ideological level), acknowledges in a broad sense that media is created for a specific 
geographically oriented culture, its ideology, and the social structure of that society.  As 
such, this level of analysis recognizes that there are various pressures of as to what 
information should or should not be reported in mass media outlets that derive from the 
broad public sphere as a whole. These pressures may derive the demands made by 
informal sources for news reports, market pressures, government officials, interest 
groups, other media, and audiences—although Shoemaker acknowledges some debate 
about the extent to which audiences actually could be recognized to influence the process. 
Taken together, the two books by Shoemaker (1991) and Shoemaker and Reese 
(1991) offered the first version of what might be called a unified gatekeeping theory for 
the study of how media messages are constructed.  The theory and the hierarchical model 
of influences on media content set up a framework for scholars to use for the empirical 
study of the gatekeeping process through methods such as surveys and interviews of 
media workers about how they make editing or publication decisions, analysis of 
ownership structures of the media, or various forms of content analysis that assess the 
  
                 31 
 
outcome of media production forces.  As Shoemaker and others have described the 
theory, these and other research methods can be used to study the various factors that 
influence the production of media content, a process in which media content is the 
dependent variable in a multivariate gatekeeping process. 
2.5 ARE THERE “GATEKEEPERS” IN THE 21ST CENTURY MEDIA ENVIRONMENT? 
The technological barriers that once prevented anyone outside of traditional media 
organizations from directly contributing to the gatekeeping process are gone today.  This 
is primarily because the internet and its associated technologies afford anyone with the 
basic tools for having the potential to directly influence the gatekeeping process. This 
shift makes it necessary to consider what these changes mean for the modern study of this 
gatekeeping process that I have described above.  In their most recent full discussion of 
gatekeeping theory, Shoemaker and Vos (2009) note that “some have predicted that the 
idea of gatekeeping is now dead, a concept made moribund by the internet” (p. 130).  In 
one form of this argument, for example, the co-founder of Facebook, Shawn Parker, 
wrote in an online blog referenced by many popular online media outlets that the 
development of the modern media environment has meant “the removal of the media 
‘gatekeepers’,” (Parker, 2013, para. 74).  Similarly, given Kovach’s and Rosenstiel’s 
(2001) definition of journalistic gatekeeping as “deciding what information the public 
should know and what it should not,” they suggest that there are “no longer gatekeepers” 
(p. 95).  And Williams and Carpini (2000) put it as follows: 
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The new media environment, by providing virtually unlimited sources of 
political information (although these sources do not provide anything like 
an unlimited number of perspectives), undermines the idea that there are 
discrete gates through which political information passes: if there are no 
gates, there can be no gatekeepers (p. 6). 
Such conceptions of gatekeeping are limited, however, in that that they emphasize the 
metaphorical meaning behind the idea of media gatekeepers as amounting to total control 
of the public’s access to news and information.  But even in the 20th century media 
model, any given media company did not actually have complete control of determining 
the news that the public could access.  Rather, a major feature of that media model was 
the broad public’s lack of control over the mediated communication that they could 
access.  But as the gatekeeping process was described by the hierarchy of influences 
model, actors from across the entire of the public sphere (1989)—from different media 
workers to private companies to political elites to the public’s general ideology itself in 
that era—have always been understood to have some degree of influence on the 
production content of the mass media. 
In a different but also reductionist conception of the gatekeeping concept, Markos 
Moulitsas Zuniga from The Daily Kos blog has suggested that “now everybody’s a 
gatekeeper” (Tweney, 2007, para. 29).  And even in their exhaustive efforts to describe 
the way the gatekeeping process has changed, Shoemaker and Vos follow in the tendency 
to use the gatekeeper term in a way that arguably reduces its theoretical meaning, 
suggesting that “the internet now allows anyone to become a gatekeeper by passing along 
  
                 33 
 
news items and commenting on them in many web sites, such as Digg.com, Reddit.com, 
YouTube, and Facebook” (p. 124).  Like the assertions that there are no longer 
gatekeepers, statements that everybody is a gatekeeper are problematic because they 
conceive of gatekeepers in atheoretical, one-dimensional terms.  In this latter case, the 
implication is that a gatekeeper is simply everyone who does some degree of filtering and 
passing on of information for others to read. 
Thus, the suggestion that there are no longer gatekeepers in the modern media 
environment represents a flawed focus on the metaphorical notion of gatekeeping—it is a 
simple and salient way of saying that traditional mass media organizations no longer have 
the same level of control that they once had over the processes of gathering, selection, 
crafting, and framing of the news that the public can access.  And the argument that 
“everyone is a gatekeeper” reduces the term to suggest that we are all information 
filterers for the rest of the public.  It is true that everyone has a different role in today’s 
media environment as active audience members who have greater flexibility in selecting 
which specific news sources and stories they want to consume as they scan the daily 
news.  But this does not make them gatekeepers in what was in the past and still is the 
most important theoretical sense of the term—the notion that media gatekeepers are 
central, particularly influential and generally trusted entities within the processes of 
widespread information diffusion about current events and issues. 
In their explanation of how the gatekeeping process had changed with the 
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development of the internet, Shoemaker and Vos recently wrote that new opportunities 
for audience input into the gatekeeping process have disrupted some of the traditional 
underlying assumptions of gatekeeping theory.  In the communication model that like the 
one previously suggested by Westley and MacLean (1957) (see Figure 2.2), Shoemaker 
and Vos (2009) write that audiences only had limited potential for feedback.   Their most 
significant update to the underlying communication model for the gatekeeping process 
today, then, is the suggestion that a direct “audience gatekeeping channel” has been 
added to a gatekeeping process (see Figure 2.5).  That is, they write, through features on 
news websites such as automated ways to share news articles via email, audiences can 
pass along news to other people more efficiently than ever before.  But their discussion of 
the changes in the media environment during the development of the internet and its 
associated technologies is limited in that it stops short of considering changes in the 
overall structure of the gatekeeping process.  That is, they do not consider what it means 
that the gatekeeping process is now happening within a networked public communication 
system.  Ultimately then, Shoemaker and Vos acknowledge that the development of a 
theory and methods for studying gatekeeping process today requires new research: 
The challenge is for scholars to think creatively about applying the theory 
to a changing world and to adapt research methodology that keeps pace.  It 
makes little sense to study a changing media landscape with methods 
developed to study printed newspapers in the pre-computer era.  New 
software is necessary to capture information about ephemeral, always 
changing internet sites, and we also need advances in ways to analyze the 
content (p. 130). 
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Figure 2.5 - Shoemaker’s and Vos’s (2009) depiction of 21st century gatekeeping 
 
From: Shoemaker and Vos (2009). Gatekeeping Theory. New York: Routledge. 
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CHAPTER 3. GATEKEEPING FROM A NETWORK PERSPECTIVE 
3.1 WHAT IS A SOCIAL NETWORK? 
As Knoke and Yang (2008) describe it, “a social network is a structure composed 
of a set of actors, some of whose members are connected by a set of one or more 
relations” (p. 8).  These actors are sometimes also called nodes or entities or vertices and 
they can represent people or organizations.  The relations in a network are also sometimes 
called ties or edges.  Notably, a social network (sometimes also called a social graph, 
especially in reference to visual depictions of networks) can be any system that is made 
up of at least two nodes and technically requires no ties between these nodes.  
Elaborating on the characteristics of a social network, Knoke and Yang write that “the 
network perspective emphasizes structural relations as its key orienting principle” (italics 
in original) (p. 4).   That is, “network analysis explicitly assumes that actors participate in 
social systems connecting them to other actors, whose relations comprise important 
influences on one another’s behaviors” (p. 4).  
 Importantly then, while various kinds of social network sites on the internet have 
developed and proliferated on in recent years and have come to represent popular 
understanding of social networks, it is important to emphasize, first, that our 
understanding of social networks long predates the social network sites on the internet.  
That is that a social network can be any group of entities—people or organizations—
connected by any kinds of “relations” that the researcher might deem worthy of 
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observing and analyzing as the ties in the social network.  These relations may include 
direct communication, either mediated or face-to-face, but they may also involve 
recognized connections between organizations with common properties.  Relations may 
even more simply represent acquaintanceship or familiarity among persons. 
 Moreover, it is especially notable that the use of social network analysis for the 
investigation of meaningful patterns in social relations has a long history dating back to 
the first half of 20th century.  Indeed, scholars began to understand long ago that the total 
number of relations (aka ties or edges) or lack thereof between actors (aka nodes or 
vertices or entities) in a social network and how these relations are distributed can reveal 
important characteristics about the actors in a group and the overall dynamics of a 
group’s structure. As Knoke and Yang explain the methodological utility of social 
network analysis: 
If social network analysis were just a conceptual framework for describing 
how a set of actors is linked together, it would not have excited so much 
interest and effort among social researchers.  But as an integrated set of 
theoretical concepts and analytic methods, social network analysis offers 
more than accurate representations.  It proposes that, because network 
structures affect both the individual and systemic levels of analysis, 
network analysis can explain variation in structural relations and their 
consequences (p. 9). 
According to Knoke and Yang then, the idea of social networks and social 
network analysis were increasingly discussed in both scholarly and popular contexts 
starting especially in the 1970s, with a gradual but exponential increase in its use by 
researchers in the ensuing decades.  There are various reasons why this method has 
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grown in use, but one specific utility of social network analysis has come from scholars 
studying various kinds of internet-mediated communication.  Probably the first use of 
social network analysis for the study of internet-mediated relations was Freeman’s (1984) 
early analysis of relations among a group of scientists in the experimental internet-based 
Electronic Information Exchange Network.  Later examples have included the study of 
social networks based on relations established through e-mail (Haythornwaite, 1996), 
online hyperlinks (Huberman & Adamic, 1998; Kleinberg, 1997), and by social network 
sites (Adamic, Buyukkokten, & Adar, 2003; Kwak, Lee, Park, and Moon, 2010; Ghosh 
and Lerman, 2010; Adamic, Bakshy, Hofman, Mason, & Watts, 2011).  Much of this still 
relatively early online social network analysis scholarship has been conducted by 
computer scientists working outside of the traditional mass communication research 
discipline in which gatekeeping theory for the study of the news media has been 
developed. 
3.2 WHEN GATEKEEPING BECOMES A NETWORKED PROCESS 
More recently, some scholars who have been trained inside of journalism and 
mass communication programs have taken to studying gatekeeping as a function of 
communication via online social network sites, including Meraz and Papacharissi (2013).  
Additionally, Bruns (2012) has moved the study of the role of journalists online from one 
of gatekeeping to “gatewatching.”   Still, these scholars have not delved into the 
fundamental theoretical considerations for conceptualizing the shift from a 20th century 
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mass media dominated gatekeeping theory to a full networked gatekeeping theory.  
Further, the most recent full conceptualization of gatekeeping theory by Shoemaker and 
Vos (2009) does not fully explore gatekeeping as a function of the network structure of 
the internet.  Specifically, extant gatekeeping theory as Shoemaker and Vos describe it 
still mostly retains its basis in a linear transmission model of communication that has 
been fundamentally altered through the advanced development and social construction of 
the internet as a platform for mediated public communication.   
But what does it mean to say that the gatekeeping process has become based on 
the structural relations of a network?  If internet-based communication and information 
exchanges enable a kind of virtual social connectivity that was previously impossible 
such that everyone is now connected to each other in a dense network, why doesn’t this 
mean then—as some media observers have suggested—that today there are no 
gatekeepers (Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2001; Parker, 2013; Williams and Carpini, 2000) or, 
conversely, that everybody is their own gatekeeper (Moulitsas, as cited by Tweney, 2007, 
Shoemaker and Vos, 2009)? And if being a gatekeeper no longer means having control 
over access to information or simply filtering information, then what does it mean in a 
networked media environment?  Shoemaker (1991) found that the key to understanding 
the gatekeeping process lay in the foundational work of the social-psychologist Kurt 
Lewin.  Here then too, a return to Lewin’s work as the theoretical basis of gatekeeping 
theory is again useful towards a new conceptualization and methodological 
  
                 40 
 
considerations for the study of gatekeeping as a networked process.  Indeed, extending 
from Kurt Lewin’s basic approach to social science research, there is a consequential 
intersection between the origins of gatekeeping theory and the origins of social network 
analysis.  This connection provides a salient means of establishing how some of the 
established principles and methods of social network analysis can be used to envision and 
study a new kind of gatekeeping process in which public news messages are created and 
disseminated in new ways today via online social networks. 
3.3 LEWIN’S PLACE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
 Freeman (2004) and Scott (2013) offer mostly parallel renderings of the history of 
social network analysis.  Each writes that the major origins of social network analysis are 
located in several strands of independently developed scholarship from the 1930s and 
40s.  The earliest research that featured all of the fundamental characteristics of modern 
social network analysis was the joint work of Jacob L. Moreno—a psychiatrist who, like 
Kurt Lewin, was connected to the Gestalt psychology movement—and Helen Jennings, a 
psychologist.  In a second strand of research separate from that of Moreno’s and 
Jennings’s work, a group of scholars from the anthropology and business schools at 
Harvard University lead by anthropologist W. Lloyd Warner also conducted research in 
the 1930s using methods that carried some of the basic characteristics of social network 
analysis (as Knoke and Yang, 2008).  But then beyond the importance of the work by 
Moreno and Jennings and by Warner for the formation of the theories and methods used 
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in modern social network analysis, Freeman and Scott also point to Kurt Lewin’s work as 
a third of three significant early and independently developed bodies of research that laid 
the foundation for the development of social network analysis.  
Understanding Lewin’s place in the development of theoretical concepts and 
methods for social network analysis starts with considering his early exposure to the 
work of several prominent pioneers in the Gestalt psychology movement during his 
doctoral studies at the University of Berlin.  Among the architects of Gestalt psychology 
were Lewin’s doctoral advisor Carl Stumpf, along with other famed psychologists Lewin 
learned from at Berlin including Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, Wolfgang Kohler and 
Ernst Cassirer (Gold and Lewin, 1999).  Wertheimer (1938) explained the logic behind 
Gestalt psychology as follows: 
There are wholes, the behaviour of which is not determined by that of their 
individual elements, but where the part-processes are themselves 
determined by the intrinsic nature of the whole.  It is the hope of Gestalt 
theory to determine the nature of such wholes (p. 2). 
Or, as Lewin (1936) himself explained the gestalt approach, it is based on the idea that 
“the whole is different than the sum of its parts” (p. 885) 
 Towards a clear understanding of the particular importance of Gestalt psychology 
in its time for the development of a better understanding of human behavior, it is helpful 
to draw a distinction between the behavioral psychologists whose perspective had been 
dominant for most of the first half of the 20th century and the Gestaltists who sought to 
challenge that dominant perspective.  Bavelas (1948) explained this difference as follows: 
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One group followed the path of breaking down the person and the 
situation into elements and attempting to explain behavior in terms of 
simple causal relationships.  The other group attempted to explain 
behavior as a function of groups of factors constituting a dynamic 
whole—the psychological field (p. 16). 
 Over time, as it became necessary to build theory and methods to test the 
assumptions behind the gestalt approach, Lewin and his colleagues from the gestalt 
tradition eventually saw the limits of its basic principle of holism for the approach to 
understanding human behavior.  As Gold (see Gold and Lewin, 1999) puts it, Lewin and 
other proponents of gestaltism grew to become dissatisfied with this generalized 
approach to theory which “often seemed to consist of only waving one’s arm broadly in 
explanation of a puzzling phenomenon” (p. 9). As Gold (1999), as well as Reese and 
Ballinger (2001) each explain then, Lewin’s primary research project was grounded in his 
desire to adopt some of the mathematical principles of physics towards understanding 
psychological processes in holistic terms.  Indeed, as Shoemaker and Vos (2009) note, 
Lewin himself suggested a desire to apply some of the principles from Einstein’s field 
theory for physics to the study of how human behavior is influenced by interactions in the 
social environment. 
3.3a LEWIN’S RESEARCH PROGRAM 
 Lewin began to make his mark on social science research in the United States 
after emigrating from his native Germany to escape persecution as a Jewish person as the 
Nazis rose to power.  For much of the 1930s and early 1940s at the University of Iowa, he 
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built a reputation as a popular teacher and proficient researcher, attracting many students 
to his ideas for studying psychology with his unique gestalt-based approach (see Lewin 
and Gold, 1999).  Gradually, his work gained significant attention around the country, 
eventually gaining the notice of administrators at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology who recruited him there to start his own research laboratory.  Lewin started 
the Research Center for Group Dynamics (RCGD) at MIT in 1945, beginning a 
productive period of research there with an impressive group of researchers around him.  
But after only a short time at MIT, Lewin died suddenly of a heart attack in 1947 at just 
56 years old. Upon his death, administrators at MIT decided that Lewin’s loss as the 
driving force behind the research group meant that they could no longer support the 
RCGD (Freeman, 2004).   
 As Freeman (2004) notes, among the former students or colleagues of Lewin’s 
who had followed him from Iowa to MIT were Dorwin Cartwright, Leon Festinger, and 
Alex Bavelas, all scholars primarily in social psychology who would eventually go on to 
make contributions to the development of social network analysis.  After Lewin’s death, 
some of Lewin’s former students and colleagues, including Alex Bavelas, remained at 
MIT.  Others, including Cartwright and Festinger, found a new home for the RCGD at the 
University of Michigan. 
3.3b LEWIN’S SCHOLARLY DESCENDANTS 
 In a series of articles that appeared in the years after Lewin’s death, we can begin 
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to see that his former students and other colleagues at MIT had started to seek the 
assistance of scholars with mathematics backgrounds for the study of social relations.  
For one, as Freeman (2004) notes, Bavelas found two students—R. Duncan Luce and 
Albert Perry—a mathematician and a mechanical engineer, respectively, to work with 
him at MIT.  In 1949 they wrote the paper, A Method of Matrix Analysis of Group 
Structure, that Freeman (2004) calls “one of the most important in social network 
analysis.”  In this paper they identified the concept of “cliques” in social groups and in 
doing so, they recognized the general importance of small, highly cohesive clusters in the 
analysis of social networks.  Further, Bavelas, along with some of his students including 
Harold Leavitt (1951), wrote several articles developing Lewin’s ideas, including a 1950 
piece in which Bavelas formally introduced the concept of network centrality and a later 
piece in which Leavitt (1951) conducted experiments to demonstrate the importance of 
the centrality concept for understanding group dynamics. 
  Other students of Lewin, including Cartwright and Festinger who landed at the 
University of Michigan, also sought out assistance from mathematical collaborators to 
further develop a mathematical model for the study of human behavior based on the basic 
field theory approach they had learned from Lewin.  Two mathematicians that they 
recruited, Frank Harary and Robert Z. Norman, helped them to identify that the work of 
Lewin and Bavelas contained the basic elements of graph theory, then a relatively young 
area of mathematics that had been unfamiliar to Lewin and Bavelas (Freeman, 2004).  
  
                 45 
 
With Cartwright’s encouragement to explain how graph theory could be used for social 
science research, Harary and Norman (1953) wrote a pioneering work in the development 
of social network analysis, Graph Theory as a Mathematical Model in Social Science.  
Some years later Harary, Norman, and Cartwright (1965) went on to write what Freeman 
calls one of the most important books for the development of social network analysis, 
Structural Models: An Introduction to the Theory of Directed Graphs. 
 That the lineage of social network analysis is traceable directly through Lewin 
and several of his scholarly descendants helps to reveal that what Lewin was talking 
about when he discussed concepts like the psychological field and gatekeepers were 
concepts of group structure that envision social life as a network.  As Freeman (2004) 
writes, the scholarship starting with Lewin’s development of field theory and his 
gatekeeper concept and down through his students and their students ultimately lead to 
the development of several important ideas that became critical for modern social 
network analysis.  Of particular significance were their concepts of relative network 
centrality and network cliques.  Through this lineage then, it becomes clear that graph 
theory and social network analysis provide the conceptual and methodological 
frameworks which explain what Lewin was attempting to develop in his effort to create a 
field theory for understanding human behavior.  Below, a brief description of Bavelas’s 
work in his development of the idea of network centrality is useful both for clearly 
describing the connection that Lewin’s work has to social network analysis and for 
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illustrating some of the fundamental principles that are useful for reaching an 
understanding of the principle of network centrality at its most basic level. 
3.4 CONNECTING LEWIN TO MODERN SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
 Throughout his research, Lewin sought to apply concepts from mathematics and 
the physical sciences to better understand the holistic aspects of human psychology, an 
approach that became the basis for his field theory (Harary and Norman, 1953).  He 
developed several different concepts and frameworks for understanding psychology 
holistically, including the idea of a “topological psychology” which he derived from the 
non-traditional, non-Euclidian geometric principles of topology—a branch of math that 
he suggested could be useful for understanding psychology in terms of the dynamics of 
social relations.   This non-Euclidian geometric approach was useful because it employed 
the notion that there are differential forces of influence within the psychological life 
space—vectors—that can be understood to have unique direction and magnitude 
(Bavelas, 1948).  To explain it another way, whereas Euclidean geometry is the standard 
geometry which deals in symmetric shapes such as squares and circles, non-Euclidean 
geometric spaces are asymmetrical and recognize changes over time.  Hypothetically 
then, a Euclidean view of a person’s social environment implicitly assumed that everyone 
has the same life space and that therefore, such a model implicitly held that the social 
world would have no measurable impact on a person’s behavior.  This was the implicit 
assumption of behavioral psychologists about the social environment.  Given that 
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Lewin’s vision of the life space was one in which different forces in the field had 
different influence on a person’s behavior and that the make-up of the life space was 
dynamic, a non-Euclidean branch of geometry was appropriate for conceptualizing 
Lewin’s topological psychology. 
 Cartwright (see preface to Harary and Norman, 1953) noted that Lewin was 
among the earliest group of social scientists who had sought to use highly specialized 
branches of mathematics to develop social science theory.  According to Harary and 
Norman, however, topology was not the ideal branch of mathematics for Lewin’s ideas.  
Indeed, his topological psychology—which he called “hodology”—did not last as a 
significant framework within the field of psychology and many of his ideas were left 
incomplete.  Indeed, Harary and Norman suggested, Lewin’s mathematical conception 
for his “life space” was better realized through the basic principles of graph theory 
applied to social science.  Barnes (1969) later similarly echoed Bavelas and Harary and 
Norman in suggesting that Lewin’s notion of psychology based on topology was on the 
right track but ultimately “inadequate for the representation of social configurations” (p. 
220).  Barnes agreed then that graph theory offered a better set of mathematical principles 
for representing Lewin’s idea of a life space and field theory. 
3.4a NETWORK CENTRALITY 
 Bavelas’s work—along with some of his students including most notably Harold 
Leavitt—seems to offer the most direct representation of the direction Lewin was moving 
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with his field theory and his particular gatekeeping concept before his death.  In a 1950 
theoretical article, Communication Patterns in Task-Oriented Groups, Bavelas introduced 
the concept of network centrality.  With this article, Bavelas’s objective was to 
understand how the working relationships within a group structure could be said to affect 
the group’s overall performance.  Noting that communication is essential to group work, 
Bavelas wrote in particular that “quite aside from a consideration of the effects of 
communication on what is generally called ‘morale,’ it may be easily demonstrated that 
for entire classes of tasks any hope of success depends upon an effective flow of 
information” (p. 725).  Bavelas suggested that there may be certain patterns of 
communication that will optimize group performance (note that while there was no 
widely used nomenclature for social network analysis at the time of Bavelas’s study, I 
will discuss Bavelas’s research using common modern social network analysis terms). 
 To illustrate his example of possible group structures (in today’s terms, the term 
“graph” is used for these visualization), Bavelas proposed four distinct hypothetical 
group configurations that imagined different possible structures for interaction among the 
members of small groups.  He suggested that ultimately, certain group configurations 
could be better than others for facilitating the efficient flow of information (see Figure 
3.1 for Bavelas’s four examples of patterns of possible group communication 
configurations among a group of five people).   
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Figure 3.1 - Bavelas’s four example patterns of group communication structures 
 
From Bavelas, A. (1950) Communication patterns in task-oriented groups. The Journal of the Acoustical 
Society of America. 22(6). 725-730. 
 
 Over time, social network analysts have identified several concepts beyond the 
basic elements of nodes and ties that are helpful to define when discussing a social 
network.  First, according to Knoke and Yang, a walk is “an alternating sequence of 
incident nodes and lines, in which each node is incident with its preceding following 
lines.”  They add that “a walk length is the number of lines it contains” (p. 47).  Next, 
they define a path as “a walk with entirely distinct nodes and lines (no node or line can be 
included more than once)” (p. 48).  Also of relevance here then is the concept of path 
distance, which Knoke and Yang define as “the length of a path (the number of lines in its 
walk)” (p. 48.  Finally then, they define the concept of geodesic distance as “the length of 
the shortest path between two actors” (p. 60). 
 In his research, Bavelas suggested several important ideas about network structure 
from his hypothetical examples of group interactivity configurations.  For one, he noted 
that within each graph there are quantifiable “distances” between each pair of nodes 
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based on the number of ties between each node.   This concept of distance remains 
important in social network analysis today. If two nodes have a communication tie 
between one another, such as with node C and node A in Graph D in Figure 3.1 (above), 
they can be said to have a distance of 1 from each other.  The distance between any other 
two nodes in Graph D such as A and B is no greater than 2 communication ties.  Table 
3.2 shows Bavelas’s calculations of the geodesic distance between each of the five group 
members in Graph D. 
Figure 3.2 - Distance between each of the group members in example D, Figure 2.6 
 
From Bavelas, A. (1950) Communication patterns in task-oriented groups. The Journal of the Acoustical 
Society of America. 22(6). 725-730. 
  
 As Bavelas notes, while the total of all distances between the pairs of nodes in 
graph D is 32, the total distances between all pairs of nodes in these graphs of five nodes 
are different: the total sum of the distances between all pairs of nodes for graph A is 30, 
for graph B the total is 40, and for graph C the total is 32.  As Bavelas suggests, many 
people intuitively see graph D as an autocratic group structure, with only one node 
connected directly to all other nodes and no other nodes directly connected to one 
another.  At the same time, Bavelas writes, people will then tend to see graph C as a 
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common structure for a business, with a business owner on the top and a manager in 
between the owner and the workers beneath the manager.  But Bavelas notes that while 
the nodes and ties in graphs D and C are arranged differently to appear as either an 
autocratic structure or as a typical business is structure, the structure of graphs C and D is 
actually the same.  That is, in each graph only one node is connected directly by one 
communication tie everyone else and a geodesic distance of 2 between each of the other 
nodes in the group.  As we will see below then, this example illustrates that regardless of 
how some organization might be hierarchically structured, , the most influential and 
important node is not necessarily at the top of a hierarchy but rather, at the center of some 
set of nodes. 
Bavelas went on to suggest then that within each of these group structures, each 
of the nodes can be calculated to have a measure of what he called relative centrality.  He 
proposed a calculation for relative centrality as the ratio of the total geodesic distance of a 
graph divided by the given node’s total distance from all other points in the graph.1  So 
for instance, because the geodesic distance of graph A is 6 and the total geodesic distance 
for the five nodes is 30, the centrality of each node in graph A is 5.  The same calculation 
can be used to calculate the relative centrality of each node in each of the example 
                                                 
 
1 Later, relative centrality would also become known as Bavelas-Leavitt centrality. 
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graphs. Figure 3.3 again shows each of Bavelas’s hypothetical graphs that also appeared 
in Figure 3.1, here with the centrality measures provided for each of the nodes).  
 
Figure 3.3 - Bavelas’s example graphs with relative centrality metrics for each node 
 
From Bavelas, A. (1950) Communication patterns in task-oriented groups. The Journal of the Acoustical 
Society of America. 22(6). 725-730. 
 
 Bavelas, along with some of his students—particularly Harold Leavitt (1951)— 
conducted experiments to test how studying group structure and specifically the centrality 
metric might be useful as analytical tools for understanding the performance of groups.  
Among these experiments were situations in which the researchers assigned several 
groups the same set of specific group problems with the condition that groups could only 
pass notes to each other.  Through their organically developed communication patterns 
with one another, the structure of the groups that emerged within these groups are 
visualized in the graph in Figure 3.4 (here, the centrality metrics marked for each node 
represent the frequency with which a given person represented by a given node was 
identified as a leader in solving the particular problem). 
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Figure 3.4 - Link structure of four groups in experiment described by Leavitt (1951) 
A   B   C    D  
From Bavelas, A. (1950) Communication patterns in task-oriented groups. The Journal of the Acoustical 
Society of America. 22(6). 725-730. 
 
 The main findings of these experiments were that group performance was clearly 
affected by specific characteristics of the groups’ structures.  The group that became 
structured in the way that graph A depicts, with no central leader emerging, had the worst 
error rate and lowest overall morale of all groups.  Generally, too, this experiment and 
others like it revealed that having clearer identified leadership in a group was correlated to 
a lower error rate in the completion of the assigned problem.   
 Social network analysis expert Linton Freeman (1980) points to Bavelas’s study 
described here, along with the follow-up experiments by Leavitt, as the work that formally 
introduced the centrality concept and identified its importance for understanding social 
structure.  Further, Freeman writes that Bavelas’s analysis of structural group relations and 
the emphasis on centrality as important concept was essentially an extension of and 
improvement upon Lewin’s more limited conceptual notion of field theory and 
gatekeepers within small group communication networks.  While Bavelas did not 
articulate a direct connection between his concept of centrality and Lewin’s gatekeeper 
concept in this study, Freeman writes that Lewin’s notion of a gatekeeper as he described 
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it, “sounds very much like the idea introduced by Bavelas.  If not identical, these are at 
least very similar ideas.  One might suspect that Bavelas was simply repeating his 
teacher’s insight and calling it centrality instead of gatekeeping” (p. 586).  Similarly, 
Harary and Norman (1953) wrote that Bavelas’s (1950) effort here “condensed much of 
Lewin’s work, though essentially preserving Lewin’s terminology” (p. 3)  having for the 
first time represented Lewin’s ideas in the basic context of graph theory.  Notably, 
Freeman (1980) adds this about the gatekeeper concept: 
While Lewin and subsequent users of the gatekeeper concept stress the idea 
of control of certain channels of communication, Bavelas, and others who 
refer to centrality, emphasize the potential of points for control of 
communication over the total network (p. 586) 
Given that the principal concept in graph theory and social network analysis that 
corresponds to the gatekeeper concept is that of centrality, network centrality seems to 
have direct relevance for our interest in understanding how the gatekeeping process is 
changing in the 21st century networked media environment.  The Bavelas-Leavitt measure 
of centrality is one among many algorithms that have been developed in the years since 
those original studies to identify different types of network centrality for the nodes in a 
graph.  Scholars such as Freeman (1980) and Borgatti (see White and Borgatti, 1994; 
Borgatti and Everett, 2006) are among the most prominent researchers who have worked 
over the past several decades to develop new algorithms for calculating different types of 
centrality in the context of social networks.   
 The most basic form of centrality is degree centrality, which is simply the number 
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of total ties that are connected to a particular node.  For a directed graph such as the 
communication networks that develop on social network sites like Twitter in which there 
may be non-reciprocal ties that are incoming or outgoing, the most basic centrality metrics 
are indegree and outdegree centrality.   Other commonly used centrality metrics, each with 
a particular conceptual rationale, include betweenness, closeness, eigenvector, and 
PageRank centrality, among many others.  The particular centrality metrics that may be 
pertinent for a particular study may vary and there may be a justification for discussing 
multiple forms of centrality in the context of a given study of the networked gatekeeping 
process.   
While Freeman’s (1980) betweenness centrality concept was developed with the 
idea that it is analogous to Lewin’s gatekeeper concept, there are problems with 
calculating and interpreting betweenness centrality for the kind of directed communication 
networks that naturally exist within internet-mediated social network sites.  The 
explanation and rationale for the specific centrality metric used for the social network 
analyses conducted for empirical study in this paper will be discussed later in the methods 
section of this paper in Chapter 7, section 7.2. 
3.4b CLIQUES AND CLUSTERING 
Like Bavelas’s identification of the importance of centrality within networks, the 
identification of the phenomenon of “cliques” within small groups by Luce and Perry 
(1949) was also a byproduct of a collaboration spearheaded by Bavelas to recruit a group 
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of mathematicians to bring their extensive knowledge of graph theory to assist in 
advancing the development of Lewin’s field theory.  The concept of cliques, then, and the 
related concept of network clusters, also became important concepts for the development 
of social network analysis and our understanding of the structure of social networks.  As 
Luce and Perry explained the concept back then,  
A subset of a group forms a clique provided that it consists of three or more 
members each in the symmetric relation to each other member of the 
subset, and provided further that there can be found no element outside the 
subset that is in the symmetric relation to each of the elements of the 
subset” (p. 110).  
Thus, with the complete undirected ties among all members of a group that are the 
requisite properties of a clique, cliques can be said to have a maximum level of density or 
cohesiveness for a small social network. 
As Knoke and Yang (2008) note, while cliques continue to have importance in the 
context of social networks, the concept of cliques is “stingy” in the sense that the strict 
requirements of a clique are that they be a completely connected network.  Indeed, Knoke 
and Yang note that cliques in the analysis of real social networks are relatively rare given 
that just a single missing tie breaks up what would be a clique among an otherwise fully 
connected set of nodes.  Over time then, social network analysts have noted the more 
common pattern in social networks that is closely related to cliques in which there tend to 
be many relatively small, highly connected small subgraphs of network actors that may 
not have perfect connectedness that is required by the clique definition.  The concept of 
high cohesiveness or “clusters” in subgraphs, especially subgraphs of nodes with low 
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centrality, has thusly become important for studying and understanding the structure of 
social networks. 
3.5 VISUALIZING GATEKEEPING WITHIN A NETWORK STRUCTURE 
 In a recent study which sought to understand the nature of structural change in the 
shift to an internet-mediated public communication system, sociologist Duncan Watts and 
mathematician Peter Dodds (Watts & Dodds, 2007) provided their own visualization of 
the way that information flow was understood within a 20th century media model.  
Specifically, their visualization of this arrangement is based upon the model suggested in 
1955 by Katz and Lazarsfeld of a two-step flow of information influence.  In an earlier 
study that provided the basis for the two-step flow hypothesis, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and 
Gaudet (1940) had explained the two-step flow process as one in which “ideas, often, 
seem to flow from radio and print to opinion leaders and from them to the less active 
sections of the population” (p. 32, italics in original).  Figure 3.5 is the visualization 
suggested by Watts and Dodds for understanding the two-step flow of communication in 
the 20th century media environment. 
 Although we don’t usually think of the 20th century’s industrial-control model of 
communication as a networked communication model, this model suggested by Watts and 
Dodds essentially uses the basic structure of networks—nodes and ties—to conceptualize 
and visualize the 20th century media environment.  Here, the image of the television in the 
center of the graph represents the structural position of the mass media within the 20th  
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Figure 3.5 - Watts’s and Dodds’s (2007) Visualization of Two-step Flow of Influence 
 
Watts, D. J., & Dodds, P. S. (2007). Influentials, networks, and public opinion formation. Journal of con-
sumer research, 34(4), 441-458. 
 
century media model in which mass media organizations had only outgoing ties to 
audiences with opinion leaders as one-way receivers.  Then, the ties between opinion 
leaders and the rest of the public are also unidirectional, asymmetric ties.  The result is a 
highly hierarchical network in which the mass media organizations in the center have very 
high network prestige, which is to say that mass media platforms within that media system 
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were highly central in this network but not at all engaged as receivers of incoming 
communication from the rest of the public sphere. 
 Conversely, in a 21st century model for understanding the modern gatekeeping 
process, instead of mediated public communication going almost entirely in a one way 
direction from mass media organizations to audiences, mediated public communication is 
now multi-directional among a network of entities.  But what does this mean?  As Singer 
(2010) notes, popular understanding about the changes in the media system brought about 
by the development of internet-centric communication technologies have often seemed to 
start and end with a basic understanding of the internet as a converged and interactive 
multimedia space.  Further, Singer suggests that many journalists have been very slow to 
recognize the most significant change in this shift: that their work is now operating as part 
of a networked process.  Indeed, misunderstanding of what this means has long abounded. 
 One popular argument about the internet suggested especially during the early 
years of internet research by some media observers such as Rheingold (1996) and Barlow 
(1996) was the idea that the internet can make the public sphere more egalitarian and thus, 
more democratic.  An analogous argument during the development of the internet has been 
the basic suggestion that either nobody is a gatekeeper or everybody is a gatekeeper.  Once 
again, such arguments are also based upon a simple understanding of network structure 
that sees networks as essentially flat, absent of hierarchical structure.  This view seems to 
be based upon an overly simplistic notion of new media which sees that because of the 
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internet, “everybody is connected.”   That is, according to this view, the basic 
technological connectedness of all computers via the internet means that everyone is on 
equal footing in the networked public communication model. 
 In hindsight, it seems that this notion which envisions the internet as an equalizer 
of influence amounts to a conception of the internet as a social network that—in graph 
theory parlance—approaches what would be considered a “completely connected 
network.”  According to Monge, Heiss, and Margolin (2008), in a completely connected 
network there are links between all of the pairs of the network’s nodes. Thus, a completely 
connected network is a symmetrically structured network in which all of the nodes are 
connected to one another (see Figure 3.6 for an illustration of a completely connected 
network.  In this example, for the purposes of having a clear visualization this network 
contains just 12 total nodes). 
 The basic infrastructure of the internet is such that, on the most fundamental 
technological level, it is indeed technically a completely connected network in which 
every computer user with an internet-capable computer is digitally connected to one 
another.  As such, via the opportunity that the internet affords for communication across 
time and space, it is true that everyone who can access a computer device with an internet 
connection technically has the opportunity to engage with every other computer user 
connected to the internet.  But this vision of such a network that approaches some ideal of 
a perfect symmetry in the qualitative and quantitative strength of all of the ties between all 
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of the nodes is only a hypothetical social network structure, not anything like the structure  
Figure 3.6 - Illustration of a completely connected network 
 
of the actual internet-mediated communication network.  At its core, the notion of a 
completely connected network of internet-mediated communication is flawed because it 
conceives of connectedness only in technological terms, not in terms of the actual patterns 
of networked information and communication flow.  After all, even before the internet was 
created, everyone with a mailing address also technically had one kind of tie connecting 
them together.  But just as that kind of connectedness did provide a completely 
symmetrical social structure, neither does the internet provide any such notion of an 
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equalized social structure. 
 Similar to this idea in which the internet is conceived of as approaching a 
completely connected network is the paradigm proposed by Erdös and Rényi (1959) for 
the study of networks.  Their hypothesis was that graph structure is inherently random.  As 
Fortunado (2010) explains, the idea that Erdös and Rényi proposed was that within 
network structures, “the probability of having an edge between a pair of vertices is equal 
for all possible pairs” (p. 76).  In such a network, no one entity is more likely than others 
to have greater network centrality or cohesiveness with others.  The network structure of a 
random graph would also, thusly, have a high level of homogeneity.  Like the completely 
connected network then, envisioning network structures as random graphs posits that 
network structures effectively equalize group structure.  But as Barabási and Albert (1999) 
first suggested and subsequent scholars have affirmed, the use of advanced computerized 
data analysis for the study of various kinds of biological and social networks over time has 
helped us to recognize that network structures are not random at all.  Rather, there are 
relatively consistent patterns that we can rely on observing within most any network, even 
within the seeming disorderliness of human social networks.  To begin to unpack these 
patterns and to understand how concepts such as centrality and cliques and density and 
cohesiveness fit into our overall picture of this network structure, it is helpful to start to 
consider these ideas in the context of the popularly understood notion of “six degrees of 
separation.”   
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3.6 “SIX DEGREES OF SEPARATION” 
 A salient means of beginning to understand the idea that society and thusly the 
structure of public communication is organized as a social network structure comes from 
the concept of “six degrees of separation.”  Generally, this is the idea that the “distance” 
between any two people in the world according to our interpersonal relations is 
surprisingly small.  That is, we as a society are not as separated as our relatively small 
social circles may make it seem.  Rather, according to this idea as it was originally 
suggested, there may be just six degrees (aka a geodesic distance of six) or less between 
any two people in the world.  The playwright John Guare was the first to use this 
particular term in his popular play Six Degrees of Separation.  But the idea that our 
communication technologies play a role in facilitating this structure was discussed as long 
ago as 1929 in an article called Chain-Links by the Hungarian writer Frigyes Karinthy.  
Karinthy (1929) suggested that Earth had shrunk over time “due to the quickening pulse of 
both physical and verbal communication” such that “anyone on Earth, at my or anyone's 
will, can now learn in just a few minutes what I think or do, and what I want or what I 
would like to do” (p. 1).  Karinthy wrote of a friend’s suggestion for an experiment that 
could demonstrate that “the population of the Earth is closer together now than they have 
ever been before” (p. 2).  He explained: 
We should select any person from the 1.5 billion inhabitants of the Earth - 
anyone, anywhere at all. He bet us that, using no more than five 
individuals, one of whom is a personal acquaintance, he could contact the 
selected individual using nothing except the network of personal 
acquaintances. For example, ‘Look, you know Mr. X.Y., please ask him to 
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contact his friend Mr. Q.Z., whom he knows, and so forth’ (p.2). 
 The various scholars who contributed to the development of social network 
analysis implicitly recognized the idea that there might be six (or some relatively small 
number) of degrees of separation between any two randomly selected people according to 
their network ties.  But Stanley Milgram (1967) is credited for conducting the first study 
which observed “empirically-created chains between persons chosen at a random from a 
major national population” (p. 67).  Testing what he called the “small-world problem,” 
Milgram conducted a study in which he sought to find out—given several randomly 
selected individuals from two Midwestern US cities—how many acquaintance links 
separated these individuals from two people living in New England.   
 Specifically, Milgram asked the two samples of people from two different 
Midwestern United States cities, respectively, to try to reach two different randomly 
selected people from Massachusetts.  He provided the starting persons in the Midwest the 
name, mailing addresses, and some basic (unspecified) information about each target 
person in Massachusetts and instructed the starting persons to send the contact information 
of the target person to some person who they thought would most likely know the target 
person.  The rules stated that an acquaintance had to be known by their first name and 
communication between two acquaintances was only allowed to move in one direction.  
Through a series of experiments between several sets of people, Milgram found that on 
average, there were five hops between each of the randomly selected individuals.  
Notably, Milgram’s conclusions did ignore questions and implications concerning the fact 
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that there were many broken and incomplete chains among the participants in his study 
such that contact was never completed. 
 Just as in the study by Bavelas that I discussed above, Milgram found that within 
different groups or networks of people, there are differences in the number of “hops” (or 
total path distance) that separate any two individuals.  Indeed, Milgram observed one case 
in his experiment in which two pairs of randomly selected individuals were separated by 
just 2 degrees of separation while in another case there were 12 degrees which separated 
the two people.  By identifying these different “shortest paths” between any two randomly 
selected people in the US, Milgram had observed differential geodesic distances between 
two nodes within in a very large social graph among the US populace. 
 Interestingly, when Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) wrote Personal Influence, they 
used some of the language and concepts of sociometry to discuss their idea of primary 
groups, opinion leaders, and interpersonal influence.  As I wrote earlier, sociometry—the 
method and term created by social network analysis pioneer Jacob Moreno—was the term 
that was commonly used at that time for what is now social network analysis.  Katz and 
Lazarsfeld recognized that the nature of sociometric structure given the notion of opinion 
leaders and primary groups was such that understanding these social structures was key to 
understanding information flow.  But as Scott (2002) writes, the study of social networks 
“was abandoned for a time because the technology necessary for its pursuit was lacking” 
(218).  Thus, it appears that Katz and Lazarsfeld recognized the potential importance of 
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social network analysis for the study of how media messages are created, distributed, and 
influence people.  However, the limitations of communication technology within a pre-
internet media system would have meant that the only sufficiently dense social networks 
of communication in that era were based upon face-to-face interactions.  Thus, it would 
not have made much sense to study mass communication in that era through social 
network analysis concepts and methods. 
 A conception of the internet as an equalizer of communication and information 
access ultimately fails in that it conceives of the ties in the internet connected network 
strictly as technological linkages between computers.  The reality is that the private and 
public communication environment that has developed on top of the technological 
infrastructure of the internet is neither a completely connected, symmetric network nor a 
random network made up of a homogenous population.  Rather, when the ties in the 
internet-mediated public communication network are empirically observed as actual 
communication, we can see that the basic patterns and topological structure of 
communication within the overall network of internet-based public communication is 
highly asymmetric.  That is, the strength of ties and the nature of communication is such 
that there is significant variation across the population in the number of incoming and 
outgoing connections to others.  Or to put it another way, some actors in this actual 
internet-mediated public communication network are much more closely connected to 
others.  Although he did not know it at the time, Milgram’s small world experiment had 
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found evidence of this asymmetric network structure for society when he studied the 
connectedness of randomly selected people from around the United States in the 1960s.  
The internet then, it seems, effectively creates the technology to facilitate the organic 
development of an asymmetric public communication network without geographic 
boundaries.  Beyond facilitating these connections, the internet also incidentally makes 
these interactions more readily observable than ever before for scientific research. 
3.7 FROM MASS SOCIETY TO NETWORKED SOCIETY  
 Van Dijk (2012) has suggested that the dominant relational structure of society 
over the last several years has shifted from a “mass society” to a “network society” model. 
In explaining this shift, van Dijk first describes the basic distinction between mass society 
and network society, first by providing the following basic definition of mass society: 
A modern type of society with an infrastructure of groups, organizations 
and communities (called ‘masses’) that shape its prime mode of 
organization at every level (individual, group/organizational and societal).  
The basic units of this formation are all kinds of relatively large 
collectivities (masses) organizing individuals (p. 24). 
He goes on to note several characteristics of mass society, including that the relational 
structure of mass society can be understood as homogenous, highly dense, high in 
centralization (very few central nodes), that face-to-face communication was the dominant 
form of interpersonal communication, and that broadcast media were the dominant form 
of media.  Furthermore, he says, in mass society there were very few available outlets for 
publically mediated communication.  Finally, he notes that a mass society is structured 
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hierarchically—that is to say that there are relatively discrete levels of power in a mass 
society and that the higher levels generally control the lower ones.  
 Conversely, van Dijk writes that in a network society, group collectivities are 
increasingly fragmenting as social structures are becoming more individualized and 
society is becoming more heterogeneous.  While local communities remain important, 
people are also increasingly becoming part of larger, more diffuse types of networks as 
well—partly through the affordances of new communications technologies.  Further, while 
face-to-face communication till occurs, communication in a network society is 
increasingly mediated by communication technologies.  As such, media access becomes 
increasingly interactive in a networked society.  And as society becomes structured as a 
network, then, the structure of society becomes more polycentric with many more 
potential outlets for access to news and information. Finally, van Dijk writes that a 
network society is not simply hierarchical but rather heterarchical, a term introduced by 
the sociologist Kyriakos Kontopolous (2006). 
 On the one hand, as van Dijk explains this concept of heterarchy, any system that 
is structured heterarchically still has inequality of power.  But in a heterarchical structure, 
van Dijk writes that across the levels of traditional hierarchically ordered power a different 
dynamic exists compared to a hierarchical structure.  That is, while the new gatekeeping 
process still has traditional properties associated with hierarchies then, van Dijk (2012) 
suggests this about the structural nature of the shift from mass society to network society: 
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Networks realize complex interactions within and between levels.  In this 
way, they increase the flexibility of organization.  In terms of 
determination, the heterarchical mode means that neither the higher nor the 
lower levels are in control.  Instead, a very complicated picture appears of 
determination from below, determination from above and determination at 
the semi-autonomous level in focus itself (p. 32). 
Importantly then, network structures do not do away with central, influential hubs.  To 
illustrate further what this means, van Dijk (2012) suggests visualizing a spider web.  
Spider webs, he notes, are like networks in that they do not have a single center but rather, 
many centers.  Van Dijk notes that computer networks are strong drivers of this process 
through which some traditional hierarchies remain while some new opportunities emerge 
for links to develop across traditional boundaries.  Thus, in this sense, the internet and its 
associated technologies serve to facilitate the development of non-traditional heterarchical 
structure in the modern media environment. 
 Within the overall network of interactions that develop via the internet and its 
associated technologies, the distribution of and interaction about the news and information 
that circulates via these online networks constitutes a networked gatekeeping process.   
The network of actors in this process, actors with the shortest communication paths 
between themselves and the rest of the group, are generally those that have the greatest 
network centrality.  As van Dijk notes, networks tend to be polycentric so there are often 
multiple people or organizations that have relative network centrality.  The most highly 
connected networked actors within such a digitally connected network, then, can be seen 
as among the “network gatekeepers” within such a network.   
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3.7a GATEKEEPING AND PERSONAL INFLUENCE CONVERGE 
 The model for communication in a network society is such that the traditional 
gatekeeping process and the personal influence process (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955) 
converge.  Audiences in this networked model of communication are less atomized 
(Rosen, 2009) or, as Chaffee and Metzger (2001) put it, less molecularized. That is, as 
Chaffee and Metzger put it, “the idea of an atomized society has never really been correct 
(a more accurate descriptor, both then and now, is a “molecular society” where individuals 
are embedded in small interpersonal networks).  Today then, in this new model of 
mediated communication, relational ties between the members of once mostly isolated 
primary groups—which might be called “clusters” or even “cliques” (Luce and Norman, 
1949) in a networked media environment—become possible.  Furthermore, as van Dijk 
(2012) notes, the media model in a network society is now more decentralized—although 
not completely uncentralized.   That is, there are more central nodes (which in social 
network analysis parlance are sometimes called hubs) within a gatekeeping process that 
now operates within the structure of internet-mediated networks. 
 Thus, while opinion leaders may have been influential only among small primary 
groups in the past, in a networked model of communication it seems likely that the 
distinctions between gatekeepers and opinion leaders becomes blurred.  After all, as Katz 
and Lazarsfeld (1955) noted, Lewin’s original notion of “gatekeepers” actually referred to 
the most influential people within small interpersonal groups.  In this sense, then, they 
wrote, “Lewin’s ‘gatekeeper’ idea is very closely related to our idea of the ‘opinion leader’ 
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(p. 118).   Indeed, in today’s networked media model, we can think of these changes as a 
process of convergence between mass media organizations (the traditional gatekeepers) 
and opinion leaders (the gatekeepers of primary groups), such that traditional mass media 
gatekeepers and some of the opinion leader types of the past now seemingly become part 
of the greater number of hubs in a decentralized gatekeeping process.  Figure 3.7 is a 
visualization suggested by Watts and Dodds for the communication model that underlies a 
networked gatekeeping process.   
 In a networked gatekeeping process then, the suggestion by Erdős and Rényi 
(1959) that the degree of individual entities within networks are randomly and thus, 
homogenously distributed has been discovered to be flawed.  Instead, as Barabási and 
Albert (1999) note, over time and through the use of advanced computerized data analysis, 
the study of networks of all kinds including networks comprised of nodes that are proteins 
and genes, nerve cells, individuals and organizations, online hyperlinks, and human 
interactions mediated by the internet has helped us to recognize that the distribution of 
centrality among a given set of nodes is known to generally follow what is called a power 
law or scale–free distribution.  In such a distribution, there are few actors that have 
relatively high centrality but who generally have low overall cohesiveness to the rest of 
the network.  Meanwhile, many network actors—usually members of the general public— 
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Figure 3.7 - Watts’s and Dodds’s (2007) Networked Communication Model 
 
tend to have relatively low centrality but high cohesiveness to a small number of 
acquaintances.  That is, the general public in such a conception of the overall structure of 
the networked gatekeeping process would be expected to form small cliques or highly 
cohesive clusters at the margins of a network. 
Scholars such as Faloutsos, M., Faloutsos, P., & Faloutsos (1999), Adamic and 
Huberman (2000), Albert and Barabási (2002), Shirky (2003), and Watts (2004) have 
  
                 73 
 
observed and documented these patterns as occurring within the structure of internet-
mediated communication.  In general, they note that the natural human tendencies toward 
preferential-attachment to a small number of network nodes within the structure of social 
networks helps to explain the power law distribution of relative prominence in networks.  
Figure 3.8 is just one visual illustration of a power law distribution of links to political 
blogs that Shirky uses to illustrate this phenomenon. 
 
Source: Shirky, C. (2003). Power Laws, Weblogs, and Inequality. Retrieved Sept. 17, 2013 from 
Figure 3.8 - Power law distribution of blogs by their inbound links from Shirky (2003) 
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http://shirky.com/writings/powerlaw_old.html 
 
3.8 JOURNALISTIC NORMS AND ROUTINES IN TRANSITION 
Keith (2011) has suggested that the conditions for Shoemaker and Reese’s 
“hierarchy of influences” on media content within the 20th century model for gatekeeping 
have changed with the development of the internet and its associated technologies. 
According to hierarchy of influences model, the subjective decision-making by individual 
journalism professionals has always been constrained by the standard routines developed 
and adopted by professionals within a transmission model of communication.  Further 
constraints on decisions by journalism professionals from higher levels in the hierarchy of 
influences have also been understood as influences on the ultimate content of media 
messages.   
But according to Keith, the media routines level of influences has lost some of its 
strength given that the old media routines that once existed have lost some of their 
relevance in the new media environment.  In this new media environment, then, in which 
media routines have become less certain as media organizations try to understand how to 
operate, Keith writes that individual journalism professionals have gained greater 
individual agency to make decisions about how best adapt to the 21st century media 
environment.  Epkins (2012) has conducted empirical research that essentially confirms 
Keith’s suggestion that journalism professionals have become more empowered as 
individual decision makers at a time when media routines have become uncertain.  In fact, 
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Epkins asserts that during this period of transition, it seems that the individual level of 
influences in the standard hierarchy of influences may have come to supersede all other 
levels of influence that have been traditionally understood to exist in the gatekeeping 
process.  In other words, she suggests that at least some journalists in recent years have 
gained increased power to make subjective decisions in their gathering and reporting of 
the news. 
According to Keith and Epkins, then, the routines of journalism within a 
networked, participatory process, are currently uncertain and in development.  As such, 
Keith and Epkins suggest the possibility that a hierarchy of influences model as it has been 
previously conceived of may no longer be the appropriate model for understanding how 
the various micro, mezzo, and macro-level influences operate within a gatekeeping 
process that increasingly occurs according to the structure of social network relations.  
Following from this argument, then, it is necessary to consider the changing gatekeeping 
process from the perspective of how the work of journalists is evolving within this 
changing media environment.  Within the developing networked gatekeeping process, the 
renegotiation of routines and norms that is currently happening perhaps most 
fundamentally as journalists seek to develop norms that suit what it means to be a 
journalist within participatory systems of journalism.  Social network sites like Twitter are 
at the nexus of these ongoing changes for journalism. 
The idea that media routines and norms are shifting is related to the idea of 
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heterarchy.  We might say that the traditional hierarchy of constraining influences on the 
production of media content are now heterarchically arranged.   In the new model, the old 
media gatekeepers are now amongst a central network of network gatekeepers within a 
more decentralized gatekeeping process.  And just as we cannot view the public as a 
“mass society,” media workers can also no longer be viewed as a homogenous mass.  
Rather, journalists are heterogeneous network actors with unique roles and degrees of 
influence in the diffusion of news.  Collectively, journalists, the public, and other actors in 
the public sphere are engaged in a networked gatekeeping process. 
3.9 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
A retrospective look at gatekeeping theory which places Lewin’s work in the 
context of social network structure and social network analysis has brought light to how 
the gatekeeper concept fits into our study of the modern news construction and diffusion 
processes.  David Manning White’s application of the concept and subsequent gatekeeping 
studies throughout the 20th century were basically suitable for the media environment of 
that era.  As Shoemaker and Vos (2009) note, gatekeeping theory was slow to develop into 
a true theory in large part because White and later scholars did not incorporate Lewin’s 
full conceptual framework for understanding gatekeeping as comprised of multivariate 
factors that produced the content of media messages.   
Lewin’s primary interest in applying mathematical principles for the study of small 
group dynamics helps to reveal why White’s conceptual framework was arguably 
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somewhat forced for this purpose.  Furthermore, the model developed by Shoemaker and 
others loses some of its applicability through the development of new technologies that 
serve to affect a restructuring of the news production and diffusion processes.  Today, one 
is left to wonder if Lewin himself would have endorsed the way that his gatekeeper 
concept was applied to the study of news for the last half of the 20th century.  This chapter 
has suggested that Lewin’s work points to the need to conceptualize gatekeeping theory 
and empirically study the gatekeeping process as a process that now occurs according to 
the structural conditions of social networks. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE PROBLEM WITH SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
4.1 THE INTERNET’S IMPACT ON JOURNALISM AND DEMOCRACY 
Prior to the digital revolution and the advanced development of the internet, the 
primary portals of access into “the media of the public sphere” (Habermas, 1989) were the 
relatively scarce number of television and radio stations, magazines, and newspapers that 
reported the daily news.  Thus, the public was almost exclusively dependent upon these 
mediums in that era as the sources of information about current public affairs.  Indeed, 
throughout the 20th century, only a small number of large companies had the requisite re-
sources for producing and widely disseminating mass mediated messages via these print 
and broadcast media platforms.  Most American cities had only one newspaper and a few 
television or radio news stations.  Within scholarly circles but also within the popular lexi-
con, these professional journalism organizations and their newspersons have long been un-
derstood as the “gatekeepers” (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009) of the news.  This concept be-
came a popular and relatively apt metaphor for describing the significant extent to which 
the public depended upon these mass media organizations for access to the news.  
  In recent years, however, internet traffic data shows that social network sites on 
the internet have diffused into wide public usage, increasingly becoming the public’s fa-
vored portals of access into the daily online news and information ecology (Pew Internet 
& American Life Project, 2013).  Indeed, these social network sites such as Facebook, 
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Twitter, and Google Plus can integrate into a single online interface an electronically inter-
connected social network of traditional and emergent media outlets and communication 
tools for direct and indirect interaction with acquaintances and public figures.  According 
to the Pew Research Center, younger generations of internet users—the “digital natives” 
(Palfrey and Gasser, 2008)—especially favor internet-based social network sites as their 
primary mediums for daily media access (see also Lee and Carpini, 2010).  These trends 
showing extremely high rates of adoption of internet-based news sources among young 
people indicate that these social network sites are increasingly the public’s preferred 
means of access to daily news and information about the world around them. 
Van Dijk (2012) has suggested that the development of the internet as a communi-
cation medium has facilitated a significant shift away from a “mass society” towards a 
“network society.”  Benkler similarly characterizes the social impact of the internet as rep-
resenting a shift from a “mass media dominated public sphere” towards a “networked pub-
lic sphere.”  Further, he characterizes the disruption and transformation of the previous 
economic model for the media as an important structural shift from a “mass media domi-
nated” “industrial information economy” towards a new “networked information econ-
omy” (Benkler, 2006).  For Benkler (2011), this shift toward a networked public sphere 
creates the potential conditions for the media system’s democratic purpose to be better 
equipped to serve the interests of a diverse public.  While scholars such as Jones (2009) 
and Baker (2009) have lamented the decline of revenues for traditional media platforms—
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especially newspapers—and offered ideas for “saving” the traditional press, Benkler ad-
vises that instead of worrying about what is being lost we should “give the networked pub-
lic sphere time to develop.” 
But some notable scholars including Habermas (2006), Baker (2009), Jones 
(2009), and McChesney and Nichols (2010) have questioned the potential of a media sys-
tem that is being transformed through the affordances of the internet and its associated 
technologies to adequately support the needs that the public has from the media system for 
a healthy democracy.  A common area of concern among these and many other scholars is 
that while the internet has evolved, declining revenues for newspapers means a decline in 
the kind of “accountability journalism” that Jones (2009) argues is at the "iron core” of de-
mocracy.  These revenue declines for newspaper journalism have occurred primarily be-
cause advertisers and members of the public have determined that internet-based platforms 
such as Google or Craigslist provide more cost-effective mediums for their advertise-
ments.  This shift, then, has significantly diminished the demand that newspapers once had 
as advertising mediums, a demand that had been the primary source of revenue for news-
paper journalism (Jones, 2009; Anderson, Bell, and Shirky, 2012).  Meanwhile,  the evolv-
ing media environment and the journalism produced for it are moving in a “post-indus-
trial” (Anderson, Bell, and Shirky, 2012) or “post-bureaucratic” (Bimber, 2003) direction 
that is filled with “information overload” and uncertainty. 
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Scholars concerned with the economic problems in the newspaper industry today 
generally operate from a perspective that Christians and Glasser (2009) call a normative 
theoretical approach to media, an approach that makes ethically informed theoretical as-
sumptions about the role the media should play in democracy.  As Sullivan (2006) notes, 
normative views of the role journalism ought to have in society generally reflect a per-
spective first suggested by the Hutchins Commission in 1947 and later articulated further 
by Peterson in the classic Four Theories of the Press known (Schramm, Siebert, & Peter-
son (1956) as the “social responsibility” model of the press.  As Sullivan explains this per-
spective in the context of newspapers, one of the fundamental ideas behind this model is 
that “the more powerful and successful newspaper companies become, the greater ‘respon-
sibility’ and obligation they have to serve the community” (p. 67).   
This social responsibility view of the press also lines up with what Herbert Gans 
(2003) calls the “journalistic theory” of democracy that he describes in three parts: 
1) The journalist’s democratic role is to inform citizens 
2) The more informed these citizens are, the more likely they are to 
participate politically 
3) The more they participate, the more democratic the country is apt to be 
(p. 6). 
 
These views reflect a belief in the central democratic purpose of what Jones (2009) calls 
“accountability journalism”—the serious investigative journalism that has been predomi-
nantly done throughout our history by newspaper journalists and supported by once 
wealthy newspaper companies. 
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Christians and Glasser. (2009) define normative theories of the press such as social 
responsibility theory in contrast to the types of theories that prescribe the factual role of 
the media in society.  Factual-oriented theories—also known as descriptive theories—are 
those such as gatekeeping theory that approach the study of the press empirically, seeking 
to describe the press and its place in society as it actually is.  In comparison, they write, 
normative theory “attempts to explain why a certain organization of public discourse leads 
to better collective decisions and eventually to an improved quality of life” (p. ix).  Nor-
mative theory has the potential to be helpful, according to Christians and Glasser, in that it 
“may serve not only as a defense of political philosophies but it can also be made to sensi-
tize media policymakers and professionals to acknowledge their own unstated premises—
by exposing discrepancies between philosophical rationales and actual operations” (p. ix). 
Such normative theory, they suggest, may be especially important to consider dur-
ing periods of significant transition such as the present time of uncertainty about what the 
short and long term impact of new media technologies might be on the media system as a 
whole.  They write: 
Today, both journalism and democracy are challenged by great changes, 
ranging from information technology to the global economy.  All of this is 
an invitation to examine critically the media’s place and task in society—in 
particular in societies where democracy is understood not only as a political 
system but as a culture.  At issue is not only what is the role of journalism 
in society but above all what this role should be.  Such a perspective of the 
media’s mission in democracy leads us to a normative level—beyond 
factual landscapes toward values and objectives” (p. vii, italics in original). 
Perspectives that operate from a normative theoretical perspective about the media’s role 
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in democracy are arguably important, at the very least then, as part of an idealistic code for 
journalists, their employers, policymakers, and indeed any citizen looking to understand 
the traditionally understood public interest role of the media in a democracy.   
4.2 THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
One much discussed theory for understanding the media’s role in democracy that 
at least began as a normative theory is the theory of communicative action proposed by 
sociologist Jürgen Habermas, sometimes also referred to as public sphere theory.  
Habermas first presented his theory of communicative action with his 1962 book The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.  As Kellner (2000) describes the impact of 
this piece of scholarship, “few books of the second half of the twentieth century have been 
so seriously discussed in so many different fields and continue, almost forty years after its 
initial publication in 1962, to generate such productive controversy and insight” (p. 59).  
Indeed, Habermas’s theory of communicative action is perhaps especially important for 
discussions of media because it offers a framework and set of concepts that are familiar 
across many academic disciplines for the discussion of the role of communication and 
mass media in a civil society.  This cross-disciplinary familiarity of Habermas’s notion of 
the public sphere, then, makes public sphere theory perhaps especially important to 
engage with given that the modern study of journalism mediated communication in the 
context of democracy generates considerable cross-disciplinary interest across many areas 
of the social sciences. 
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As Fraser (1990) describes the theory of communicative action, Habermas’s 
conception of the public sphere “designates a theater in modern societies in which political 
participation is enacted through the medium of talk” (p. 57).  In Habermas’s (1991) own 
words, the bourgeoisie public sphere is “a domain of our social life in which such a thing 
as public opinion can be formed,” adding the important qualifier that “access to the public 
sphere is open to all citizens” (p. 391).  Continuing, he wrote that the public sphere is 
embodied in “every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public 
body” (Habermas, Lennox, & Lennox, 1964/1974, p. 49) and that further: 
Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted 
fashion—that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association 
and the freedom to express and public their opinions—about matters of 
general interest.  In a large public body this kind of communication 
requires specific means for transmitting information and influencing those 
who receive it (p. 49). 
Finally, he wrote that within the scale of modern society in the 1960s, this ideal kind of 
public deliberation necessitated “certain means of dissemination and influence; today, 
newspapers and periodicals, radio and television are the media of the public sphere. (p. 
398).   
According to Habermas then, the public sphere is a realm within society that is 
necessary in a civil society for enabling the public as a whole to manage a balance 
between the objectives of the “private sphere” (the private sector in which commodity 
exchange and paid labor operate) and the functioning of the “Sphere of Public Authority” 
(the government).  Benson (2009) notes the significance of this idea of a public sphere, 
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writing that “the emergence of a small-scale bourgeois ‘public sphere’ of coffeehouses, 
salons, and small political journals challenged the principle of traditional feudal rule and 
brought into being a new basis for authority: the consensus emerging from the public’s 
open-ended, critical argumentation and debate.” (p. 176).  Indeed then, according to 
Kellner, the “structural transformation of the public sphere” that Habermas describes as 
occurring over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries was thusly a “transition from the 
liberal public sphere which originated in the Enlightenment and the American and French 
Revolution to a media-dominated public sphere” (p. 265). 
Habermas went on to suggest that something approaching a normatively idyllic 
version of a democratic public sphere—something of a “Golden Age” for democracy—
became realized in 18th century French salons and English coffee house in which members 
of the public would regularly gather to engage in rigorous deliberation about public 
affairs.  Meanwhile, as Kellner (2000) notes, the various newspapers and as printed 
newspapers and political clubs that were born complemented the regular public 
discussions in this era in a way that facilitated the kind of public sphere to which 
Habermas believed we should strive.  For Habermas, then, over time there was a move 
away from the kind of bourgeoisie public sphere that he suggests existed in the 18th 
century Europe in which he says citizen interests were optimally represented.  The 
structural transformation that he saw in the 20th  towards a mass media dominated public 
sphere, then, was a move away from that prior ideal, noting about the structure of the 20th 
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century public sphere that “the world fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere in 
appearance only” (p. 171).   In his critique Habermas’s conclusions about the 20th century 
public sphere as follows, Kellner (2000) concluded: 
For Habermas, the function of the media have thus been transformed from 
facilitating rational discourse and debate within the public sphere into 
shaping, constructing, and limiting public discourse to those themes 
validated and approved by media corporations. Hence, the interconnection 
between a sphere of public debate and individual participation has been 
fractured and transmuted into that of a realm of political information and 
spectacle, in which citizen-consumers ingest and absorb passively 
entertainment and information. ‘Citizens’ thus become spectators of media 
presentations and discourse which mold public opinion, reducing 
consumer/citizens to objects of news, information, and public affairs” (p. 
265). 
4.3 SOME PROMINENT IDEAS FOR STRUCTURAL MEDIA REFORM  
Habermas’s conception of the mass media system in the 20th century as enabling a 
public sphere “in appearance only” reflects ideas that are similar to those expressed in the 
work of several prominent scholars including C. Wright Mills (1956), Ben Bagdikian 
(1983; 2004), Robert McChesney (2004) C. Edwin Baker (2007).  All of these scholars 
have presented compelling evidence and criticisms of a media system in the United States 
comprised of companies owned by wealthy and powerful elites who influence the news 
creation process in such a way that privileges elite points of view.  This media system, 
these scholars argue, has long presented a major barrier to the development of a public 
sphere that can equally represent the interests of a public comprised of diverse classes and 
needs.  
In general, Bagdikian, McChesney, and Baker can be categorized as scholars who 
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have mostly sought reforms to the media system that could happen through policy or other 
changes on the outside of commercial media organizations.  For one, Baker has suggested 
that regulatory interventions on the ownership structure of the media system could help in 
increasing structural ownership diversity in the media system (Baker, 2007). Sociologist 
Rodney Benson (2009) describes Baker’s argument as follows: 
States have a role and an obligation to intervene where markets fail—such 
as in providing an adequate amount of reporting on controversial or 
complex social problems, or news about the poor and the working class.” 
Such information and commentary, generally offensive or not of interest to 
advertisers and high-disposable income audiences, is nevertheless crucial to 
the functioning of a democracy (p. 19). 
McChesney (2004) has advocated similarly for interventionist media reforms.  Among his 
major arguments, for instance, has been to advocate the expansion of funding for the US 
public broadcasting system, an intervention that he suggests would have positive impact 
across the US media system.  Baker (2009) has suggested greater government subsidies 
for newspapers or for giving newspapers a special nonprofit tax category status that would 
eliminate or reduce their tax obligations.  Swenson and Schmidt (2009), two prominent 
investment officers, have concurred with Baker’s point in arguing that tax policies could 
be changed to allow for endowments to subsidize journalism. 
But as Obar (2009) notes, calls for regulation of media ownership and other kinds 
of artificial regulatory interventions during this era of increasing concentration have been 
largely gone ignored.  US government policymakers and regulators over the past several 
decades have instead favored a laissez faire, deregulatory approach to developments in the 
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media ownership structure especially during a period of significant economic tumult 
during the ongoing development of the internet.  Further, efforts to expand funding for 
public broadcasting and bills put forward to give newspapers non-profit tax status have not 
come to fruition.  Resistance to reforms is likely the product of a kind of “path 
dependence” within a commercial media system in which government officials rarely 
respond to calls to intervene for normatively driven purposes (Starr, 2004; Peters, 1997). 
As Benson (2009) writes, in the “hyper-commercialized” US system of media, “once an 
institutional path has been chosen, for good or ill, it is difficult to get off of it” (p. 190). 
 Meanwhile, as Horwitz (2005) notes, scholars such as Compaine (2000) and 
Noam (2009) have made arguments that question the very basis of calls by scholars for 
further regulation of the media industry.  That is, they offer mostly parallel arguments 
suggesting that the overall ownership structure of the media marketplace has become 
much more diversely distributed since the 1980s.  Specifically, they write, if we consider 
the media industry to include the computer industry and other major information 
technology companies within the media marketplace, one can argue that the overall 
information economy was even more concentrated in the 1980s when IBM controlled 
most of the computer market, AT&T had a monopoly on the telephone industry, and a 
small number of media companies owned the media companies that produce content.  
Given that such technology companies as Facebook, Twitter, Google, and Comcast and 
even software and hardware companies like Microsoft or Apple have a major role in the 
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new media marketplace for some of the tools the public use for engagement in a 
networked public sphere, along with their role in hosting public data and making decisions 
about customer privacy issues, these companies have arguably become increasingly 
pertinent to overall questions about the economic structure of the media marketplace. 
 
4.4 MEDIA REFORM FROM THE INSIDE: THE CASE OF PUBLIC JOURNALISM 
Before the internet became a major structuring force in the media environment, 
Habermas (1991) suggested that a one possible means of revitalizing the public sphere 
could happen “through the very organizations that mediatize it” (p. 232).  In other words, 
according to Habermas, the clearest way to create a more deliberative and egalitarian 
public sphere would be to advocate reform directly within the mass media system that 
operated the media of the public sphere.  As it happens, there is a useful test case for this 
notion that effective normative reforms towards making the media system more inclusive 
of diverse public voices could happen from the inside of the media system through 
proactive efforts by journalists and media organizations.  That is, guided in large part by 
the scholarly work of influential communication scholar James Carey, a group of 
communication scholars and media professionals in the United States in the latter part of 
the 20th century sought to create a new dynamic within journalism which would engender 
more regular public engagement among journalists and the public.  The effort came to be 
known as the public journalism movement. 
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4.5 WHAT IS/WAS THE PUBLIC JOURNALISM MOVEMENT? 
Although straightforward descriptions about what public journalism was are some-
what elusive, the newspaper editor and major public journalism advocate Davis Merritt 
(Merrit and McMasters, 1996) explained the public journalism movement when it was in 
its heyday, writing that “public journalism is an attitude; a state of mind in which we do 
journalism in a way calculated to reengage people in public life” (p. 173).  Another of the 
movement’s most forceful advocates, media scholar Jay Rosen (1999), wrote that “public 
journalism tries to place the journalist within the political community as a responsible 
member with a full stake in public life” (p. 75).  As Anderson (2011) describes the move-
ment, “public journalism reformers argued that journalists should acknowledge themselves 
as democratic actors, should help to create a public, rather than just inform it, and that 
they should embrace a thick concept of democratic life centering on political deliberation, 
rather than simply on elections and polls” (p. 533-534).  Another of the movement’s advo-
cates, media scholar Edmund Lambeth (1998), provides a synopsis of public journalism 
that Voakes (2004) calls the “most explanatory (and ideologically neutral) definition” (p. 
25) of the movement available.  In Lambeth’s words, public journalism sought to: 
1. Listen systematically to the stories and ideas of citizens even while 
protecting its freedom to choose what to cover 
2. Examine alternative ways to frame stories on important community 
services 
3. Choose frames that stand the best chance to stimulate citizen 
deliberation and build public understanding of issues 
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4. Take the initiative to report on major public problems in a way that 
advances public knowledge of possible solutions and the values served 
by alternative courses of action 
5. Pay continuing and systematic attention to how well and how credibly 
it is communicating with the public (p. 17). 
According to Anderson (2011), the public journalism movement began to take its 
shape in the wake of Watergate as media observers observed that the journalism they were 
seeing in the major news media was increasingly reliant upon a kind of stenographic, non-
critical reporting which was seen as mostly regurgitating the views of political insiders.  
Further, Anderson writes that the people within the public journalism movement became 
troubled by what they saw as simple horse race coverage of political elections, coverage 
that ultimately failed to explain the actual views of candidates on issues.  Over the course 
of its development then, the public journalism movement manifested itself in limited fash-
ion at a few newspapers around the country, especially in the 1990s, when some media 
professionals at some of the major newspaper organizations like the Charlotte Observer 
and the Wichita Eagle took the initiative to lead deliberative public forums to attract more 
audience feedback and engagement in the process of determining what citizens wanted 
from the press. 
But after its peak period of interest in the 1990s, the public journalism movement 
ultimately lost momentum as a formal effort.  Why did public journalism ultimately not 
work as a concerted scholarly and applied movement?  As I will argue, a further analysis 
of the movement’s conceptual and operational objectives can be useful for understanding 
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its failures.  But more than that, considerations of what the movement may have had right 
and wrong conceptually can be useful for contextualizing the ongoing changes for journal-
ism today within the overall changing media environment. 
4.6 DECONSTRUCTING THE PUBLIC JOURNALISM MOVEMENT 
To begin to deconstruct the public journalism movement, it is important to 
understand the overall scholarly work of the movement’s primary architect, James Carey.  
As Schudson (2008a) writes, Carey’s general scholarly mission involved his efforts to 
develop a course for communication research as an alternative to the “administrative 
research”—the media effects research tradition established by Paul Lazarsfeld in the 
1940s that became dominant in the United States during the 20th century.  Carey had 
wanted to devise an approach to the study of communication that was different from the 
media effects tradition but which was also distinct from the approach that Lazarsfeld had 
labeled “critical” communication research.  The approach that Carey developed, which he 
called a “ritual view of communication,” was grounded in optimistic ideals that Carey saw 
in the Chicago School philosopher John Dewey’s vision for the media’s role in 
democracy.  Namely, Carey sought to argue in favor of Dewey’s notion that in order for 
the media system to better serve democracy, it would need to better facilitate the 
participation of the public as a whole in the civic conversation that leads to the formation 
of public opinion.  For example, of the role of news within his ritual view of 
communication, Carey (1989) wrote: 
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News is not information but drama. It does not describe the world but 
portrays an arena of dramatic forces and action; it exists solely in historical 
time; and it invites our participation on the basis of our assuming, often 
vicariously, social roles within it (p. 21). 
Further, as Rosen (199?) notes, Carey believed that journalism and democracy are actually 
“names for the same thing” (p. 191)—in other words, Rosen notes, Carey argued not just 
that journalism is important for democracy but that journalism is democracy.  It was 
within this perspective of the news media’s central place in democracy with an essential 
need to engage the public directly that Carey conceived of the notion of public journalism. 
The public journalism movement was significant enough that the leading scholar 
of journalism history and media sociology Michael Schudson (1999) called it “the best 
organized social movement inside journalism in the history of the American press” 
(Schudson, 1999, p. 118).   Along the same lines, Peters (1999) wrote in his critique of the 
public journalism movement that “it is hard to argue against the idea of public journalism” 
(p. 99).  The movement was, as Peters writes, aimed at promoting “more responsive and 
responsible public information” and to enable “vigorous debate and discussion among 
citizens” (p. 99).  As such, the public journalism movement was clearly a well-intentioned 
effort aimed at enhancing the service of journalism to democracy.   
So what was wrong, then, with the idea of public journalism?  A useful way of 
understanding the problems behind the public journalism movement starts with a 
consideration of the way that Carey characterized the differing views about the media’s 
role in democracy as described by John Dewey and Walter Lippmann.  As Carey portrayed 
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their different visions of the kind of press needed in a democratic society, Lippmann had 
represented the antithesis of Dewey.  That is, according to Carey, Lippmann offered an 
elitist perspective which suggested that the citizenry is, in Carey’s (1987) words, 
“inherently incompetent to direct public affairs” (p. 6).  As such, in Carey’s 
characterization of Lippmann’s perspective, Lippmann believed that the media system 
would only get better when it was taken over by experts.  Indeed, as Schudson (2008a) 
writes, Carey represented Lippmann’s ideas for how the media system could improve “as 
the chief exhibit of what went wrong” (p. 1033) in the development of the media system 
of the 20th century 
As both Schudson (2008a) and Jansen (2009) write further, several media 
observers including historians Thomas Bender (1987), and Christopher Lasch (1995), and 
journalist James Fallows (1996)—all supporters of the public journalism movement—
seemingly latched on to Carey’s portrayal of Lippmann as an elitist while lauding the 
Deweyan perspective of the press.  Fallows, for instance, characterized Lippmann as 
believing the following: 
The only hope for effective modern government lay in cultivating a group 
of well-trained experts, who would manage the country’s journalism and its 
governmental affairs. The newspapers and magazines produced by these 
experts would lay out conclusions for the public to follow, but no one 
should expect the public to play more than a passive, spectator’s role” 
(Fallows, 1996, p. 236). 
As both Schudson and Jansen explain it then, a misrepresentative scholarly image of 
Walter Lippmann has developed over the past several decades within communication 
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studies, sociology, and other social science disciplines “as an arrogant critic who found 
democracy an inadequate system of government” who had advocated for “turning 
governance over to the experts” (Schudson, 2008a, p. 1031). 
But such characterizations of Lippmann as an elitist who believed that the public is 
incompetent for engagement in democracy missed the pragmatic value of Lippmann’s 
vision of the press.  While it is true, as Schudson (2008a) writes, that Lippmann placed too 
much focus on the need for experts, it is not true that Lippmann thought expert voices and 
the methods of scientists should replace journalists.  Nor did he believe that journalists 
must become specialized experts.  And as Schudson notes, Lippmann did not see the 
public as incompetent but rather, he questioned those whose lofty ideals about the central 
role of the public in regular democratic deliberation seemed to view the public as 
“omnicompetent.”  Instead, as Schudson puts it, Lippmann believed that “a capacity for 
democratic self-government has nothing to do with native gray matter, but with the 
insufficiencies all of us share, a limited ability to attend to matters beyond our everyday 
experience” (p. 1033). 
Peters (1999) agrees with the Lippmannesque perspective on this point, writing 
that public journalism failed to account for “the limitations of human energy” (p. 105).  In 
other words, Peters noted that it can oftentimes be understandably impractical for the 
public to be engaged in the process of constructing the press as public journalism or any 
social responsibility model of the press envisions.  Quite simply, as Peters writes, choosing 
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not to engage in public deliberation and the democratic process should be considered an 
important right of citizens in a democracy, not a deficiency of such citizens who are less 
engaged. 
In similar terms, Schudson (2008b) notes that the nature of representative 
democracy is such that citizens in a democracy may not be able to or want to be engaged 
regularly in deliberation and that this must be their right in a free society.  Indeed, as 
Schudson (1998) has argued, it is misguided to think that all citizens in a representative 
system of democracy need to fulfill an “informed citizen” model of citizenship based on 
the notion that in order for democracy to work, all citizens must be maximally engaged 
with and informed about public affairs.  Bimber (2003) concurs with this perspective, 
writing of the flawed assumption behind the informed model of citizenship that “the 
informed citizen is the responsible citizen, and the responsible citizen is an informed one 
(p. 197).  But as Schudson (2000) suggests, a more accurate and workable model of 
citizenship for modern society is one of “monitorial citizenship.”  That is, in contrast to 
the informed citizen model, Schudson writes that the monitorial citizen  
…should be informed enough and alert enough to identify danger to their 
personal good and danger to the public good.  When such danger appears 
on the horizon, they should have the resources—in trusted relationships, in 
political parties and elected officials, in relationships to interest groups and 
other trustees of their concerns, in knowledge of and access to the courts as 
well as the electoral system, and in relevant information sources to jump 
into the political fray and make a lot of noise (p. 16). 
Thus, a citizenry that is not omnicompetent but still monitorial may still be responsible in 
that they still monitor the media landscape and are sufficiently informed about issues of 
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interest to them.  
Economist Anthony Downs (1957) and political scientists Robert Dahl (1989) 
concur with this argument that a well-functioning democratic public sphere does not 
require a model of citizenship in which all citizens are regularly engaged and highly 
informed about public affairs.  As Downs wrote in his 1957 book An Economic Theory of 
Democracy, “any concept of democracy based on an electorate of equally well-informed 
citizens presupposed that men behave irrationally” (p. 221).  But as Bimber puts it, the 
inevitability of democracy in practice is that “rational citizens choose to delegate some 
information acquisition tasks as long as information is not free; therefore, information will 
be asymmetrically distributed among perfectly rational citizens” (p. 241).  And for Dahl, 
while only a subset of citizens will take advantage of the modern technological tools that 
have enhanced the opportunities for information access and engagement, these unique 
citizens can still serve as a check and balance for the citizenry as a whole within the public 
sphere. 
According to Schudson, Lippmann thought that democracy could only work better 
for the public as a whole when an overall knowledge system outside of the press 
comprised of truly independent experts would develop to inform political leaders.  Thus, 
contrary to how Carey and others have characterized his ideas, Lippmann did not believe 
that experts should take over the role of journalists or that journalists must become 
experts.  Further, Schudson writes that Dewey (1925) actually agreed with Lippmann that 
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the public should have a limited role in democratic governance.  That is, Dewey wrote the 
following about the limitations of the general public’s role in democracy: 
Executive action is not for the public. The intrinsic merits of a question are 
not for it. The intellectual anticipation of a problem, its analysis and 
solution, are not for the public. The specific technical, intricate criteria 
required in the handling of a question are not for the public” (p. 52-53). 
Thus, while Dewey was more concerned than was Lippmann that experts are like 
any class of leaders who will be prone to privilege their own private interests, Dewey still 
ultimately believed in a need for experts and the public to communicate with one another.  
Indeed then, Schudson’s argument in unpacking the Lippmann/Dewey distinction is 
ultimately that they both believed, for one, that journalism’s ability to enhance democracy 
is limited.  Further, they both essentially seemed to believe that for democracy to get better 
we must become better able to incorporate the knowledge of experts into our decision-
making while at the same time enabling that the public voice to be represented in the 
public sphere.  But why are experts so necessary?  As Bimber (2003) writes, as the scope 
of government increases over time, then so too does the complexity of the political process 
increase as well.  This increase in complexity in the policymaking process thusly increases 
the need for experts to inform political leaders about the policy decisions they make.  
According to Schudson then, public journalism advocates failed to acknowledge an 
important component of Lippmann’s perspective.  That is, Schudson writes, journalism 
only improve if other institutions of intelligence arose outside of journalism to feed better 
data to the press” (Schudson, 1999, p. 124).    For one, as Schudson (2006) explains 
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Lippman’s vision of the need for experts: 
The press provided news accurately only when journalists could depend on 
an efficient “machinery of record.” …News picks out from the wide world 
only what its imperfect “searchlight” reveals, and the searchlight is guided 
by market forces, political wishes, and cognitive blind spots, not by any 
kind of scientific aspiration to truth (p. 492). 
According to Gans (2011) then, Lippmann’s idea was that for the media and democracy in 
the United States to get better it would need the assistance of what he called “political 
observatories.”  Gans writes: 
News organizations must be supported and complemented by other 
professions that gather and report data about society, ranging from the think 
tanks and other research organizations that Lippman called political 
observatories, to social scientists and scholars from other disciplines. These 
should work especially to provide data and other support to journalists 
responsible for analytic, process and other specialized news. They should 
also participate, together with pollsters and others, to develop the picture of 
society that appears in the symbolic arena. Actually, one could argue that 
researchers ought to have prime responsibility for making sense of society, 
leaving journalists the reporting tasks for which they have been trained (p. 
11). 
As Schudson (2010) adds, Lippmann’s vision for these political observatories began to 
become partially realized beginning in the 1970s in the form of various governmental and 
private bodies such as the creation of Inspectors General in all federal cabinet-level offices 
and in the form of private, non-partisan think tanks that are increasingly engaged in 
enhanced data gathering efforts. 
According to Schudson (2006), a major possible trouble with this development of 
experts getting greater control in the policymaking process is what he calls the “inevitable 
complicity of knowledge and power” (p. 493).  Indeed, it was within a “broad cultural 
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revolt against authority” (Schudson, 2006, p. 493) in the US 1960s in which a large body 
of scholars from varied fields began to point with particular suspicion to this potential 
problem with experts.  During this era, the idea of a “sociology of knowledge” developed 
which suggested that knowledge in society is socially constructed.  Experts, critics 
believed, would bias their own personal interests in their efforts to inform the political 
process.  This somewhat suspicious notion of expertly gathered knowledge is as inherently 
connected to the interests of reinforcing power among the powerful is helpful for 
understanding why some of the scholars behind the public journalism movement saw 
bringing the public into the journalistic process as the best means of media and democratic 
reform. 
Bimber acknowledges that there is valid concern with such an arrangement that 
privileges the influence of experts in which democracy becomes “vulnerable to drift 
toward a state of Platonic guardianship, in which the judgment of citizens is severed from 
the decisions of elites” (p. 240).  And political scientist and democratic theorist Robert 
Dahl (1989) agrees, too, that this kind of inequality in the people who inform democratic 
governance has the potential to favor elite interests in a problematic way.  However, Dahl 
suggested that changes in communications technologies could eventually have the 
potential reduce inequality in the political process.   Bimber agrees, arguing the potential 
for change given that the necessarily bureaucratic structure of media organizations in the 
20th century has given way to nonbureaucratic structures among the various players in the 
  
                 101 
 
media environment. 
4.8 - A FIFTH ESTATE? 
Besides the needs for changes in the structure of public sphere outside of the 
industrial-controlled media system, Schudson (1999) suggests that one of the things that 
public journalism advocates had most wrong was their failure to recognize the problem in 
efforts to bring reform to the media and democracy directly through media organizations.  
Specifically, Schudson suggests that the public journalism movement was ultimately 
flawed in its very idea that the people and organizations that comprise the traditional press 
should spearhead democratic media reform.  As he wrote in 1999 in a critique of the 
movement, the problem with the public journalism movement was that it did not “remove 
control over the news from journalists themselves.”  Schudson continues: 
In this regard, public journalism as a reform movement is conservative.  It 
does not propose new media accountability systems….  Public journalism, 
in other words, stops short of offering a fourth model of journalism in 
democracy, one in which authority is vested not in the market, not in a 
party, and not in the journalist but in the public.  Nothing in public 
journalism removes power from the journalists or the corporations they 
work for” (p. 122). 
Here then, before new communication innovations facilitated by the affordances of the 
internet and its associated technologies had offered mechanisms to facilitate regular, direct 
engagement by the public with the news media, Schudson anticipated a future direction 
for how citizen-driven journalism and participatory engagement could best become 
integrated into the media system.  Indeed, as Schudson explains it, what public journalism 
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had most wrong may have been that its proponents wanted journalists be involved in 
creating the conditions for the media to become more discursive and participatory by 
actively infusing those characteristics into the traditional press system themselves.   
Schudson’s suggestion that for public engagement to be truly driven by the public 
it must come from outside of the traditional press system mirrors a compelling argument 
by Usher (2011).  That is, she criticizes the common trend in some journalism 
organizations in recent years of inviting citizen journalists to submit their work to news 
sites.  She writes that “we want to cover the caps in the news, and we want citizens to be 
involved in news creation, but we cannot assume that traditional journalists know best 
about how citizens ought to cover the news” (p. 266).  As Usher continues, she suggests in 
terms reflecting Schudson’s critique of public journalism that it is problematic to want 
traditional journalism organizations to be actively involved with defining what public 
input into the media should be.  Instead, she writes: 
Today, what counts as a public concern has the potential to be defined by 
citizens themselves.  In a Web. 2.0 world, citizens no longer need to rely on 
traditional media organizations for the dissemination of content or have 
their work fulfill any quality or resolution demands.  However, the reality is 
not that simple.  The Web 2.0 world, in fact, has only accelerated the extent 
to which a commercial and professional impulse from news outlets 
permeates citizen content.  News organizations can take advantage of the 
ease and speed that citizens have in sharing their content in a way that is 
timely and relevant” (p. 266). 
Benkler (2011) echoes Usher, rejecting calls for government interventions into the media 
system and discouraging traditional news organizations from approaching citizen 
journalism as if the news organizations can control the way the public chooses to engage 
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in the media system.  That is, Benkler argues in favor of “giving the networked public 
sphere time to develop.”  The idea then, in short, is that through the development of what 
we might call a “Fifth Estate” that serves as a check and balance on the “Fourth Estate,” 
the media system as a whole can potentially improve. 
From this review of the literature that has offered different arguments about the 
capacity of the media environment to better serve the needs of a democratic society, some 
major conclusions can be drawn: 
(1) First, numerous scholars have made arguments advocating for structural reform within 
the media system through government interventions such as tightening media 
ownership restrictions, increasing government funding for public broadcasting, 
providing government subsidies for journalism, or offering tax-exempt status for news 
organizations.   But these arguments have generally fallen on deaf ears within a 
political system that has consistently taken a laissez faire approach to media 
regulation. 
(2) Secondly, one of the clearest flaws in these arguments comes through basic critiques of 
Habermas’s (1991) widely studied theory of communicative action. Habermas 
suggested that the modern media system must develop to fulfill what he considered an 
idyllic system of democratic deliberation that existed in 18th century social gathering 
spaces in France and England.  But as Fraser (1990), Schudson (2000), and Kellner 
(2000) have noted, Habermas’s original development of public sphere theory 
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expressed a romantic vision of the public sphere of the past that does not match reality.  
The notion of an idyllic public sphere in that distant 18th century past was flawed, for 
instance, in that it was a very exclusionary public sphere which privileged the voices 
of wealthy white men while cutting out entirely the voices of women and minorities.   
(3) Third, while these efforts to reform the media system through structural government 
initiatives or initiatives within professional media organizations are clearly well-
intended, in many ways these arguments follow what Gans (1998) calls a journalistic 
theory of democracy which ascribes an exaggerated and unrealistic view of the role of 
journalism in democracy.  This perspective is like the social responsibility model of 
media in that it puts journalism at the center of democracy, viewing the traditional 
system of media as indispensable if democracy is to work.  According to scholars like 
Gans and Schudson, however, information is not as central to democracy as some have 
suggested. That is, as Schudson (2000) writes, “understanding the history of civic 
engagement in America is not a matter of positing a single standard of good 
citizenship and then documenting how well or how poorly Americans lived up to it in 
different eras” (p. 2).  Rather, he writes, citizens in modern society tend to be 
“monitorial.”  A significant part of understanding the changes in modern media and 
democracy involves understanding, as Lippmann (1922) suggested, that much change 
must happen within the political system outside of media, that the public media system 
can only get better when there are better mechanisms for scientific experts in all fields 
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to inform political leaders on public policy.  In turn, to some extent journalism has the 
potential to better inform the public too if we develop better means of gathering 
information towards addressing modern problems. 
(4) And finally, efforts of the past to reform the media system from within such as the 
public journalism movement also are flawed in that they have sought to bring the 
public voice into the public sphere based on conditions that the public voice would 
ultimately be still controlled by industrial media organizations.  As such, such 
arguments sought reform that would not truly offer a mechanism for independent 
public deliberation.  This inherent problem with the public journalism movement helps 
to reveal why the internet inherently has greater potential than some form of public 
journalism ever could have had to enable more equitable representation of the public 
voice in democracy. 
With all of this in mind, we can turn to the problem of understanding the way 
forward.  Among the ongoing questions that cannot be easily answered today is whether 
the affordances of the internet and other advanced technologies can provide for conditions 
that make possible a media system that can develop to work better for democracy.  The 
way forward begins with avoiding the temptation to look backward at what is lost and 
instead look at how a responsible kind of modern, changing journalism can adapt itself to 
the conditions of the new media environment. 
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CHAPTER 5. TOWARDS MORE RELEVANT JOURNALISM  
WITHIN A NETWORKED GATEKEEPING PROCESS 
5.1 THE WAY FORWARD 
As we consider the present and future of journalism, a good starting point comes in 
a reminder from Shirky (2009), who offers that “the old stuff gets broken faster than the 
new stuff is put in its place” (para. 16).  Thusly, he implores those who have fretted the 
decline of newspapers to take notice that new forms of media and journalism can develop 
to work well within the modern media system.  Indeed, there are still economic problems 
in the journalism industry—newspapers especially are still struggling.  But many good 
things have happened as well.  As Anderson, Bell, and Shirky (2012) write about the past 
decade in the media ecosystem: 
Everybody suddenly got a lot more freedom. The newsmakers, the advertisers, 
the startups, and, especially, the people formerly known as the audience have 
all been given new freedom to communicate, narrowly and broadly, outside the 
old strictures of the broadcast and publishing models (p. 1)   
As for the future of journalism, Anderson, et al. say that there has already been a 
degradation in the quality of journalism and that “we are convinced that journalism in this 
country will get worse before it gets better, in some places (principally midsize and small 
cities with no daily paper) it will get markedly worse” (p. 2).  Still, they suggest that new 
possibilities exist for journalism to better serve its democratic role in the media system.  In 
order to understand these possibilities, it is necessary to consider the evolving media 
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environment to which traditional journalism organizations are trying to adapt.  
5.1a THE PRESSURES ON JOURNALISM AS A PROFESSION   
Before discussing the media environment today, it is important to note that tradi-
tional, sometimes romanticized impressions of the media system of the past may be col-
ored by a Golden Age bias.  Indeed, for one, one of the most pointed criticisms of a Haber-
masian conception of the 18th century public sphere is that it romanticized an era in which 
only rich white men were included in public sphere deliberation (see Fraser, 1990).  As 
such, Habermas’s suggestions that the media of the public sphere in the 20th century was 
comparatively worse were always questionable.  Indeed, according to Kellner (2000) Ha-
bermas has backtracked on his romanticization of the 18th century public sphere in Europe, 
now calling his vision of a public sphere an “ideal type” in a Weberian sense—a descrip-
tion of the kind of public sphere that is understood to be necessary for an optimally func-
tioning democracy but not necessarily a system that has actually ever existed with a 
healthy balance of interests and power within the various realms of the public sphere.  
Similarly today, it is worth considering whether the journalism of the 20th century 
and the media system as a whole during that era was better than the much changed and de-
veloping media system of today.   As Shirky (2008) writes, there were problems with the 
media system in the past in which a small number of highly profitable corporations essen-
tially controlled the public’s portals of access to news and information.  The news busi-
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ness in the 20th century was a highly profitable industry in the industrial information econ-
omy because first, traditional news outlets offered the public their most efficient place for 
finding out what was happening in the world.  This value meant that these traditional news 
outlets were unparalleled in their audiences.  Therefore, mass media organizations argua-
bly possessed their greatest value in the industrial information economy not necessarily 
because they upheld some normative ideal but rather, because they offered by far the most 
efficient and cost-effective mechanisms then available to advertisers for reaching the mass 
public.   
Indeed, Shirky argues that social authority that has long been ascribed to profes-
sional journalism organizations was not necessarily created, as perception might suggest, 
because their specialized knowledge made them solely capable of gathering and reporting 
the news.  Rather, he suggests, much of their authority derived from the inherent power 
that came from having decision-making control within the organizations that once held 
virtual monopolies on wide public access to current events news.  Addressing the particu-
lar construction of the journalism profession around that model built in part on the scarcity 
of media outlets, Shirky writes:  
In any profession, particularly one that has existed long enough that no one 
can remember a time when it didn’t exist, members have a tendency to 
equate provisional solutions to particular problems with deep truths about 
the world. (Shirky 2008, p. 59) 
In terms similar to Shirky, Singer notes that journalists have long justified the 
privileged place of their work and of professional media organizations as “as key to a 
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democratic process that survives only through broad public access to reliable accounts of 
what is going on in the world,” (p. 63) reliable accounts which journalists once perceived 
that only they could provide.  This perceived conception of journalists as ethical 
gatekeepers, Singer notes, reflects the journalistic view of democracy described by Gans 
(1998).  Again, the journalistic view of democracy mirrors the social responsibility 
perspective in that it sees professional journalism as uniquely equipped to provide the only 
reliable accounts about the events in the world that can be considered valid information 
for public sphere deliberation.  But as both Shirky and Singer explain this view of 
journalism, the media system of the 20th century was “provisional.”  That is to say that it 
worked satisfactorily within the technological and economic conditions of that particular 
era for distributing and accessing news and information even as it fell short of some of the 
normative hopes that the diverse interests and needs of diverse publics could be 
sufficiently represented within the media of the public sphere.  The diffusion of new 
communication technologies around the internet and a new economic structure that have 
resulted from the changes of these technologies have enabled the creation of a new, also 
provisional system of media for a kind of journalism that will be appropriate for these new 
conditions. 
The journalistic view of democracy seems to see the media system of the 20th 
century through what sociology of professions scholars call a “trait approach” to 
understanding what kind of journalism profession is needed in society.  That is, according 
  
                 110 
 
to Shirky (2008), this antiquated view of journalism’s purpose was once based on the 
assumption that to do any kind of work in some area, in this case journalism, required 
being part of a profession.  Indeed, doing professional work had been generally seen as 
inherently requiring formal training, requiring practitioners to follow certain standard 
ethical principles.  In some cases this meant having officially recognized licenses, through 
affiliation with certain recognizable organizations, or through other various forms of 
legitimation.  As Schudson and Anderson (2008) explain it, “key to the trait approach was 
an attempt to isolate certain professional characteristics and then to determine the degree 
to which various occupational categories fulfilled them” (p. 89).  Notably, Schudson and 
Anderson write that the trait approach was characterized by normative tendencies for 
defining the purpose of professions.  This approach paralleled to a journalistic view of 
democracy that tended to take for granted the inherent necessity of the particular kind of 
journalism that was developed and practiced within traditional media organizations 
throughout the 20th century. 
Sociology scholars beginning with Hughes (1971) saw a different paradigm for the 
sociology of professions perspective which suggested that professions are not inherently 
worthy of institutional authority through certain formal traits.  Rather, these traditional 
assumptions were to some degree based on a commonly overlooked and misunderstood 
notion that professions themselves are not inherently needed for the market or the public 
good.  According to this perspective, professions and the tasks they are aimed at fulfilling 
  
                 111 
 
are formed over time through a culturally constructed process.  Within this new 
understanding of how professionals develop then, it is understood that the demand from 
society dictates the work that is needed.  In many cases, that work does not necessarily 
require professional authority.   As Hughes put it, considerations of how professions 
develop have shifted away from a question of “is this occupation a profession” to the less 
presumptuous question of “what are the circumstances in which people in an occupation 
attempt to turn it into a profession and themselves into professional people” (p. 655).  The 
way Schudson and Anderson frame the second question, this newer way of viewing a 
profession involves asking “over what social markers would we expect to see occupations 
struggle as they advance their “professional project?” (p. 95)  
In the former “trait” approach to conceptualizing the development of a profession 
then, for instance, if you had the formal credentials and affiliation with a professional 
organization, then those traits gave you the professional status that thusly gave you official 
status as an official journalist.  Comparatively, Abbott (1988) suggests that the latter 
approach can be thought of as a process of professionalization that is based on struggle.  
As it is conceptualized in this latter process, it is not that all of the formal, requisite traits 
for what it once meant to be a professional are gone.  Rather, in his latter perspective, 
those traits can be viewed as common (but not mandatory) characteristics that people tend 
to pick up through the process of working within the jurisdiction of the journalism 
profession and becoming more skilled and knowledgeable about doing this kind of 
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specialized work. 
The idea to be drawn from this literature, however is not to scrap the idea that 
journalism can be considered a profession or that journalists can be somewhat central 
actors within the modern media environment.  Rather, the suggestion of this literature is 
that there are periods such as the present one in which, as the possibilities for who can 
engaged in journalism expands, journalism will occasionally be forced to go through 
transitions and professional struggle over questions of “what counts” as journalism.  As a 
result, there becomes a need to acknowledge that the work of a journalism professional is 
not by definition the only means through which journalism as a valuable process can be 
conducted.  As such, there must be refinements to what it means to be operating in the 
particular jurisdiction of journalism. 
According to this sociology of professions perspective then, efforts toward 
understanding the role of journalism in the evolving media ecology are aided by this 
recognition of how and why professions have been known to develop and what 
professions are for.  Further, perhaps the most central importance for understanding this 
process of professionalization is that occupational groups of different kinds are 
continuously engaged in what Gieryn (1983) calls “boundary work.”  As Lewis (2012) 
explains it, engagement in boundary work involves efforts by people and organizations 
working within a particular occupational field to gain authority for their work relative to 
those doing similar kinds of work or those outside of their field.  This boundary work, 
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driven by the pursuit of cultural and economic benefits for the people and organizations 
operating within a particular field of work, can be understood as their process of 
establishing their particular work as being part of an institutionalized profession.  In 
specific terms, boundary work involves the pursuit of professional status through efforts to 
create “distinct and identifiable structures of knowledge, expertise, work, and labor 
markets, with distinct norms, practices, ideologies and organizational forms” (Leicht 2005, 
p. 604). 
According to Lewis, professions in general are facing significant challenges at 
present from heightened economic threats that derive in large part from a growing do-it-
yourself ethic among the public.  Professions within fields such as law, academia, and 
even medicine are being significantly challenged through these forces as well.  In those 
professions, however, there are at least stronger legal requirements for practice which 
inherently act as boundaries for the functions that they serve.  In journalism, while there 
are some legal boundary mechanisms such as shield laws, the legally constructed 
boundary mechanisms are less rigid than for many other professions.    
Within the journalism profession, then, the challenges for professional legitimacy 
are particularly strong today as professional journalists and their employers are being 
forced to adjust to a set of new technological and economic conditions that have disrupted 
a longstanding, lucrative, and thus highly entrenched model for professional journalism 
practice.  In that previous model, journalism professionals and their organizations were 
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ultimately in control of the final decisions in the gatekeeping process for deciding what’s 
news.  The exclusivity they enjoyed in that model as providers of the widely accessible 
news afforded professional journalists and organizations significant control over the 
information that reached the public affairs agenda.  This extraordinary advantage for the 
few people and groups who owned a news outlet within that industrial-controlled media 
system provided a powerful technological boundary that served to distinguish professional 
journalism in one important way from any kind of mediated information that did not 
appear in a mainstream publication. 
It is through boundary work then, Lewis writes, that workers of any occupation 
strive to establish institutional logics that can provide justification of professions as 
indispensable institutions.  He suggests that in the past, these traits made up the principles 
through which we tended to identify justification for why journalists and their 
organizations became the gatekeepers of news who operated as agents within the 
organizations that decided what should and should not be news.  That is, simply put, one 
of the traditional “truths” of professional journalism has been that journalists are essential 
to this process of disseminating and sharing news.  But Deuze (2005) notes that there is a 
problem with this presumption that journalism professionals should control the processes 
of gathering, reporting, and distributing of news that the public could access.  And as 
Lewis (2012) writes, this notion that journalists should control the gatekeeping process is 
one of the fundamental flaws behind what he calls “professional logics,” for journalism.  
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These professional logics for journalism are “the collectively shared and taken-for-granted 
assumptions underlying the belief that journalists, acting in their normative roles, ought to 
wield gatekeeping control over news content on behalf of society” (p. 845). 
Looking back to the 20th century media model, given the technological and 
economic conditions that afforded media organizations control over information, in that 
era media organizations also had control over how journalism profession developed.  As 
such, they determined the credentials that were necessary for being hired as one of their 
journalists, how these journalists would be trained, what the ethical principles would be 
that journalists would follow, and what a professional news report should and shouldn’t 
contain.  The trait-based approach was thusly at least somewhat more suitable for 
describing how the journalism profession developed in the past when these organizations 
could more fully dictate what could count as journalistic reporting.  In this sense, and 
given that the control of information of those traditional news organizations has been 
eroded, so too has their authority on deciding what counts as journalism been eroded.   
The development of new technologies and ways to use those technologies by 
people unaffiliated with traditional legacy media companies has allowed outsiders to 
engage in what some have called “parajournalism” (Schudson and Anderson, 2008).  This 
is the case with some bloggers or for some citizens, for example, who occasionally engage 
in “random acts of journalism” (Lasica, 2003).  Such random acts of journalism are small 
contributions by citizens to the overall picture of journalism that can get visibility through 
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new channels of networked communication and information access such as social network 
sites.  Although it is undeniable that these are difficult times for journalism as a 
profession, the development of parajournalism and the loss of control by traditional media 
journalists need not be construed as threats to the integrity of journalism or to journalism 
professionals.  Instead, journalism as a profession must continue to adapt to a news 
creation and dissemination process (a gatekeeping process) that involves professional 
journalists, non-professionals who are regularly engaged in journalism, and various other 
people and organizations contributing bits of information that make the news. 
Thus, while the “institutional logic” of journalism as a profession was previously 
defined by “control over content” (Lewis, 2012), the sociology of professions literature 
suggests that journalism is currently undergoing a process of “struggle” to renegotiate the 
“boundaries” (Gieryn, 1983) of what constitutes journalism.   As the boundaries expand, 
journalists and the organizations that employ them must better learn what it means to be 
not at the center of the gatekeeping process, with everyone passively waiting for your 
newspaper or broadcast report to arrive, but among a differentiated series of traditional 
and emergent influential voices in a networked gatekeeping process.   
5.2 JOURNALISM IN A NETWORKED COMMUNICATION ENVIRONMENT 
According to the sociology of professions perspective, the expanded number of 
voices in networked gatekeeping process has significant implications for the journalism 
profession and the media system as a whole.  For one, through the expansion of the 
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influential voices in a networked gatekeeping process, the journalism profession can be 
currently viewed as going through a period of significant struggle at the boundaries that 
define what counts as journalism.  Because of these changes, it seems necessary to rethink 
the hierarchy of influences that Shoemaker and Reese (1991) identified as the multivariate 
influences within the gatekeeping process that influence the content of the media 
messages that reach the public. 
But how has the gatekeeping process changed?  Media scholars have offered 
various conceptions of the way that the internet has transformed the gatekeeping process.   
Williams and Carpini (2000), for instance, once suggested that there is no longer a 
significant gatekeeping process in the construction of news to speak of.  They wrote that 
the way the internet has disrupted the traditional gatekeeping influence of traditional 
media organizations “undermine the idea that there are discrete gates through which 
political information passes: if there are no gates, there can be no gatekeepers” (p. 61).  
Importantly, this conception of gatekeeping characterized by Williams and Carpini focuses 
mostly on a metaphorical definition of gatekeeping which emphasizes the control aspect 
of the gatekeeping process. 
5.3 THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY? 
In a different argument that also invokes the gatekeeping concept in metaphorical 
terms, political scientist Matthew Hindman (2009) suggests in terms contrary to Williams 
and Carpini that a powerful form of control persists in the modern media environment.  
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On the one hand, Hindman acknowledges Williams’s and Carpini’s argument that media 
organizations and professionals have lost control over determining the content of the 
news.  However, Hindman suggests that in the modern internet-based media environment, 
“search engines and portal Web sites are an important force” of influence over the 
messages that reach the public and that “a key part of their role is to aggregate thousands 
of individual gatekeeping decisions made by others” (p. 13).  Thus, he concludes that a 
powerful form of control by elites persists in the modern gatekeeping process.  Further, 
Hindman challenges arguments that have been popular amongst some that the internet has 
a democratizing influence on the media, suggesting instead that a gatekeeping influence 
exists today such that the internet “is shifting the bar of exclusivity from the production to 
the filtering of political information” (p. 13) [emphasis in original].   
As Hindman sees it then, the collective filtering effects of the most widely used 
internet-based information portals such as the Google search engine or social network 
sites like Facebook and Twitter are such that a “winner take all” phenomenon occurs 
online.  That is, specifically, Hindman finds that the distribution of audience traffic and 
attention today is very much concentrated to a relatively small number of sources.  
Hindman’s method for measuring the diversity of the internet in this case is related to 
what Philip Napoli (2011) calls “exposure diversity” (although Hindman does not 
explicitly cite Napoli’s exposure diversity concept). 
Media policymakers dating back to the Communications Act of 1934 have long 
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identified diversity in the media as one of the core pillars—with media competition and 
localism—for assessing to what extent a media system is serving the public interest.  And 
as Napoli notes, perhaps the clearest expression of this concern for diversity came in the  
U.S. Supreme Court case Associated Press v. United States, where the court declared: 
“The widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources 
is essential for the welfare of the public.”  Napoli goes on to identify several different 
kinds of media diversity that might be important to measure towards understanding 
whether or not the media system is sufficiently enabling a representation of diverse voices.   
First, Napoli defines source diversity as “the extent to which the media system is 
populated by a diverse array of content providers” (p. 247).   This form of diversity might 
include diversity of ownership of content or outlets, which may refer to the ethnic 
diversity of the people who own the media based on ethnicity or it may involve diversity 
based upon “various dimensions of organizational or economic structure (e.g. public, 
private, for-profit, non-profit, independent, group-owned)” (p. 247).  Source diversity can 
also refer to diversity of the people who own or work for a particular organization.   A 
second form of diversity that Napoli cites is content diversity, which can be thought of as 
the diversity of available types of programming, diversity in ideas conveyed in media 
content, or demographic diversity of the subjects depicted in media content.  According to 
Napoli, source diversity and content diversity have traditionally been the most examined 
indicators of media diversity for policymakers and policy scholars. 
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 As Napoli notes, in policy and scholarly circles it has often been suggested that 
source diversity can lead to content diversity.  But according to Napoli, this correlation 
between these conceptions of diversity might be tenuous.  As an alternative and better 
metric for measuring what is most important about diversity, Napoli points to the concept 
of “exposure diversity” in the media which he defines as “the extent to which audiences 
consume a diverse array of content” (p. 248).  Napoli suggests that exposure diversity 
offers he most direct means of assessing true media diversity within an increasingly 
internet-mediated system of media.  After all, metrics for measuring exposure diversity are 
the only metrics that directly account for how audiences actually consume media. 
    Hindman’s empirical evidence has effectively shown that audience attention on 
the internet is concentrated to a very small number of online sources.  Thus, Hindman’s 
work effectively reveals the same or even greater inequality of exposure diversity in the 
modern media system compared to the past.  He refers to this phenomenon as the 
emergence of “Googlearchy.”  In disputing what he called “the myth of digital 
democracy” then, Hindman concluded that “it may be easy to speak in cyberspace, but it 
remains difficult to be heard” (p. 142).   
More recently, in a report that Hindman wrote as a commissioned researcher for 
the Federal Communications Commission’s 2010 quadrennial review of media ownership 
rules, Hindman studied the distribution of internet traffic for local news websites within 
the top 100 largest US metropolitan areas.  In this study, Hindman found that internet 
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traffic among internet-based websites for local news outlets is moderately to highly 
concentrated within the top 100 largest US communities.  Here again then, he observed 
that this distribution of audience attention followed a power law distribution within each 
metropolitan area.  More specifically, he found that a small number of news websites that 
have a local focus on the events within any given metropolitan area receive the vast 
majority of the public’s attention while most news sites get a relatively small amount of 
audience attention.  Ultimately, Hindman suggests that this tendency toward concentration 
of audience attention is antithetical to the kind of media system that can serve diverse 
publics and promote a more democratic system of media. 
5.4 POWER LAW DISTRIBUTIONS AS CHARACTERISTIC OF NETWORKS 
 
The extreme inequality in the distribution of audience exposure diversity that 
Hindman observes in his studies follows what scholars such as Barabási and Albert 1999; 
Shirky (2003), Adamic and Glance (2005), Benkler (2006), and van Dijk (2012) call a 
“power law” distribution. This phenomena is observable across the various types of 
internet websites including sites for magazines, newspapers, blogs, and television and 
radio news sites, with Hindman finding that there is actually more diversity of audience 
exposure for each of these types of media in their traditional forms compared to their 
online web forms.  Or as Anderson (2006) characterizes this pattern, there are a small 
number of online sites that are at the head of a statistical distribution line that get most of 
the attention. Further then, most online websites are in the “long tail” of line. 
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Several scholars have acknowledged that the power law distribution of online 
audience traffic presents questions for how the internet impacts the media system’s 
capacity to uphold the interests of democracy.  Barabási (2002) has drawn similar 
conclusions from his findings of a power law distribution of overall Web traffic, writing 
that “the most intriguing result of our Web-mapping project was the complete absence of 
democracy, fairness, and egalitarian values on the Web. We learned that the topology of 
the Web prevents us from seeing anything but a mere handful of the billion documents out 
there (p. 56).  Similarly, while noting that power law distributions naturally occur in 
networks described in physics and biology, Benkler writes that this power law effect 
represents “a serious theoretical and empirical challenge to the claim that Internet 
communications of the sorts we have seen here meaningfully decentralize democratic 
discourse” (p. 241). 
Evidence of these power law distributions in internet traffic patterns raise 
important questions that are relevant to the discussion in this dissertation about the role of 
journalism and the overall media environment in democracy.  On the one hand, 
Hindman’s basic conclusion that the internet does not democratize the news is difficult to 
refute.  On the other hand, there are no clear criteria for normatively declaring what the 
distribution of audience attention should be in a media system that optimally works in a 
democracy.  Or, as Benkler puts it, we might also consider that it could be wrong to 
presume that such patterns of asymmetrically distributed internet traffic are necessarily 
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problematic for democracy.  That is, according to Benkler, it could be that arguments that 
problematize power law distributions in internet traffic patterns begin with “the wrong 
baseline” (p. 247). So while it could be that the power law distribution is a basic, common 
feature of internet traffic, understanding the overall changes in the evolving media 
environment involves a broader consideration of other dimensions in the developed 
structure of internet-mediated public communication. 
5.5 SOCIAL NETWORK SITES AND THE NETWORKED GATEKEEPING PROCESS 
Given that Hindman suggests a filtering effect that derives from the networked 
properties of the internet such that a somewhat undemocratic level of exposure diversity 
occurs, it is necessary to look closer at the structure of communication that occurs within 
the internet-mediated media outlets that are most widely used among the public.  Among 
the most central fronts for the shift from a mass media dominated gatekeeping process are 
social network sites such as Twitter that effectively bring together into a shared space a 
variety of public sphere actors including journalists, politicians, non-traditional alternative 
media organizations and personalities, and the citizenry as a whole.  Twitter, along with 
other social network sites like Facebook and network-based information aggregators like 
the Google search engine and Google News or Reddit, together influence and are 
influenced by common network phenomena  
 In Hindman’s (2011) study of online media use for local communities, he found 
that internet traffic patterns follow a power law distribution such that a small proportion of 
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local media get a highly disproportionate amount of audience attention.  In the empirical 
portion of this paper, I conduct an empirical study of Twitter as a networked news 
platform for a moderately sized metropolitan area in the United States, the Twin Cities 
metropolitan area in Minnesota.  In this study, I analyze various dimensions of the overall 
structure of networked interactions on Twitter that revolve around news that is relevant to 
current events news in the Twin Cities.  Following from Hindman’s observations about the 
power law distribution of audience exposure to local news media, we can suggest a first 
hypothesis for the present study that is relevant to understanding one characteristic part of 
the networked gatekeeping process as it can be observed on Twitter.  That is, given 
observations by numerous scholars that power law distributions are an expected feature of 
internet traffic, we can propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1A: The overall sharing of links to local news websites on 
Twitter will follow a power law distribution that is roughly similar to the 
one that Hindman found in his 2011 study. 
 
Directly related to Hypothesis 1A is the issue of just how concentrated is the 
distribution of overall audience exposure to local media sources in the Twin Cities?  Thus, 
I suggest the following hypothesis which extends upon Hypothesis 1A: 
 
Hypothesis 1B: The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) for the 
distribution of URL mentions for local news organizations will be 
roughly comparable to the moderately concentrated HHI score that 
Hindman found in his 2011 study. 
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5.6 JOURNALISM WITHIN A NETWORKED GATEKEEPING PROCESS 
Lasorsa, Lewis, and Holton (2012) note that a common tendency among some 
observers when new communication technologies develop is to see their potential for a 
“revitalization and expansion of democratic discourse” (p. 21).  Specifically, they write, 
such arguments envision the flattening of extant hierarchies and the promotion from the 
media system of greater accountability and transparency in government.  They point to 
Hindman as being among these scholars who have suggested that assessing the democratic 
potential of the modern media system should directly involve questions of whether such 
hierarchies have been dismantled.  For Lasorsa, et al., however, such conditions for 
studying the ongoing changes in the media environment ultimately see only one 
dimension of a multi-dimensional process of change in a networked media environment. 
As Lasorsa, et al. note, over the first decade of the internet’s widespread diffusion 
among journalists beginning in the middle of the 1990s, the internet became a space that 
was dominated by pre-existing elites inside and outside of media.  These media elites 
generally continued to use the same operating practices on internet-based media that 
they’d used in the 20th century media environment, operating with a “we write, you read” 
(Deuze, 2003, p. 220) approach to media work that they had learned within the 20th 
century linear transmission media model. As an example of this, Singer (2005) noted that 
journalists who picked up blogging in the years after blogs became popular tended to use 
them the way they’d always used news columns.  That is, when journalists began to use 
professional “j-blogs,” their tendency in the early years of the internet’s development 
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involved a tendency to avoid employing the interactive affordances of blogs that were an 
important characteristic of what made blogs a unique and unprecedented medium in a 
networked media environment.  Singer called this tendency among journalists to carry 
over their old norms to the networked media environment a “normalization” of internet-
based media.  In short, journalists were operating as if they were in control of information 
as gatekeepers in the same way that they had been in a 20th gatekeeping model. 
Here, it is useful again to consider the suggestion by Schudson and Anderson 
(2008) that our understanding of the journalism profession today must consider the 
question of “over what social markers would we expect to see occupations struggle as they 
advance their “professional project”?” (p. 95).  As Deuze (2005), Singer (2008), and 
Lewis (2012) have similarly argued, the journalism profession has long tied itself to a set 
of fundamental ethical norms such as objectivity, truth-telling, and autonomy that were 
developed within an era in which they had significant control of information while 
audiences had essentially zero control over the news and information they could easily and 
efficiently access.  According to Singer (2008) and Lewis (2012), it was within the now no 
longer existing conditions for doing journalism within the 20th century one-way media 
model that the standard ethical norms developed.  Within that model, journalists came to 
see themselves as “ethical gatekeepers” just as many scholars had come to see the role of 
journalists in this way through a social responsibility model of the press (Schramm, 
Siebert, & Peterson, 1956) or journalistic theory of democracy (Gans, 1998).  Journalists 
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as ethical gatekeepers within that model, Singer argues, were seen as the controllers of a 
sort of conveyor belt of news such that the ethical gatekeepers monitored and sorted out 
the true information from the misinformation.  To state this another way, the idea of 
journalists as gatekeepers took on not only a descriptive meaning alluding to journalists as 
in control of access but also a normative meaning in which journalists came to understand 
their role in society as the public’s protectors.  Within such a conception of the role of 
professional journalists, Singer writes that “journalists see themselves as key to a 
democratic process that survives only through broad public access to reliable accounts of 
what is going on in the world” (p. 63).  Without journalists, according to this view, 
“democracy comes apart” (p. 63).  
 Singer writes that this conception of the place of journalists in society was 
reasonable within the confines of that system but that it no longer can apply today. Singer 
does not suggest, however, that journalists dispose of their ethical norms altogether.  That 
is, like Deuze, she suggests reconceptualizing a new set of norms, writing that “both 
scholars and journalists need to think about those concepts a little differently as the 
journalist’s position relative to others in society changes (p. 62).  According to Singer 
then, journalists need to consider what these norms now mean within a new networked 
model of media in which information “flows not only through the journalists but also, 
continuously, around them” (p. 64).  As Singer explains it, “one could argue that the role 
of gatekeeper remains viable but in a different form, one that has more to do with sense-
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making—with helping people understand, interpret, and use information rather than 
merely giving them access to it” (p. 65).  In short, journalists have to come understand that 
their ethical norms must be carried out differently when they are participants within a 
network over which they have no control.    
 As Singer explains then, this means that for instance, instead of seeing themselves 
as the only possible sources of truth and fairness, a journalist must build trust with 
audiences in order to earn the audience’s belief that a particular journalist is a reliable 
source of truth within an otherwise complex web of information.  After all, as Singer 
writes, “truth-telling is fundamental to trust, and trust is the basis for all social 
relationships.” (p. 65).  Earning this trust, Singer argues further, continues to be related to 
needs for journalists to be authentic and accountable to standards of accuracy.  But instead 
of authenticity deriving only from affiliation with a professional media organization and 
the branded identity of its traditional mass medium as it did in the past, Singer suggests 
that authenticity now “becomes less institutional and more individual” (p. 67).  That is, 
journalists must earn authenticity through an ongoing, consistent relationships they 
develop as individuals with the public.  
 While accountability has in the past been based on the need for the public to trust 
journalists because there were no better choices, the expanded number of possible sources 
of information means that accountability is now more than ever about individual 
journalists being transparent.  This means, Singer writes, that journalism is becoming 
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more of a conversation in which, for example, journalists can gain greater accountability 
“through provision of greater evidentiary support for what they write, including the use of 
network capabilities such as hyperlinks” (p. 68-9). 
 Singer writes that the traditional notions of journalistic autonomy that developed 
within the closed linear model of the 20th century must now be reworked as well.  
Journalists in the past have envisioned themselves a “Fourth Estate” in the classic notion 
of the term in which journalists have been imagined as separate from any ideological 
influences and thus, “able to report impartial truth” (p. 70).   But as Singer writes, it has 
become clearer in recent years that past claims of the “ethical gatekeeper” role of 
journalists have often been romanticized.   That is, the idea that journalists are a “Fourth 
Estate” with autonomy from pressures by elites were spurious all along.  Indeed, the very 
idea of autonomy suggests a level of isolation from public life that is untenable within a 
media environment that is no longer a one-way lecture but rather more of a conversation 
(Levine, Locke, Searls, and Weinberger, 1995).  As such, Singer writes: 
…autonomy is increasingly difficult if not impossible to maintain within a 
network, which is inherently about relationships and connections. Seeking 
to remain apart from such relationships may render journalists less 
admirably independent than dangerously isolated and even irrelevant, a 
concern that leads to consideration of the perpetually controversial topic of 
objectivity (p. 72). 
Finally, then, Singer argues that the traditional objectivity norm in journalism must 
also be reconsidered, writing that “being even-handed in providing information is a plus, 
but ‘he-said-she-said’ reporting is a disservice to the public” (p. 72).  Singer’s criticism 
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here reflects a concern perhaps best described by journalist Brian Stelter (see Rosen, 
2010), who has suggested a particular problem with the expression of journalistic 
objectivity that manifests as what the philosopher Thomas Nagel (1989) has called “the 
view from nowhere.”  That is, according to Stelter, when all journalists seek to report 
public affairs news with the kind of political impartiality that is commonly understood to 
embody objectivity, the result is a “view from nowhere,” a perspective that promotes 
fairness to different sides of the story over faithfulness to what might be a more important 
truth based on empirical evidence (see Rosen, 2010).  As Singer writes, when criticisms 
have arisen that journalistic reporting has been unfair, “objectivity served as a bulwark 
against these challenges: It was a way to arrive at truth, neither sidetracked by literary 
pretensions nor deterred by esoteric debates about whether reality was knowable. It 
happened. We reported it ‘objectively’. It’s true” (p. 72). 
Journalists today then, she writes, should not dispose of the objectivity norm 
altogether; indeed, there is still value in journalists bearing faithful witness to the facts 
about the events and issues they are reporting about.  As Singer explains how objectivity 
should be rethought: 
The term does not mean detachment.  It does not mean erecting walls 
around the journalistic product, process, or person. It does not mean a 
determination to be unmoved by an event or its effects. It cannot mean 
those things if journalism is to retain any relevance in a world in which we 
are all so thoroughly intertwined.  Instead, objectivity in a networked 
environment should mean a recommitment to the professed rationale 
behind establishing it as a norm in the first place” (p. 73).   
As such, she argues that being relevant in the networked media environment in the context 
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of the objectivity norm asks for journalists to be truthful and objective to start with but 
empowered to draw informed conclusions, even if this means breaking from traditional 
journalistic norms of objectivity.  For Singer then, “the role of gatekeeper remains viable 
but in a different form, one that has more to do with sense-making—with helping people 
understand, interpret, and use information, rather than merely giving them access to it” (p. 
63).  Perhaps we might say that such an approach means that journalists should strive for 
objectivity in their approach to reporting the news but not necessarily in the outcome of 
their reporting. 
As Singer explains the ongoing changes in the gatekeeping process then, the 
structural transformation of the gatekeeping process through the development of a new 
technological infrastructure for the media system necessitates new manifestations of these 
journalistic norms, norms that should be driven by logics of openness and participation.  
As the traditionally understood “gatekeeping process” that involved the gathering, writing, 
reporting, and disseminating of information” moves into the networked public sphere, 
gatekeeping theory becomes disassociated from the gatekeeping metaphor that suggests 
control of information. That is to say that gatekeeping today should mean something more 
along the lines of the meaning that the concept took on when Bavelas (1950) reconstituted 
Lewin’s gatekeeper concept in the context of a network into the notion of relative network 
centrality.  Various somewhat central actors within the networked gatekeeping process 
today, among them journalists and large media organizations, do not really have the kind 
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of control over the public’s access to information that they once had.  But among a larger, 
more decentralized group of central network actors within the diffusion of news today, 
journalists and media organizations do have significant and specific influence in the role 
of what Sunstein (2011) calls “general interested intermediaries.”  This conception of 
news organizations and journalists is useful, first, in that it locates a vital democratic role 
of journalists as information brokers.  Further, this conception of their role also provides a 
useful conceptual notion of what a journalist does in a networked media environment in 
which their former control over the current events news that can reach the public has been 
lost. 
Bruns (2005; 2008) has asserted that the shift in the role of journalists in the media 
environment today should be understood within the context of citizen-driven journalism 
from the blogosphere are engaged in “gatewatching.”  According to Bruns, 
Gatewatching describes the continuous, communal observation of the 
output gates of conventional news organizations, as well as of the primary 
sources of news and information, for information which is seen to be of 
interest to the gatewatcher’s own community.  Gatewatchers will then 
frame such information more or less elaborately, possibly also combining it 
with further, other reports from a variety of alternative sources as well as 
informative background information relating to the story (p. 74).   
As Bruns explains it, gatewatching is different from traditional notions of 
gatekeeping in that it “does not concern itself with making a comprehensive news 
selection from all available information in the news flow; it does not claim to present ‘all 
the news that’s fit to print’” (p. 73) but rather, it is “a process of highlighting news, of 
publicizing rather than publishing information” (p. 74).  This kind collaborative filtering 
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(Lewis, Kaufhold, and Lasorsa, 2010) of the news is connected to the “commons-based 
peer production” that Benkler (2006) described when he wrote that the networked media 
environment “makes possible a new modality of organizing production: radically 
decentralized, collaborative, and nonproprietary; based on sharing resources and outputs 
among widely distributed, loosely connected individuals who cooperate with each other 
without relying on either market signals or managerial commands” (p. 60). 
5.7 TWITTER 
Empirical observation and evaluation of the networked gatekeeping process that is 
developing in an increasingly internet-mediated public communication environment 
presents significant challenges.  Perhaps the most significant challenge is the question of 
“what should you observe?”  There are billions of people who actively use the internet 
across a constantly growing and changing set of traditional and emergent types of media 
sources.  No online aggregator or social network site encompasses the whole of the 
networked gatekeeping process. 
However, Twitter is particularly useful for observation of the evolving positions of 
journalists, the public, and other public sphere actors within a networked gatekeeping 
process.  For one, within today’s emerging media environment, Twitter is among the 
central fronts for commons-based peer production and the ongoing negotiation of 
boundaries for what counts as journalism.  Further, while observation of internet-mediated 
communication patterns across many websites would be challenging, Twitter is like many 
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other online web portals in that it has an Application Programming Interface (API) that 
makes for efficient collection of data and analysis.  Many developers and researchers have 
created programming applications specifically for use in accessing the Twitter API 
specifically.  Moreover, many of the data collection software tools that developers and 
researchers have created are openly available for use by researchers to continue data 
collection and analysis of Twitter and other internet-based databases. 
5.7a THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF TWITTER 
Twitter (http://Twitter.com) is a social network site where millions of people 
submit, read, and interact through a constant flow of short messages comprised of no 
greater than 140 characters each.  Chen, Nairn, Nelson, Bernstein, and Chi (2010) call 
Twitter and other such social networking and information platforms  “information 
streams” in that “(1) they deliver to each user a stream of text entries over time that are 
personalized to the user’s subscriptions, and (2) they allow users to explicitly interact with 
each other” (p. 1184).  Started in 2006, the idea for Twitter grew out of a realization that 
the increasing popularity of Short Message Service (SMS) or text messaging via mobile 
phone devices could translate well to an online community setting (Sarno, 2009). 
 In September 2011, Twitter reported that the site had reached 100 unique monthly 
users.  That is, 100 million unique users were logging into Twitter each month, with 60% 
of these active users posting tweets and the rest logging on at least once per month and 
reading their Twitter feeds but neither contributing nor retweeting content. In addition, 
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Twitter reported that half of these users, 50 million, were logging onto the size every day.  
The 100 million active user base, according to Twitter, represented an 82% increase over 
the previous past year (“One hundred million voices,” 2011).  By October of 2013, Twitter 
reported in its Initial Public Offering filing with the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission that the site had grown to 218.3 million monthly active users with 100 
million unique daily users sending 500 million tweets per day.  
5.7b TWITTER, JOURNALISM, AND THE FLOW OF NEWS AND INFORMATION 
The role and relative importance of social network sites like Twitter in the 
networked gatekeeping process and specifically, for the filtering of public affairs news 
from journalism organizations, is still far from certain.  Indeed, there is evidence that 
seemingly points in different directions regarding the impact of Twitter on the flow of 
information and its role as a site for news access.  For example, in a 2012 study the Pew 
Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism reported that within Facebook and 
Twitter, the two largest US-based social network portals on the internet, only 9% of 
respondents reported accessing news recommendations “very often” from either site (see 
Mitchell, Rosenstiel, and Christian, 2012).  This 9% figure does, however, mark a more 
than twofold increase in the use of these sites for news access compared to 2009.  In 
addition, this same study also found that 52 percent of respondents get at least some news 
from some kinds of social network sites.  And further, the percentage of people accessing 
social network sites for news is highest amongst people who own mobile phone devices or 
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tablets. 
Indeed, as Twitter wrote in its 2013 Initial Public Offering filing, mobile devices 
are the primary driver of traffic on their service.  Given these data and Twitter’s limitation 
of 140 characters or less per tweet, there is clear evidence that the use of Twitter for access 
to news is on the rise.  More than that, this evidence also suggests that Twitter is also 
equipped to function well into the future given its compatibility with the increasingly 
ubiquitous portable tablet and phone devices that people now so commonly use to 
consume and interact with media.  In addition, in 2009, the internet traffic measurement 
company comScore reported that Twitter users were two to three times more likely than 
regular internet users to visit online news sites (Farhi, 2009).  Furthermore, a recent study 
revealed that 59% of journalists worldwide use Twitter, that 51% of journalists said that 
they use social network sites to gather information for their reporting, and that almost 80% 
of US journalists have a Twitter handle (Oriella Digital Journalism Study, 2013). 
Given that it was started just seven years ago and took some time after its inception 
to clearly emerge into one of the most popular social media portals on the internet, 
scholarly study of Twitter is still relatively new.  However, a growing number of 
researchers are conducting studies specifically designed to understand certain aspects of 
influence on the flow of information as well as the role of journalists on Twitter.  Among 
those who have conducted research about the flow of information and structural patterns 
of interaction on Twitter include Bakshy, et al. (2011), Kwak, et al. (2010), and Ghosh and 
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Lerman (2010).  While the approach of these scholars was not explicitly rooted in direct 
connections to gatekeeping theory or the mass communication research discipline, this 
research is relevant to the general scholarly pursuit of better understanding the 
gatekeeping process on the internet-driven networked public sphere. 
There are numerous potential methods that could be used to determine the influ-
ence of news organizations within the Twitter network, too numerous to list here.  One 
commonly agreed upon conclusion among these and other researchers is that simple met-
rics such as the number of followers for a profile are limited as indicators of actual com-
munication structure and information influence (Kwak, et al., 2010).  Indeed, findings by 
Kwak, et al., showed that raw follower numbers on Twitter cannot reveal some of the im-
portant underlying patterns on communication structure among the various network actors 
in the networked public sphere. For instance, in Kwak, et al’s work, there were several 
news organizations and public affairs oriented profiles that were not particularly highly 
ranked based on their number of followers but which were much more highly ranked 
when their influence was measured as a product of their capacity for influencing users via 
retweets within their follower graphs.  Given such findings, it is clear that it is not enough 
merely to assess the influence of an organization or person within a social network site 
based solely on their follower numbers. 
Numerous scholars with a focus on the intersection of social media and journalism 
have conducted research focused on the way that journalists are using Twitter (see Lewis, 
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Zamith, and Hermida, 2013; Bruns, 2012; Himelboim, McCreery, and Smith, 2013).  
Hermida (2010) suggests that Twitter operates as a new kind of interactive news service, 
likening it to what computer scientists call an “awareness system.”  Within the computer 
science literature, awareness systems are internet-based media systems ‘‘intended to help 
people construct and maintain awareness of each other’s activities, context or status, even 
when the participants are not co-located’’ (Markopolous, et al. p. v).  Hermida writes that 
“in an awareness system, value is defined less by each individual fragment of information 
that may be insignificant on its own or of limited validity, but rather by the combined 
effect of the communication” (p. 301) 
Many media scholars, including Gillmor (2004) and Hermida (2010), have pointed 
to Pierre Lévy’s (1994) notion of “collective intelligence” to explain how the internet is 
changing our modern media system.  According to Lévy (2013), collective intelligence 
involves a combination of two concepts: cognition and community. He writes that 
cognition is “the activity of perceiving, remembering, problem solving, learning, etc…” 
and that as such, collective intelligence refers to “the cognitive capacities of a society” (p. 
99).  For Hermida, “microblogging systems that enable millions of people to communicate 
instantly, share and discuss events are an expression of collective intelligence” (p. 298). 
Within a developing awareness system such as Twitter in which a form of 
collective intelligence is become arguably more efficient than it has ever been before, 
Hermida (2010) suggests that a new kind of role for journalists involves what he calls 
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“ambient journalism.”  Hermida defines ambient journalism as “an awareness system that 
offers diverse means to collect, communicate, share and display news and information, 
serving diverse purposes” (p. 301).  Thus, he suggests, “if we consider Twitter as a form of 
ambient journalism, then the issue becomes the development of systems that can identify, 
contextualize and communicate news and information from a continuous stream of 140-
character messages to meet there needs of an individual” (p. 302).  For the empirical study 
conducted for this dissertation, my objective is to use social network analysis to better 
understand some characteristics of the networked gatekeeping process as it can be 
observed within the information flow and public communication that occurs on Twitter.  
In short, my objective is to understand the place of journalism within the Twittersphere. 
5.7c HOW TWITTER REPRESENTS A SOCIAL NETWORK 
There are two basic types of social networks.  One type is an undirected network. 
O’Malley and Marsden (2008) write that “an undirected network is symmetric by 
construction” (p. 232) in that any two actors in such a network are reciprocally connected.  
In other words, the connections in an undirected network are, by definition, two-way.  This 
does not mean that the structure of an undirected network itself is asymmetrically 
arranged, however.  In the context of social network sites, one can think of the original 
Facebook “friendship” network as essentially an undirected network—when Facebook 
started, two people had to agree to be “friends” and doing so would give users special 
access to see each other’s Facebook posts and other personal content.   
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A directed network consists of ties that may or may not be symmetric.  The Twitter 
“follower” network on Twitter is and always has been inherently directed—I can follow 
you but you don’t have to follow me.  Over time, Facebook has created functions that 
allow for it to technically be a directed network but its original structure as an undirected 
network seems to have defined the purpose it took on for many people, making it mostly a 
closed network with numerous somewhat private clusters of undirected follower networks.  
As a fundamentally directed network, on the other hand, Twitter is more open—excepting 
the rare Twitter users who keep their posts and profiles “private,” anyone can “follow” 
anyone on Twitter.  And anyone, including a person who has not created a Twitter account, 
can read the posts of most Twitter users. 
5.8 TWITTER DATA COLLECTION 
As Bruns (2012) notes, for its first few years of existence, the owners and 
operators of Twitter had very a very liberal policy for its Application Programming 
Interface (API) that computer developers and researchers could use to build web 
applications and collect data for research.  This open policy made the Twitter API very 
efficient for skilled computer developers and researchers to collect most any kind of data 
they wanted to gather.  But beginning in 2011, Twitter began making decisions to 
significantly limit the openness of its API.  They set stricter “rate limits” on how fast a 
researcher could collect various types of data.   
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Twitter made these decisions primarily to protect their proprietary interests.  For 
one, before Twitter made these decisions, a lot of independent developers made money off 
of applications that Twitter users used for customizable interfacing with Twitter.  After 
establishing a significant user base, however, Twitter decided that they wanted to take 
greater proprietary control of the applications that facilitate user interfacing with Twitter.  
Twitter does allow paid access to any content a researcher could want through an online 
service called Gnip, but data requests through Gnip are very expensive. 
Twitter, Inc.’s tightening of rate limit policies have created new challenges for 
researchers seeking to collect data from Twitter.  Requests for follower data are especially 
restricted.  In fact, in the original proposal for this study, my plan was to collect a network 
follower graph for all of the followers of all of the Twitter profiles affiliated with Twin 
Cities news organizations.  Within current rate limit restrictions, however, I have since 
calculated that a request for a multi-ego follower network for the 900-plus local Twitter 
profiles affiliated with Twin Cities news organizations would require at least a year of 
uninterrupted, automated data collection of this one social network.  Any disruption in this 
kind of data collection due to a temporary failure in the internet connection would 
potentially require me to start over from the beginning with the data collection. 
Beyond these data collection issues, there would be several problems in any 
conclusions that might be drawn exclusively from the network of ties that are defined by 
the follower relations between Twitter users.  For one, the follower counts for users are 
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likely to be skewed upward compared to the actual network of real, active Twitter users.  
One reason for this involves the potential for fake or SPAM accounts on Twitter.  
Additionally, many accounts on Twitter are not active at all and even the ones that are used 
by real people at least sometimes may not be regularly active.  Further, even daily active 
users will never see many of the tweets posted by the Twitter profiles that they follow.  Of 
course, the act of Twitter users deciding to follow certain users is generally an indicator 
that the followers are somehow interested in the users they choose to follow.  But 
ultimately, follower ties are somewhat unreliable indicators of actual social relations 
because they do not reveal how many Twitter users in the network are actually interacting.   
In addition to the social network that is created by the directed follower network 
on Twitter, connections created by actual communication between users can also represent 
the nodes and ties in a social network.  And unlike the rates limits on requests for follower 
data, the rate limit allowances on requests for actual communication or “tweet” data 
between users are much more open.  Ideally, one would be able to easily get as much data 
as possible, including both follower network data and communication network data.  But 
the collection of follower data from the Twitter API is very inefficient.  Further, follower 
data is limited in what it can reveal about the flow of information on Twitter.  Moreover, 
the social network created by the actual communication network between users is arguably 
more emblematic of the social structure of Twitter anyway.  In sum then, the observable 
social network patterns based on actual communication between users is the best and most 
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accessible indicator that Twitter offers for understanding the actual social structure of 
communication on the site. 
5.9 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH OF TWITTER 
While most Twitter research has focused generally on various aspects of the flow 
of information within this social network, the approach taken in this study is aimed at 
studying the flow of information within a local news ecology—specifically, in the Twin 
Cities metropolitan area in Minnesota that roughly includes the cities of Minneapolis and 
St. Paul and their suburban areas.  Notably, as Anderson, Bell, and Shirky (2012) write, 
while there is less concern today for the ongoing sustainability of large newspapers like 
the New York Times or the Washington Post, there is significant concern today about the 
economic viability of smaller local news organizations around the country.  Indeed, large 
newspapers in several comparably large metropolitan areas in the US including Denver, 
CO and Seattle, WA have closed down or gone online only in recent years.  Further, most 
newspapers in recent years have had to scale down the size of their journalism staffs 
(Starkman, 2010). 
While a few cities such as New York City, Los Angeles, or Chicago are 
individually unique as very large US cities and thus probably unique compared to most 
other US cities, the Twin Cities is a moderately sized metropolitan area with a population 
that is comparable to numerous other metro areas in the United States.  Indeed, as a media 
market with a population of 3.34 million people, the Twin Cities is among 21 Metropolitan 
  
                 144 
 
Statistical Areas that have between 4.55 million and 2 million people and among 30 cities 
with between 4.55 million and 1.5 million (US Census, 2010).  Thus, a case study of the 
networked gatekeeping process within the Twin Cities is expected to have direct relevance 
for our understanding of patterns that of news diffusion within numerous other 
comparably-sized US cities.  It is also notable that the Twin Cities make up the largest 
metropolitan area in Minnesota and contain the state’s capital.  This makes the Twin Cities 
metropolitan area similar, in terms of its political importance to the state, to the largest 
metropolitan areas and state capital cities in most other US states. 
5.9a BOUNDARY SPECIFICATION AND “FINDING THE ACTUAL GATEKEEPERS” 
Some conceptual clarifications are necessary towards beginning to consider an 
empirical investigation of the observable networked gatekeeping process as it occurs 
within a particular community.  For one, in the paper where he originally described his 
field theory and the concept of gatekeepers, Kurt Lewin (1947) wrote that “the first 
diagnostic task” in efforts to study what we can now call the gatekeeping process “is that 
of finding the actual gate keepers” (p. 145).  Within the 20th century media environment, 
it was essentially unnecessary to look for the gatekeepers.  That is because in that era, 
organizational affiliation with a major news platform, by definition, is what granted media 
workers and news organizations their status as gatekeepers.  Within the modern 
gatekeeping process that occurs within the structural relations of an internet-based social 
network, however, it has essentially become necessary to once again find the actual 
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gatekeepers.  In this new conception of gatekeeping as a process that occurs within the 
relational structure of a network, we might call these modern central actors network 
gatekeepers, influentials, or hubs. 
The question of who the influentials are in a networked gatekeeping process 
immediately gives rise to a second, related challenge necessary in many social network 
analyses: that of boundary specification. That is, social network analysis often requires the 
researcher to first address the boundary specification question of “where does a researcher 
set the limits when collecting data on social relations that, in reality, may have no obvious 
limits?” (p. Knoke and Yang, p. 165).   Just as it was unnecessary to find the actual 
gatekeepers in the 20th century media environment, there were also clear boundaries for 
being actively engaged in the gathering, sorting, reporting, and dissemination processes 
that makes up the gatekeeping process.  That is, the boundaries for determining who could 
count as gatekeepers in the 20th century gatekeeping process started and ended with 
professional journalists and the major news organizations they worked for who owned the 
print and broadcast news platforms. 
For the empirical study in this paper, a first level of boundary specification is the 
decision to collect data from the Twitter API.  Secondly, the boundaries for my social 
network analyses are further established by a chosen focus on the networked gatekeeping 
process as it occurs within the local news ecology in the Minneapolis and St. Paul 
metropolitan area in Minnesota—also known as the Twin Cities.  But still, even with this 
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criteria established, there are no obvious limits further to the boundaries for the social 
network that is relevant for understanding the networked gatekeeping process within the 
Twin Cities news ecology.  This is because for one, as I wrote previously, the boundaries 
of what counts as journalism are being significantly challenged (Lewis, 2012) today.  As 
such, boundary specification of the network of participants engaged in the news 
construction and diffusion process that is relevant to some given community presents an 
important challenge for empirically studying the networked gatekeeping process. 
The challenge and importance of boundary specification becomes especially clear 
when considering that there is so much communication on Twitter that has nothing to do 
with the news ecology of any defined geographic area.  Indeed, at a time when Twitter was 
rapidly diffusing into broad public use, the New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd 
(2009) suggested that the site is nothing more than “a toy for bored celebrities and high-
school girls.”  And while it is true Twitter contains a lot of communication that is 
inconsequential for the public as a whole, this fact only makes clear the need to identify 
the boundaries of a social network within Twitter that captures meaning for our 
understanding the gatekeeping process and the place of journalism within it. 
This problem of boundary specification is not unique to social network analyses 
studies of internet-mediated communication.  Rather, efforts to conduct social network 
analyses of human relational structures and communication patterns in “offline” life are 
frequently challenged by the initial question of boundary specification.  
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Numerous scholars have discussed the challenge of boundary specification for 
social network analysis (Marin & Wellman, 2011; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011).   Borgatti and 
Halgin provide a useful directive for understanding how to go about the specification of 
boundaries for social network analysis: 
The naïve concern is that we may select nodes “incorrectly,” accidentally 
excluding nodes that should not have been.  In reality, however, the choice 
of nodes should not generally be regarded as an empirical question.  Rather, 
it should be dictated by the research question and one’s explanatory theory” 
(p. 1169).    
Towards considering possible research questions for this study then, it is necessary to take 
into account Borgatti and Halgin’s advice.  Indeed, there are several research questions 
that stem from the theory and literature covered in this study.  In the following sections, I 
lay out an argument for how the ideas of socially responsible journalism and relevant 
journalism can become part of a dual mission in doing journalism that is both socially 
responsible and good for the business of news. 
5.9b WHAT “RESPONSIBILITY” DOES JOURNALISM HAVE FOR DEMOCRACY? 
The American publisher Nelson Poynter long ago made the suggestion that in spite 
of the status of news organizations as businesses, they have a special obligation to the 
public such that their profit motives “cannot compromise with the integrity of the news.”2   
                                                 
 
2 The principles that Poynter developed in 1947 can be viewed at: http://ajrarchive.org/article.asp?id=1536,  
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And yet as Sullivan (2006) notes, while newspaper organizations generally claim to take 
seriously the idea that they are public goods that ultimately belong to their communities, 
actual evidence suggests that “many executives view good journalism more as a byproduct 
of business success than as a source of it.”  The common refrain by executives according 
to Sullivan has been that “we need to be profitable so that we can continue to do good 
journalism” (p. 67).   So how does a news organization resolve its business interests in a 
profit-driven media market with its democratic responsibility?  Given that profit margins 
for newspapers in the 20th century were at 20 to 30 percent (Anderson, Bell, and 2012) and 
quality did not even come first in that era, how can we expect news organizations to 
operate in accordance with the democratic principles that they are normatively expected to 
uphold? 
 The first step in answering this question involves considering the premise of 
Poynter’s position that journalism must primarily serve a democratic purpose before any 
business considerations.  Importantly, Poynter’s argument is based upon a social 
responsibility model of journalism that I discussed earlier and thusly reflects a journalistic 
theory of democracy as well.  To recap, within this view of journalism’s place in 
democracy, (1) journalism’s role is to inform citizens, (2) citizens get more engaged when 
they are more informed, and (3) democracy works better with more citizens engaged 
(Gans, 1998).  Each point in this theory follows from the last and comes back to the 
ultimate belief that the health of democracy is directly contingent upon the health of 
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journalism. 
But is this premise accurate?  Sullivan (2011) writes that one of the fundamental 
problems with the social responsibility model of journalism is that it is based on a “mass” 
approach to news distribution which perceives that the job of journalist is to get their 
media messages to reach the greatest number of people possible.  But within an 
increasingly internet-based media model in which public communication is interactive, the 
viability of a mass approach to doing journalism unravels. 
According to Sullivan (2011), a common complaint about the journalism produced 
by newspaper organizations today is that it lacks relevance for the citizenry.  This critique 
is particularly significant, according to Sullivan, given the agreement across most media 
observers that being relevant to audiences is one of the most important imperatives of 
doing good journalism.  And indeed, the idea of being relevant today, within a networked 
media environment, directly contradicts any premise for doing journalism that is based 
upon a mass approach to attracting audiences.  That is, a mass approach to doing 
journalism and getting the public engaged with the news implicitly views its targets as a 
passive, homogenous audience in which everyone has the same wants and needs.  Such an 
approach ignores the reality of a networked media environment in which “the people 
formerly known as the audience” (Rosen, 2006) must be viewed as active, heterogeneous 
recipients. 
Journalism scholar Keith Stamm (see Stamm & Fortini-Campbell, 1983) long ago 
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articulated a model for community journalism such that its focus should be on an 
understanding of a naturally interdependent relationship between audiences and local 
journalism.  As Mersey (2010) explains this connection in Stamm’s model between local 
news and the community, “those who read their local newspaper are likely to be connected 
to their local community, and those who are connected to their local community are likely 
to read their local newspaper” (p. 525).   
Perhaps more today than several decades ago when Stamm proposed this model, 
this model points to a kind of participation and symbiosis between journalists and the 
collective public as active recipients which requires journalists to better understand and 
engage with their audiences.  But how can journalists understand their entire audiences at 
once?  It is not practical to suggest that journalists should simply engage with anyone on 
social network sites who talks to them.  Indeed, there are likely to be audience members 
who are highly expansive but not worth listening to, what some would colloquially call 
“loud mouths.”    
Within a networked gatekeeping process within a social awareness system like 
Twitter then, an important part of being relevant involves understanding other participants 
in the network—both other journalists and non-journalists—who are influential within the 
overall discussion around news that is important to the local community.  These other 
influential participants in the conversation around news are what I would call influentials 
in the networked gatekeeping process, or “network gatekeepers.” 
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Generally speaking, as Meraz and Papacharissi (2013) note, prominence within a 
social network around the discussion of news cannot simply come from well-known 
people talking to other well-known people.  Rather, this kind of prominence and thus, the 
extent of one’s influence on the agenda setting of the modern news environment has been 
observed to come largely from the aggregated attention from numerous active audience 
members who mostly reside within small, tight clusters on the periphery of the networked 
gatekeeping process. 
When Lewin said that it is important to find the gatekeepers, his reasoning was that 
this was the key to connecting with the most influential people in a person’s life.  
Similarly, the process of understanding the other people and organizations that are 
influential in the networked gatekeeping process allows for us to recognize the network 
actors that have special relevance within the networked gatekeeping process.  Thus, the 
following is a major research question that I will seek to address with this paper: 
Research Question 1: In a social network analysis of discussion about 
news on Twitter that is connected to issues in a local community, who are 
the most influential people and organizations in this network—that is, 
who are the network gatekeepers? 
   
For the empirical study in this paper, I describe two approaches to boundary 
specification that allow us to go about finding the network gatekeepers in a networked 
gatekeeping process.  One kind of boundary specification is defined by discussion around 
news as reported by established news organizations within the Twin Cities—that is, a 
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network of Twitter tweets that contain URL links to the websites for local news 
organizations.  A social network analysis that is defined this way will, by definition, bias 
the position of these news organizations.  Therefore, the boundaries for these kinds of 
networks conceive of the gatekeeping process as it has traditionally been viewed: as 
revolving around established news organizations.  A network whose boundaries are 
defined with these terms in itself can reveal useful information, such as pointing to which 
journalists from these professional news organizations are the most central to the flow of 
local news on Twitter.  Additionally, such a network is likely to reveal some network 
actors outside of news organizations that are also particularly central to the flow of news 
as it is reported by these news organizations.  Moreover, a social network whose 
boundaries are defined this way is also useful for comparison to a second type of network 
that is specified not by orientation to established organization but rather, through 
orientation around events and issues that are important for a local community. 
 In a second social network for Twitter data then, I define the boundaries for social 
network analysis based on events and issues of local importance—specifically, those 
issues and events that are revolving around the #mnleg hashtag which involves 
discussions that are relevant to the actions of the Minnesota State Legislature.  Collection 
of this event/issue-centered network sets up a comparative analysis between the news-
organization centric dataset and the event/issue-centered dataset.  That is, I will analyze 
important differences across these two datasets in which the boundaries are defined in two 
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distinct ways: the first dataset conceives of the networked gatekeeping process as 
revolving around Twin Cities news organizations and the second one conceives of the 
networked gatekeeping process as revolving around events and issues of relevance in the 
Twin Cities.  Respectively, these two types of social networks conceive of the gatekeeping 
process in 20th century terms (with news organizations at the center) and in 21st century 
terms (with the networked gatekeeping process revolving around news itself).     
Defining the boundaries for social network analysis based on the logic of the 
second dataset, in which the process is seen as revolving around the news, acknowledges 
the idea from the sociology of professions literature that the boundaries for what can count 
as news are no longer controlled by traditional news organizations or professional 
journalists.  By identifying the network gatekeepers in a network that revolves around 
events and issues of local importance, we can better identify the body of old gatekeepers 
and new gatekeepers who are relevant to the networked conversation of news.  In addition 
to the traditional gatekeepers in the media industry, it is important for our understanding of 
the networked gatekeeping process to recognize the new mixture of network gatekeeper 
types including politicians, bloggers, businesses, and other influential voices that are 
influential in the modern media environment. This leads to an additional research 
question: 
Research Question 2: In a Twitter-based social network that revolves 
around events instead of around news organizations, do the network 
gatekeepers include a greater diversity of network gatekeeper types?  
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CHAPTER 6. METHODS AND RESULTS 
6.1 TWITTER AS MICROCOSM OF THE NETWORKED GATEKEEPING PROCESS 
There are two core theoretical frameworks at the heart of this study: gatekeeping 
theory and graph theory.  The latter, graph theory, provides the underlying conceptual 
basis for the primary method, social network analysis, that is used for the empirical study 
in this dissertation.  As I wrote in Chapter 2, gatekeeping theory as it was most recently 
described by Shoemaker and Vos (2009) has long history as the theory from the 
communication field for understanding how “the countless bits of information” about 
current events become “the limited number of messages that reach people every day” 
(Shoemaker and Vos, 2009, p. 1).  But that theory was developed primarily within a 
“transmission” model of media in which the gatekeeping process was comprised of 
“senders” sending messages to “receivers” (McQuail, 2010) in an almost entirely one-way 
direction.  Further, the model for that gatekeeping process conceptualized audiences as an 
essentially homogenous “mass” of receivers. 
The introduction and advanced development of the internet and its associated 
technologies, however, have enabled the development of a gatekeeping process which now 
occurs within the structure of network relations that are facilitated by the internet and its 
associated technologies.  The media environment that journalists are working within is 
now a networked, participatory process such that “the people formerly known as the 
audience” (Rosen, 2006) are engaged as active receivers who play a shared part in the 
  
                 155 
 
control over the flow of information through social network sharing and conversation 
about news and information.  Thus, these changes have effectively transformed the 
gatekeeping process into a digitally and socially networked process. 
First, then, graph theory provides a complementary conceptual framework for 
reconceptualizing gatekeeping theory to account for the way that the network structure of 
the internet has transformed the gatekeeping process.  Secondly, social network analysis is 
a useful analytical method that can be used the empirically study this now networked 
gatekeeping process.  And thirdly, a social network site like Twitter—the public 
communication forum that is the object of observation for this empirical project—
embodies a unique sort of microcosm of the networked gatekeeping process overall.  This 
nature of Twitter makes it adequately reflective of some important patterns that are 
occurring within the overall internet-mediated modern gatekeeping process. 
Below, I describe in detail the processes for data collection, organization, and 
analysis of several Twitter datasets that can provide useful for better understanding the 
networked gatekeeping process.  Each step is part of the total empirical study conducted 
for this dissertation that is designed to get a picture of how the news gatekeeping process 
ensues in the “Twittersphere” (the public information distribution and communication that 
occurs on Twitter).  Specifically, the focus of my study is confined to observation and 
analysis of the network of people and events that are locally important for deliberation 
about the public affairs in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area.  Also commonly 
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known as the Twin Cities, the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area is the 15th largest 
Designated Market area in the United States according to the Nielsen Company (Nielsen, 
2013). 
This study of gatekeeping as a networked process involves the collection and 
observation of social network data that might reasonably be thought to have relevance for 
the events and issues of local importance within the metropolitan area of Minneapolis-St. 
Paul, Minnesota.  Towards this objective, I collected and drew upon three separate but 
overlapping and complementary data sets that collectively comprise a case study, 
revealing useful insights about the influentials and the overall network structure of the 
Twin Cities news ecology.  To collect and analyze these data, I used the Social Network 
Analysis software known as NodeXL, which is an add-on for Microsoft Excel that allows 
for the collection, storage, computation, and visualization of social networks from several 
social network sites (for detailed information about NodeXL, see Himelboim, Smith, and 
Schneiderman, 2013, Schneiderman and Dunne, 2013; http://NodeXL.codeplex.com/). 
Each gathered dataset in this case study represents a network of Twitter mentions and 
replies that was collected using NodeXL using different search procedures based on 
conditions for boundary specification that derive from the research questions in this paper.  
Table 6.1 briefly describes the nature of the reply and mention tweets that represent the 
ties in the social networks in this study. 
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Table 6.1 – Description of Replies and Mentions 
Replies 
A “reply” tweet is a tweet posted by one Twitter user which is generally intended to be read 
by only one other Twitter user.  In order for a tweet to be a reply tweet that is directed at 
only one other user, the tweet must begin with the @ sign in the first character space in the 
tweet, immediately followed by the Twitter handle of the intended recipient of the reply 
tweet.  An example of a reply tweet is: @thomasernste What do you think of NodeXL as a 
social network analysis tool?  Notably, the term “reply” tweet is used to refer to either an ac-
tual reply to a previous message or to any message that begins with the @ sign and a re-
ceiver’s handle.   
Replies are distinguished from “direct messages,” which are private messages, not 
viewable by other Twitter users, that one user can send via Twitter to a second user.  While 
reply tweets generally only appear on the newsfeed of the target receiver, a reply tweet will 
appear on the newsfeed for any third user who follows both the sender and receiver node. 
Mentions 
One kind of “mention” tweet is a tweet posted by one Twitter user that is viewable by both 
the followers of that sender and also viewable by one or more specific receiver nodes whose 
Twitter handle appears somewhere in the tweet in the spaces after the first character space.  
An example of a mention tweet might be: I’ve been told that @thomasernste is using the 
NodeXL software to conduct a social network analysis.  Notably, a mention becomes a men-
tion instead of a reply because the tweet does not begin with the @ sign along with the re-
ceiver’s Twitter handle. 
Also of note here is that “mentions” also include retweets.  A retweet is the same as a 
regular mention in that in both cases, the tweet contains the Twitter handle of a second node 
and a retweet appears for both the followers of the sender node in the retweet and it also ap-
pears in the newsfeed for the person whose tweet was retweeted.   Notably, retweet is differ-
ent from a mention in that it includes all or most all of the text that was previously posted by 
the Twitter user whose Twitter handle appears in the retweet.  An example of a retweet 
might be if, first, a user sees a message posted by @thomasernste which says: I am learning 
a lot about NodeXL from their website at www.nodexl.com.  While retweets have been 
crafted differently over the years, the most common way to post a retweet is for a sender to 
click a “Retweet” hyperlink that is adjacent to some tweet as it appears on the sender’s 
newsfeed.  
Note: Replies and mention tweets represent the ties in the social networks for this study 
 
6.1a ADDRESSIVITY MARKERS 
According to Hansen, Kai, Arvidsson, Nielsen, Colleoni, and Etter (2011), 
retweeting represents broadcasting and indicates virality and the formation of opinion on 
Twitter.  Boyd, Gilder, and Lotan (2010) add that retweets are often a form of 
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endorsement.  Further, tweets with URLs are especially likely to be retweeted (Suh, Hong, 
Pirolli, and Chi, 2010).  The makers of NodeXL categorize retweets into the category of 
“mentions,” which also include other tweets by one user that mention another user’s 
Twitter handle.  Of note, when one Twitter user retweets a message from a second user or 
mentions that second user’s handle in a tweet after the first character in the tweet, that 
tweet is considered a mention that is disseminated to the newsfeed for all users following 
the first user.  The number of “mention” tweets listed in Table 6.1 can be understood as an 
indicator of the relative extent to which news from a particular news organization is 
getting exposure.  Ultimately, I followed from Himelboim, McCreery, and Smith’s (2013) 
approach in combining replies and mentions into a single indicator of the network ties. 
6.2 THE DATASETS 
The datasets in this study were collected using two types of boundary specification 
for the construction of social networks.  Dataset 1 is a social network that centers around 
16 established Twin Cities news organizations and the journalism professionals they 
employ.  Dataset 2 is a social network that centers around the most followed Twitter 
accounts that are affiliated with 30 different established news organizations in the Twin 
Cities.   The social networks in these first two datasets will be generally referred to as 
news organization-centric networks.  Dataset 3 is a social network that centers around a 
specific public affairs event or issue—specifically, this social network is defined by the 
patterns of communication on Twitter that circulate around the Twitter hashtag #mnleg.  
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This latter type of network will generally be referred to as event/issue centered network.   
Following from the rationale suggested by Borgatti and Halgin (2011) that 
boundary specification should derive directly from the research concerns involved in a 
particular study, these datasets address different research questions that have grown out of 
the theory and literature discussed in this dissertation.  The various datasets discussed here 
have different analytical value both individually and comparatively for understanding 
characteristics of the networked gatekeeping process in general.  Collectively, analysis of 
these datasets contributes to our understanding of how the networked gatekeeping process 
operates within a local media ecology, especially within the Twin Cities metropolitan area.  
6.3 DATASET 1, PART 1:  1ST NEWS ORGANIZATION-CENTRIC NETWORK 
6.3a SOCIAL NETWORK OF TWITTER LINKS TO 16 TWIN CITIES NEWS OUTLETS 
 The first dataset I collected is a social network that derived from the following 
criteria for boundary specification: (1) using NodeXL, all data was collected from the 
population of tweets posted to Twitter over a period of 24 non-consecutive days spread out 
over the summer and fall of 2013; (2) all tweets from Twitter’s REST API were searched 
for presence of the URL domain to the website for one of sixteen different Twin Cities-
based news organization (example: startribune.com).  The identified links could be either a 
link to the front page of the site or a link to a specific article from one of these news 
organizations.  Of note, even if a link to one of these news sites is a shortened URL, 
NodeXL will still identify this site and collect these tweets; (3) the sixteen news 
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organizations that were searched were chosen if they do at least some reporting on 
political issues that are directly relevant to being informed for engagement in the local 
democratic process.  Thus, news outlets dedicated strictly to sports, entertainment, or 
lifestyle news were disregarded for this dataset; (4) most of the news organizations in this 
dataset were chosen, first, because they are believed to be the largest Twin Cities news 
organizations from the following formats: newspaper, television, radio, and online only.   
In addition, during pilot testing I discovered media organizations beyond the major 
newspapers, online, TV, radio news, and online only organizations.  These non-major 
news organizations that I discovered as viable news organizations during pilot testing 
included the Twin Cities Business Journal, Twin Cities Business Magazine, The Uptake, 
Twin Cities Daily Planet, and the Minnesota Progressive Project.  The decision was made 
to include some newer online only news organizations in the dataset based on the 
supposition that the internet enables independent news organizations with no traditional 
mass media platforms and no traditional business model for journalism to emerge as 
important players in the networked gatekeeping process.  Table 6.2 restates and 
elaborates on the conditions and characteristics for constructing Dataset 1. 
The social network that resulted from these conditions for boundary specification 
is comprised of a total of 27,700 nodes and 69,866 total edges (each of which represents a 
single tweet).  33,220 of these edges are self-loops (singleton tweets, or tweets that are 
standalone posts that are not directed at another Twitter user) and 36,646 are ties between  
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Table 6.2- Characteristics of Dataset 1 
1 Data was collected from the Twitter social network site using  NodeXL 
2 
Data was collected from the population of tweets from the Twitter Rest API posted to Twitter over a 
period of 24 days spread out over the summer and fall of 2013* 
3 
Data was collected through separate searches for the URLs of 16 different news organizations (i.e. 
example: startribune.com) that do journalism about local news in the Twin Cities metropolitan area 
in Minnesota. 
4 All data was compiled into a single social network 
5 
The 16 news organizations were chosen because they do at least some reporting on political issues 
that are directly relevant to being informed for engagement in the local democratic process.  Thus, 
news outlets dedicated strictly to sports, entertainment, or lifestyle news were disregarded.
**
 
6 
Nodes in Dataset 1 are either sender or receiver nodes in tweets containing a URL for one of 16 
news organization 
7 Ties in Dataset 1 are the tweets containing a URL for one of 16 news organizations 
 
*Ideally, one would collect data for all 16 news organizations on all of the same days to ensure that all 
data represents news website link frequencies surrounding the same basic flow of news in the Twin 
Cities. Most of the data from all 16 news organizations was collected on all of the same 24 days but a few 
days throughout the data collection were missed due to inconsistencies with data gathering from Twitter’s 
REST API.  To compensate for missed days for some news sources, I collected data for some additional 
days for some news organizations to ensure that I had 24 full days of data collected from each news 
organization.  Notably, there is some potential for problems interpreting meaning from these data 
collection problems and decisions if certain days were unusually high or low in overall hits for links to a a 
particular news organization.  
 
**This list includes the major news organizations in the Twin Cities that report and discuss politically 
relevant local news plus a few were added after they appeared in adequate frequencies during data 
gathering pilot tests. Some minor political news organizations, including one called Politics in Minnesota 
(politicsinminnesota.com) may have been overlooked in constructing this dataset even as Politics in 
Minnesota seems on par in terms of typical exposure with an organization like the Minnesota Progressive 
Project. 
 
 
two separate users (replies or mentions).  To clarify, in this dataset, the nodes/vertices in 
the network are Twitter users who are either the “senders” or “receivers/sources” of replies 
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or mentions in this network.  The actual reply or mention tweets between any two users 
represent the ties/edges in this social network.   
 
6.3b RESULTS FOR DATASET 1, PART 1 
Table 6.3 contains information about the network of tweet data collected for 
Dataset 1 that is relevant for addressing Hypotheses 1A and 1B.  The total number of 
Twitter accounts that have an affiliation with each news organization include both 
personal Twitter accounts and organizational accounts.  In addition to the primary 
organizational account for each news organization and the accounts for individual 
journalists, many organizations also have divisional accounts for departments such as the 
sports department, the business department, or the entertainment department.   
Notably, the number of Twitter accounts affiliated with a particular news 
organization are highly correlated with the number of overall mentions for each news 
organization.  That is, given a one-tailed t-test with 14 degrees of freedom for these 16 
pairs (df = N-2) rows, the Pearson’s r value was calculated as 0.929.  This correlation is 
statistically significant at the 0.005 level.  This significance in this correlation is notable 
because it indicates that the number of users for a given organization is highly correlated 
with the exposure that a particular organization is likely to get on Twitter.  To some extent 
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Table 6.3 - Data for 16 Twin Cities News Organizations 
News Organization  
& URL domain 
Type of  
News Org. 
Total # of Affiliated 
Twitter Accounts* 
Total # of URLS  
in mentions 
Star Tribune                        
startribune.com 
Daily newspaper, 
private for profit 
198    9213 
St. Paul Pioneer Press 
twincities.com 
Print, private 
 for profit 
89 4269 
Minnesota Public Radio     
minnesota.publicradio.org 
Radio, public  
nonprofit 
88 4200 
WCCO                               
cbslocal.minnesota.com 
TV and radio,  
private for profit 
86 3110 
City Pages                       
citypages.com 
Print, private  
for profit 
16 2552 
Kare11                                
kare11.com 
Television,  
private for profit 
81 2354 
MinnPost                              
minnpost.com 
Online only,  
private nonprofit 
37 2225 
KSTP                            
kstp.com 
TV, private  
for profit 
58 2141 
Twin Cities Business Journal 
bizjournals.com/twincities 
Print, private  
for profit 
17 1881 
Twin Cities Daily Planet 
tcdailyplanet.net 
Online only,  
private nonprofit 
11 1030 
KMSP-FOX                     
myfoxtwincities.com 
TV, private for 
profit 
55 596 
Bring Me The News          
bringmethenews.com 
Online only, pri-
vate for profit 
9 582 
Twin Cities Public Television 
tpt.org 
TV, public non 
profit 
10 465 
Finance and Commerce         
finance-commerce.com 
Print,  private for 
profit 
6 448 
The Uptake            
theuptake.org 
Online only, pri-
vate nonprofit 
7 183 
Minnesota Progressive Project 
mnprogressiveproject.com 
Online only, pri-
vate nonprofit 
3 91 
 
*Totals may not be exact, dependent upon new hirings, attrition, and possible slight collection errors 
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this could mean that the larger your organizational workforce who have Twitter accounts, 
the larger your overall exposure “footprint” on Twitter is likely to be.   
The total number of Twitter accounts affiliated with each news organization that I 
discovered is based on a variety of methods for searching and finding these Twitter 
accounts.  These methods included, first, the use of the website followerwonk.com to 
search Twitter profiles for self-identified affiliation with the given news organization.  I 
also conducted a crosscheck with Twin Cities journalist David Brauer’s Twitter lists of 
Twin Cities journalists available for public access on Twitter and on a 2012 blog post 
(Brauer, 2012) where Brauer listed the top 100 most followed Twitter accounts on Twitter 
that are affiliated with Twin Cities news organizations.  There was also some serendipitous 
discovery of some Twitter profiles affiliated with the various organizations throughout the 
data collection process, including discovery of the organization the Minnesota Progressive 
Project and its three affiliated Twitter accounts. 
It must be noted here too that the 16 news organizations chosen for inclusion in 
these datasets are not assumed to be an exhaustive list of all Twin Cities news 
organizations.  Significant efforts were made to identify not only the most prominent news 
organization in the Twin Cities that report political news about events and issues in the 
Twin Cities, but also smaller political news organizations that have developed in recent 
years. The clearest reason why all possible “news organizations” may have not be 
identified for this dataset is that the definition of what can count as a news organization is 
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not clear in a networked gatekeeping process. 
On one level, in an evolving media environment, new news organizations come 
and go frequently.  When a person or group starts a blog, that person or group may 
reasonably claim to be professional journalists or at least para-professional journalists.  
Further, there are also some established news organizations that I did not choose to include 
in my data collection, including several suburban and city neighborhood media outlets. 
Such smaller organizations were mostly ignored for the sake of efficiency even as they 
may have added value to this study.  The marginal news organizations I chose to include, 
including The Minnesota Progressive Project (MPP), are not known to definitely be even 
the biggest emerging media organizations.  But I did see the MPP appear in pilot testing 
stage for this analysis and determined that it would be important to include, especially as it 
is central in conversation around politics in Minnesota.  Overall, while this selection of 16 
news organizations for inclusion here was primarily based on their prominent observable 
presence on Twitter then, it could be that some small news organizations such as Politics 
in Minnesota would have been better to choose than some that are in this sample. 
 Dataset 1 is directly relevant towards addressing Hypothesis 1A in which I ask if 
the audience exposure diversity (Napoli, 2011) of news sources on Twitter follows a 
power law distribution.  Further, the data in Table 6.3 are also relevant for Hypothesis 1B 
in which I predict that the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) for this exposure diversity 
data will be statistically similar to the HHI that Hindman found when he evaluated the 
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concentration of the Twin Cities news market in his 2011 study.  In Hindman’s study, he 
found moderate to highly concentrated distributions of audience exposure in all local 
media markets in the United States, including the Twin Cities.  Figure 6.1 is a graph of the 
distribution of overall links to sixteen Twin Cities news organizations over the data 
collection period. 
Figure 6.1 - Power law distribution of tweet frequency for 16 Twin Cities news URLs 
 
The Y-axis represents the total number of times over 24 non-consecuitive days that a link to an article from 
the listed news website appeared on Twitter. 
The X-axis represents the 16 news organizations included in this study, ranked from most to least visited. 
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As I hypothesized in Hypothesis 1A, the distribution of exposure to Twin Cities 
news organizations on Twitter does follow a relatively skewed power law distribution 
which is shown in visual form in Figure 6.1.  Hypothesis 1A is supported.  Furthermore, 
in his study of internet traffic distribution for news organizations in local news ecologies, 
Hindman (2011) found an HHI for the Twin Cities news ecology of 1598—any HH1 with 
any index over 1500 is considered a moderately concentrated distribution by the 
Department of Justice (Department of Justice, 2013).  From the data I collected, I 
calculated the HH1 for the distribution of links to the websites for Twin Cities news 
organizations on Twitter during the collection period.  The HHI score for this distribution 
is 1,263.  This number indicates a lesser level of concentration of market power compared 
to Hindman’s findings when we look solely at the distribution of links to these news 
organizations across all mentions on Twitter during the collection period.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1B is not supported.  I discuss the implications of these findings in my 
analysis in Chapter 7. 
6.4 DATASET 1, PART 2:  1ST NEWS ORGANIZATION-CENTRIC NETWORK: 
6.4a TOP 100 “NETWORK GATEKEEPERS” IN FIRST SOCIAL NETWORK                                                           
Before revealing who the “networked gatekeepers” are according to the conditions 
for boundary specification in Dataset 1, it is first useful to consider the broader context of 
the entire network of people and organizations that actively use Twitter.   The number of 
“followers” a given user has appears on all user profile pages; this follower number is 
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commonly used in popular discussions about Twitter as a surface level indicator of a 
user’s overall popularity on the social network site.  Further, in popular discussions about 
Twitter, much is made of which celebrities or prominent people and organizations have the 
most followers. 
Generally speaking, follower numbers reflect one basic measure of one’s 
prominence in society.  The most followed users on Twitter are generally famous on a 
national and international level within the United States, with several solo music 
performers and other entertainment celebrities taking many of the top spots on this list. 
But without the capacity to conduct a social network analysis of the underlying structure 
of a network and without appropriate boundary specification within the massive network 
of Twitter users, most Twitter users probably cannot recognize the important topological 
features of the social networks of users around various topics.  This problem of 
recognizing and learning from the patterns of discussion on Twitter seem especially 
challenging for understanding the news that might be relevant within a local news ecology.  
The data in Table 6.4 is a list of Twitter users that have the most followers and who appear 
as a node in at least once communication dyad among the 27,700 nodes and nearly 70,000 
tweets that appear in Dataset 1.  
My intent for Table 6.4 is simply to illustrate that the most widely known measures 
of Twitter, the follower figures, are not particularly useful for actually understanding what 
can be important about Twitter for journalism and the news diffusion process in any given  
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   Table 6.4 - Top 35 most followed nodes that appear in Dataset 1 
       Nodes  
(Twitter users) 
Type # of followers 
Ladygaga Entertainment 39,783,374 
Barackobama politics – national 35,419,985 
taylorswift13 Entertainment 33,982,854 
Ddlovato Entertainment 19,590,668 
Kimkardashian Entertainment 18,709,159 
Aplusk Entertainment 14,725,863 
Cnnbrk news, international 13,037,825 
Facebook Business 11,109,121 
Kanyewest Entertainment 10,068,935 
Nytimes news – national 9,944,622 
Carlyraejepsen Entertainment 8,459,761 
Tomhanks Entertainment 6,979,276 
Espn news - national sports 6,966,486 
google Business 6,756,648 
codysimpson Entertainment 5,951,183 
sportscenter news - national sports 5,652,575 
theonion satirical news 5,442,588 
sarahksilverman Entertainment 4,579,937 
starbucks Business 4,157,545 
whitehouse politics - national 4,074,869 
piersmorgan news - national 3,680,500 
reuters news - national 3,519,590 
wholefoods Business 3,494,620 
nelly_mo Entertainment 3,316,445 
huffingtonpost news - national sports 3,249,894 
foxnews news - national 3,113,915 
pontifex religious - Pope 2,881,897 
sarabareilles Entertainment 2,870,887 
schwarzenegger Entertainment 2,845,809 
Cbsnews news - national 2,796,972 
bigtimerush Entertainment 2,734,966 
Questlove Entertainment 2,714,070 
Thatkevinsmith Entertainment 2,463,377 
Common Entertainment 2,293,974 
1loganhenderson Entertainment 2,274,567 
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context.  One might even say that these numbers, by their prominence as indicators of 
Twitter popularity, serve to implicitly obscure the more meaningful characteristics of some 
specified network with relevant boundaries for a network of news diffusion that might be 
important for particular geographic locations or for specific issues.  If I am a journalist in 
the Twin Cities, for example, the most familiar and ultimately superficial information I 
will have about relative differences in the popularity or influence of users is the follower 
numbers of users on all of Twitter.   
But is such information actually useful to a local journalist? Not really.  And even 
if several highly followed celebrities appear in a discussion within a communication 
network that is locally oriented, as many did in the network collected for Dataset 1, this 
does not mean that they have any particular local relevance.  What is most likely is that 
such celebrities might appear in the network of conversation about local news because 
someone who lives local sent them a direct message or retweeted one of their messages.  
But this tendency in which celebrities may have many incoming communication ties does 
not necessarily make such a national celebrity relevant to a particular local media network.  
Indeed, as Meraz and Papacharissi (2013) note, it is common for celebrities to be the 
frequent objects of mention tweets but with very few or zero reciprocated tweets with 
most users. 
Research Question 1 involves the question of who the most influential users are 
in this network.  My rationale behind pursuing this research question is that identification 
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of the most central Twitter users within this social network of conversation around the 
news reported by news organizations begins to give us an idea of who might be included 
among the new central actors or gatekeepers within the networked gatekeeping process.  
As stated previously, the social network collected for Dataset 1 is, first, comprised of 
nodes that represent Twitter users.  Secondly, the ties in this dataset represent the reply and 
mention tweets between any two users in the network of tweets that contain a URL link to 
the website for a Twin Cities news organization.  Table 6.5 below contains data for the 
Twitter users who are the most central in this network based on indegree centrality—in 
this network, indegree centrality represents a straightforward count of the number of times 
that a user is the target or receiver node in a reply or mention tweet.   
Table 6.5 - Top 100 Nodes in Dataset 1 by Indegree Centrality, in rank order 
       Nodes  
(Twitter users) 
Name of  
Person/ 
Org. 
Description News beat 
Network 
Gatekeeper 
type 
Political 
leaning 
Indegree 
centrality 
startribune 
Minneapolis 
Star Tribune 
Minneapolis news-
paper 
General 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 1530 
mprnews 
Minnesota 
Public Radio 
Radio news 
organization in 
Twin Cities 
General 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 1033 
pioneerpress 
St. Paul  
PiPress 
Newspaper in St. 
Paul 
General 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 1022 
kare11 Kare11 - TV 
Twin cities televi-
sion news org. 
General 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 893 
Kstp KSTP TV 
Twin cities TV 
news org. 
General 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 828 
Wcco WCCO - TV 
Television news 
org. in TC 
General 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 675 
citypages City Pages 
Twin Cities print 
news org. 
General 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 590 
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minnpost MinnPost 
Online only local 
news organization 
General Hybrid Non 500 
naifco unclear 
Promotes nutri-
tional products 
NA Business 
Non 
 
444 
mspbjnews 
MSP Busi-
ness Journal 
Business news org. 
in Twin Cities 
Business 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 342 
bringmn 
Bring Me the 
News 
Curator/aggregator 
of local news 
General Hybrid Non 278 
mayorrtrybak RT Rybak 
Minneapolis 
mayor 
NA Political Left 216 
stribsports 
Minneapolis 
Star Tribune 
Sports division of 
Star Tribune 
Sports 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 176 
gimme_noise Reed Fischer 
City pages music 
editor 
Enter-
tainment 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 167 
tcdailyplanet 
Twin Cities 
Daily Planet 
Local online only 
news organization 
NA Hybrid Non 167 
myfox9 KMSP FOX 
Twin cities televi-
sion news organi-
zation 
General 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 153 
mikeberardino 
Mike 
Berardino 
MN Twins beat 
writer for St. Paul 
Pioneer Press. 
Sports 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 145 
dailycircuit 
Daily Circuit 
radio show 
MPR radio pro-
gram 
Enter-
tainment 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 127 
mnstatefair 
Minnesota 
State Fair 
Twitter handle for 
MN State Fair in-
formation 
NA Entertainment Non 116 
mayoclinic Mayo Clinic 
Minnesota-based 
hospital with na-
tional profile 
NA 
Health organ-
ization 
Non 115 
psychosuzis Psycho Suzis 
Twin Cities 
bar/restaurant 
NA Business Non 107 
stribopinion 
Minneapolis 
Star Tribune 
Opinion section for 
Star Tribune 
Public 
affairs 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 105 
newsbreaker Ora TV 
New digital TV or-
ganization 
Enter-
tainment 
Hybrid Non 97 
mspbjvomhof Jon Vomhof 
Business reporter, 
MSBJNews 
Business 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 95 
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psych4you 
Psychology  
for you 
Inspirational 
tweets 
NA Entertainment Non 95 
wccoradio 
WCCO 
Radio 
Radio news organ-
ization in TC 
General 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 94 
thereplacements 
The Replace-
ments 
Minneapolis based 
music band 
NA Entertainment Non 94 
atrupar 
Aaron  
Rupar 
"Blogger" for City 
Pages 
Public 
affairs 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 79 
stribroper Eric Roper 
Public affairs re-
porter, Star Trib-
une 
Public 
affairs 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 79 
Tpt 
Twin Cities 
Public 
 Television 
Public television 
station in the Twin 
Cities. 
General 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 77 
malbertnews Mark Albert 
Former KSTP Re-
porter, no current 
employer 
NA Citizen Non 77 
betsyhodges 
Betsy 
Hodges 
Minneapolis 
Mayor-elect 
NA Political Left 73 
bigtimerush 
Big Time 
Rush 
National enter-
tainer (music 
group) 
NA Entertainment Non 70 
joecstrib 
Joe 
Christenson 
NCAA football re-
porter for Star 
Tribune 
Sports 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 69 
russostrib 
Michael 
Russo 
Covers pro hockey 
for Star Tribune 
Sports 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 69 
classicalmpr 
MPR classi-
cal music 
Classical music 
program, MPR 
Enter-
tainment 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 68 
gophersnow 
Marcus 
Fuller 
Pioneer Press MN 
Gopher sports re-
porter 
Sports 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 64 
businessmn 
Finance & 
Commerce 
Minnesota busi-
ness magazine 
Business 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 63 
lavelleneal 
La Velle 
Neal 
Covers MN pro 
baseball for Star 
Tribune 
Sports 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 62 
carlospenanow Carlos Pena 
National music 
performer 
NA Entertainment Non 61 
hotdishblog 
City Pages 
food blog 
City Pages food 
blog. 
Enter-
tainment 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 60 
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govmarkdayton Mark Dayton 
Minnesota Gover-
nor 
NA Political Left 60 
dbrauer 
David 
Brauer 
Journalism, Min-
nPost 
Public 
affairs 
Hybrid Non 57 
chrisrstrib 
Chris Rie-
menschnei-
der 
Star Tribune music 
writer 
Enter-
tainment 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 54 
webertom1 Tom Weber 
Co-host, MPR 
Daily Circuit 
Enter-
tainment 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 52 
kevinmaddendc 
Kevin  
Madden 
National political 
strategist 
PR Political Right 52 
jerryzgoda Jerry Zgoda 
Pro basketball re-
porter, Star Trib-
une. 
Sports 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 52 
patrickreusse 
Patrick 
Reusse 
Columnist at the 
Star Tribune 
Sports 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 52 
mspbjsamblack Sam Black 
Senior Reporter 
MSBJNews 
Business 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 51 
vikings 
Minnesota 
Vikings 
TC Pro Football 
team 
NA Entertainment Non 50 
rachelsb 
Rachel Stas-
sen-Berger 
Star Tribune politi-
cal reporter 
Public 
affairs 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 49 
Samsteelepon-
der 
Samantha 
Ponder 
National sports re-
porter, ESPN 
Sports 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 49 
vsaucetwo Kevn Lieber 
Amazing Humans 
& The Best of the 
Internet 
Enter-
tainment 
Hybrid Non 48 
otiswhite Otis White 
Public affairs con-
sultant 
PR Blogger Non 48 
randball 
Michael 
Rand 
Digital sports edi-
tor, Star Tribune 
Sports 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 48 
target Target Co. 
National retailer 
based in Twin Cit-
ies 
NA Business Non 47 
surlybrewing 
Surly 
Brewing Co. 
Local beer brewery NA Business Non 46 
jasonkburnett 
Jason  
Burknett 
Citizen NA Citizen Non 45 
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theuptake The UpTake 
Twin cities public 
affairs news outlet 
NA Hybrid Left 45 
btrtourupdater 
Big Time 
Rush band 
National music 
performer 
NA Entertainment Non 44 
beth_hawkins 
Beth  
Hawkins 
MinnPost educa-
tion reporter 
Public 
affairs 
Hybrid Non 44 
progress2day 
America 
United 
Citizen activist or-
ganization 
Public 
affairs 
Citizen Left 44 
accessvikings 
Access Vi-
kings (Star 
Tribune) 
Coverage of  Min-
nesota Vikings for 
Star Tribune 
Sports 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 44 
mspbjhammer 
Jim 
 Hammerand 
Digital edi-
tor @mspbjnews 
Business 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 43 
mnsure 
MNSure in-
formation 
Information about 
Minnesota govern-
ment healthcare 
Political 
Government 
agency 
Non 43 
drudge_report 
Drudge 
Report 
U.S. based news 
aggregation web-
site 
Public 
affairs 
Hybrid Right 43 
panopticon13 
Kevin  
Hoffman 
Editor of City 
Pages 
Public 
affairs 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 43 
cpdressingroom 
Jessica  
Armbruster 
City pages fashion 
writer 
Enter-
tainment 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 42 
amyklobuchar 
Amy 
Klobuchar 
US Senator NA Political Left 42 
stpaulbuzz 
Breaking St. 
Paul News 
Community ser-
vice media 
Public 
affairs 
Blogger Non 42 
stribdw 
Dan  
Wiederer 
Pro football  writer 
for Star Tribune 
Sports 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 42 
Pbs 
Public 
broadcasting 
Education is the 
only solution, eve-
rything else is a 
Band-Aid. 
General 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 41 
purplepride 
Minnesota 
Vikings fan 
site 
Minnesota Vikings 
fan site. 
Sports Citizen Non 41 
Mpr 
Minnesota 
Public Radio 
Radio/online news 
organization in 
Twin Cities 
General 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 40 
mallofamerica 
Mall of 
America 
Shopping Mall in 
Twin Cities 
NA Business Non 40 
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markformpls 
Mark  
Andrew 
Minneapolis 
mayoral candidate 
NA Political Left 40 
boydhuppert 
Boyd  
Huppert 
Reporter at KARE 
11 TV 
Public 
affairs 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 40 
eric_pusey Eric Pusey 
Co-founder, MN 
Progressive Project 
Public 
affairs 
Blogger Left 40 
3rdeyegirl Prince 
Minneapolis-based 
national musician 
NA Entertainment Non 39 
umdhumor 
University of 
Minnesota - 
Duluth 
UMD humor page NA Higher Ed. Non 39 
ricknelsonstrib Rick Nelson 
Restaurant critic 
for the Minneap-
olis Star Tribune. 
Enter-
tainment 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 38 
mashalot Mashalot 
Social shopping 
application for 
smart phones 
NA Business Non 38 
frederickmelo 
Frederick 
Melo 
Reporter covering 
St. Paul City Hall 
Public 
affairs 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 38 
cathywurzer 
Cathy 
Wurzer 
MPR morning edi-
tion host 
Enter-
tainment 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 37 
derushaj 
Jason 
Derusha 
WCCO-TV  An-
chor/Reporter 
Enter-
tainment 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 37 
stribbiz 
Minneapolis 
Star Tribune 
- business 
Business news 
from Star Tribune 
Business 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 36 
spps_suptsilva Valeria Silva 
Superintendent St. 
Paul schools 
NA Public official Non 35 
vmontori 
Victor  
Montori 
Medical doctor/re-
searcher, activist 
NA Citizen Non 35 
kerrimpr Kerri Miller 
Host, Daily Circuit 
program, MPR 
Enter-
tainment 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 34 
Zite Zite 
Automated news 
aggregator 
General Emergent Non 34 
brendan_fischer 
Brendan 
Fischer 
Counsel at Center 
for Media and De-
mocracy 
NA Citizen Non 34 
ameliarayno 
Amelia 
Rayno 
NCAA basketball 
writer at the Star 
Tribune 
Sports 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 34 
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vsawkar 
Vineeta  
Sawkar 
Video host, Star 
Tribune 
General 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 33 
goldengophers 
U of MN 
sports 
Univ. Minnesota 
sports news and 
notes  
NA Entertainment Non 33 
minndata MinnPost 
MinnPost interac-
tive data service 
Public 
affairs 
Hybrid Non 33 
1500espn_reuss
e 
Patrick 
Reusse 
Sports reporter Sports 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 33 
stribprepsdavid 
David La 
Vaque 
Covers high school 
sports for Star 
Tribune 
Sports 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 33 
vikingsbuzztap 
Vikings 
buzztap 
Automated Twitter 
aggregator of NFL 
news 
Sports Emergent Non 33 
michelebach-
mann 
Michelle 
Bachmann 
US House Rep NA Political Right 32 
Ofa 
Organizing 
for action 
Barack Obama's 
advocacy group 
Political Emergent Left 31 
Notably, in both Table 6.5 and 6.9, a category is labeled as “network gatekeeper types.”  In my analysis of 
these two tables below, I explain how I conceptualized and arrived at these terms.    
 
6.4b RESULTS OF DATASET 1, PART 2 
In general terms, the Twitter users in the social network for Dataset 1 who have a 
high level of indegree centrality can be considered among the “influentials” or “network 
gatekeepers” in the distribution and conversation that is oriented around the reporting of 
current events news in the Twin Cities by these news organizations and their employed 
journalists.   For instance, a network relation in this network might be a message from one 
citizen to one of his acquaintances containing a link to an article from Minnesota Public 
Radio about a story of mutual interest.  Another relation might be a citizen directing a 
message at a journalist with a link to a news article and a question about it.  A social 
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network analysis that can reveal the most central nodes in the overall flow of such kinds of 
interaction within a network of participatory journalism.   
The identification of the individuals with the greatest centrality in the networked 
flow of information that includes links to Twin Cities-based news websites can be 
potentially important for a few reasons. For one, because these users can be understood as 
being among the networked gatekeepers in the networked gatekeeping process, 
understanding who they are tells us part of the story about the events or issues that are 
most likely to become or that are already news according to the overall network of 
interactivity at a given time.  Further, finding these network gatekeepers gives us an idea 
of who some of the most influential people are for setting the local news agenda 
(McCombs and Shaw, 1972) and for maintaining the parameters of the sphere of 
legitimate controversy (Hallin, 1986) that Shoemaker and Reese (1991) long ago noted 
was a major role of traditional media gatekeepers. 
In this collected social network, several things can be noted.  Most significantly, 
and as expected, Twitter accounts for individual journalists and for organizational 
accounts that are affiliated with the 16 news organizations in this network are by far the 
most prevalent among the influentials in this network.  60 of the 100 vertices in this 
network are Twitter profiles affiliated with one of the 16 organizations whose URL 
domains were used to collect this network.  Of these 60, eight of the profiles are affiliated 
with local news organizations that I call “hybrid” news organizations—organizations that 
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have developed their models of operation in an internet-mediated media environment but 
who have become established to some extent online.  Thus, they are hybrids, in the grey 
area between traditional media organizations and the typical citizen blogger.  
 On the measure of political identification, I generally coded the journalists from 
incumbent mainstream local news outlets but also many of the emerging journalists as 
non-partisan network actors.  This coding decision is based on the presumption that the 
objectivity norm mostly keeps modern professional journalists in the middle of the road 
within political debate.  Thus, in my review of these influentials there are just eight 
profiles among the 100 profiles that I coded as being “Left” or liberal and three coded as 
“Right” or conservative.  Thus, it is notable that the vast majority of the Top 100 
influentials in this graph can be thought of as apolitical in their public Twitter presence—
other than some politicians and a few activists, these influentials generally do not espouse 
a public political identity in the Twittersphere.   
Beyond the 60 vertices affiliated with these news organizations in this dataset, 
there are a few other notable characteristics of this graph.  For one, there are 17 sports 
journalists from incumbent media organizations, 13 non-sports entertainment-oriented 
journalists from incumbent media organizations, and ten other influential vertices outside 
of news organizations that are entertainment oriented.  Thus, a full 40% of the influentials 
in this graph have a media role that is geared towards some kind of entertainment, a 
diversion from the function that is traditionally thought of as central for the media’s 
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purpose in democracy.  These findings mirror the results from Dataset 2 in which half of 
the most followed Twitter handles affiliated with Twin Cities news organizations are 
sports oriented media workers. 
 There are other notable nodes in this social network, such as several users that are 
affiliated with the online news outlet MinnPost.   MinnPost is an online only news outlet 
that was started in 2007 mostly by a group of Twin Cities-based journalists who had for 
various reasons left some of the large media organizations in the area.  In Hindman’s 2011 
paper in which he found moderate concentration in the distribution of audience traffic for 
Twin Cities news outlets, the traffic to MinnPost that he discovered using comScore data 
was so low at that time as to be quantitatively undetectable.  But here, with over 30 
journalists with active accounts on Twitter and several accounts in the top 100 by indegree 
centrality, the rankings in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 reveal that MinnPost is above several 
incumbent news organizations in both raw URL links tweeted as well as in the indegree 
centrality of several MinnPost-affiliated Twitter handles. 
6.5 DATASET 2:  2ND NEWS ORGANIZATION-CENTRIC NETWORK                                                       
6.5a SOCIAL NETWORK WITH TOP 50 MOST FOLLOWED TWIN CITIES JOURNALISTS 
Dataset 2 comprises a social network of 50,573 social network ties among 18,106 
nodes that derived from the following criteria for boundary specification: (1) I searched 
for and identified all—or as many as possible—of the Twitter profiles for Twin Cities 
journalists affiliated with 21 major news organizations of all kinds, including general news 
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outlets, public affairs news outlets, popular culture news outlets, and sports news outlets.  
In total, I identified 925 Twitter profiles affiliated with Twin Cities news organizations; (2) 
from this list of 925 Twitter profiles affiliated with Twin Cities news organizations, I 
identified the top 50 Twitter accounts based on total number of followers.  The selection 
logic here was that I wanted to understand who the users are who are driving the most 
readers to news websites and thus, the most attention to a particular news organization’s 
online brand; (3) I searched all reply and mention tweets in which one of these top 50 
most followed Twitter accounts affiliated with established news organizations in the Twin 
Cities—for all tweets in which these 50 Twitter handles appeared followed journalism 
accounts were either the sender or receiver node; (4) all data was collected from the 
population of tweets posted to Twitter during an approximately two week period in the fall 
of 2013.  Table 6.6 restates and elaborates on the conditions and characteristics for 
constructing Dataset 1. 
Table 6.6 - Data collection conditions for Dataset 2 
1 Data was collected from the Twitter social network site using  NodeXL 
2 
Data was collected from the population of tweets from the Twitter Rest API posted to Twitter over a 
period of approximately 2 weeks during the fall of 2013 
3 
Data was collected through separate searches for the Twitter handle for the top 50 most followed 
Twitter handles that are affiliated with one of 30 news organizations in the Twin Cities including 
general interest news outlets, business news outlets, sports news outlets, and entertainment/lifestyle 
news outlets 
4 
Tweets were collected by searching for all reply and mention tweets that contain the Twitter handle 
name of each of these 50 Nodes most followed nodes from these news organizations 
5 All data was compiled into a single social network 
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I identified this list of 925 Twitter Twin Cities journalistic accounts on Twitter 
through a search of the website followerwonk.com, along with a crosscheck with a 
somewhat outdated Twitter list of Twin Cities journalists made by MinnPost journalist 
David Brauer (see https://Twitter.com/dbrauer/lists/tcjournos; 
https://twitter.com/thomasernste/lists/twincitiesnewsprofiles).  Like Dataset 1, the 
nodes/vertices in this network are Twitter users who are either the “senders” or 
“receivers/sources” of replies or mentions in this network.  Again, the actual reply or 
mention tweets between any two users represent the ties/edges in this social network. 
6.5b RESULTS, DATASET 2 
Simply put, Dataset 2—comprised of the network of the top 50 most followed 
Twitter profiles amongst journalists working for news organizations in the Twin Cities—is 
dominated by a network of sports journalists and discussion around sports, especially local 
professional sports and some college sports.  By my count, of the 925 total Twitter handles 
affiliated with Twin Cities news organizations, there are 126 that are either sports 
journalists or organizational accounts for Twin Cities news organizations.  Of the top 50 of 
all Twin Cities news organizations, 25 are sports news accounts.   
NodeXL can produce a list of “word pairs” for any social network which derive from 
some category that the researcher can choose.  I programmed NodeXL to search all tweets 
to get the most frequently appearing word pairs in all tweets.  Word pairs in this kind of 
social network operate as a rough representation of the most prominently featured topics 
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in the discussion within some specified network.  Table 6.7, then, is a list of top word 
pairs derived from Dataset 2.  These word pairs show that an overwhelming volume of 
discussion of local professional and college sports above all else is the major takeaway 
from these data. 
One non-sports story to emerge in these word pairs appears as “stowed away” and 
“9 year old boy,” which alludes to the unusual local story that made national news recently 
of a 9 year-old boy who snuck onto a plane from Minneapolis to Las Vegas. Besides this 
story, all word pairs here are related to sports.  Even one story that is technically not sports 
related, the death of an infant, is discussed because it is the death of the child of a player 
for the Minnesota Vikings, the professional football team in the Twin Cities.  All told, 
discussion that can be quickly gathered from the tweet content in this graph indicates a 
focus around local sports, including Minnesota Vikings running back Adrian Peterson, 
discussion of University of Minnesota Gophers football coach Jerry Kill, and the signing 
of a new quarterback by the Minnesota Vikings, Josh Freeman. 
This phenomenon of a sports-dominated social network given these boundaries for 
this social network is not merely a product of a network that is pre-specified by the 
inclusion of mostly highly followed sports profiles in a single network graph.  Indeed, 
even in the word pairs and hashtags that are most prominent within the networks for single 
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Table 6.7 - Top word pairs from Dataset 2 
Word 1 Word 2 Total   Word 1 Word 2 Count 
1500 espn 1071   flight went 241 
peterson's son 1065   went airport 241 
Espn sportswire 1046   airport 2 241 
Son died 917   2 times 241 
adrian peterson's 880   times earlier 240 
Josh freeman 798   official startribune 240 
chipscoggins adrian 643   week official 238 
Died according 621   breakingnews boy 234 
according police 613   startribune http 231 
Year old 509   u s 229 
Via mprnews 490   freeman vikings 227 
Jerry kill 386   adrian peterson 221 
Sad chipscoggins 383   first time 210 
Via pioneerpress 377   super bowl 183 
St paul 373   check out 178 
adamschefter unspeakably 364   ryan suter 171 
unspeakably sad 364   new stadium 169 
Twin cities 339   russostrib ryan 162 
9 year 270   coach jerry 155 
wanted clarify 264   suter booed 149 
training camp 264   teammates first 149 
adrian jr 261   time touched 149 
chipscoggins wanted 258   touched puck 149 
Died adrian 258   puck skate 148 
Jr photos 258   booed mnwild 146 
photos training 258   mnwild teammates 146 
clarify everyone 257   skate ready 146 
everyone peterson's 257   ready ton 144 
stowed away 256   las vegas 139 
Right now 253   via startribune 136 
Boy 9 250   kfan1003 cleansnap 135 
9 stowed 242   ponder cassel 124 
earlier week 241   peterson jr 124 
Away minneapolis 241   fsnorth kfan1003 123 
minneapolis flight 241   next week 117 
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general interest news organizations such as the Minneapolis Star and Tribune, the St. Paul 
Pioneer Press, or a local TV station like WCCO in Minneapolis, sports discussion within 
Twitter overshadows other content in volume as sports journalism personalities tend to be 
the most prominently followed and “talked at” personalities on Twitter.   
Finally, while I ideally would have collected a graph containing an edge for all of 
the reply or mention tweets from all 925 Twitter handles in the population of Twin Cities-
based journalism profiles, there were two main reasons why I did not do this.  For one, 
collection of data using this method with NodeXL is very cumbersome and prohibitively 
time-consuming.  Secondly, it became clear during the data collection that discussion of 
sports would likely dominate such a social network.  As such, a network made up of 
edges that represent all Twitter accounts connected to Twin Cities news organizations 
would be unlikely to produce enough research value for the significant time and effort 
that this would require. 
6.6 DATASET 3: ISSUE-CENTERED SOCIAL NETWORK 
6.6a SOCIAL NETWORK FOR #MNLEG HASHTAG 
Dataset 3 comprises a social network made up of 2,521 vertices and 11,419 total 
network ties that derived from the following criteria for boundary specification: (1) all 
data was collected from the population of tweets posted to Twitter during an 
approximately three month period over the summer and fall of 2013; (2) tweets were 
collected that contain the Twitter hashtag, #mnleg.  Of note, the #mnleg hashtag was 
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identified from data collected in Dataset 1 as the most widely used hashtag in that social 
network.  Thus, this prominence of the #mnleg hashtag suggests that it has particular 
significance for the Twin Cities news ecology.  Specifically, the #mnleg hashtag is a 
marker for discussion surrounding the Minnesota State Legislature.  Table 6.8 restates 
and elaborates on the conditions and characteristics for constructing Dataset 1. 
Table 6.8 - Data collection conditions and characteristics of Dataset 3 
1 Data was collected from the Twitter social network site using  NodeXL 
2 
Data was collected from the population of tweets from the Twitter Rest API posted to Twitter for 
most of the days over a period of approximately 3 months during the summer and fall of 2013 
3 Data was collected through searches of the keyword #mnleg, which is also commonly referred to as  
4 
Tweets were collected by searching for all reply and mention tweets that contain the Twitter handle 
name of each of these 50 Nodes most followed nodes from these news organizations 
6 All data was compiled into a single social network 
 
As with Dataset 1, the nodes/vertices in the social network for Dataset 2 are 
Twitter users who are either the “sender” or “receiver/source” nodes of replies or 
mentions in this network of tweets containing the #mnleg hashtag.  Also like Dataset 1, 
the actual reply or mention tweets between any two users here represent the ties/edges in 
this social network.  Table 6.9 provides some of the most significant data that is relevant 
for analyzing the event-centered network around the #mnleg hashtag.  
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Table 6.9 - Top 100 nodes in Dataset 3 by indegree centrality 
Nodes 
Name of Per-
son/Org. 
Description 
Network 
Gatekeeper 
type 
Political 
leaning 
Indegree 
Centrality 
Followers 
govmarkdayton 
Mark  
Dayton 
MN Governor Political Left 200 19560 
mnsure 
MNSure 
Health 
Gov't healthcare 
division 
Political Non 149 556 
andrewwagner 
Andrew  
Wagner 
Communications 
Specialist, GOP 
Political Right 108 1407 
rachelsb 
Rachel  
Stassen-Berger 
Star Tribune politi-
cal reporter 
Political Non 92 7863 
mnhousegop 
MN House 
GOP Caucus 
MN political or-
ganization 
Political Right 88 3128 
blakeffm Jonathon Blake 
Freedom Founda-
tion of Minnesota 
Cit. rights Right 85 1311 
startribune 
Minneapolis 
Star Tribune 
Metro news organ-
ization 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 78 54685 
john_rouleau 
John  
Rouleau 
Minnesota Major-
ity, blog 
Cit. rights Right 77 890 
mlahammer 
Mary  
Lahammer, 
TPT, Metro news 
organization 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 75 6162 
billglahn Bill Glahn 
Businessman, po-
litical blogger 
Cit. rights Right 72 563 
shabbosgoy 
Peter  
Waldron 
Former Bachmann 
Aide, wrote Bach-
mann expose 
Cit. rights Right 70 1549 
snienow Sean Nienow MN Senator Political Right 66 1730 
mngop 
MN Republi-
can Party 
MN political or-
ganization 
Political Right 64 5027 
lukehellier Luke Hellier 
Press Secretary for 
MN GOP 
Political Right 60 2291 
stribopinion 
Star Tribune 
Opinion  
section 
Minneapolis Star 
Tribune division 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 57 3874 
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oshakarow Osha Karow 
Affiliation with 
OccupyMN 
Cit. rights Left 54 3,069 
mnaflcio 
MN Federation 
of Labor 
Citizen rights or-
ganization 
Cit. rights Non 53 3671 
mprnews 
Minnesota 
Public Radio 
Metro news organ-
ization 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 53 44554 
mattroznowski 
Matt  
Oznowski, 
Communications 
Specialist, DFL 
Political Left 49 904 
patkessler Pat Kessler, 
WCCO TV politi-
cal reporter 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 47 18193 
carlymelin Carly Melin MN State Rep Political Left 46 1696 
sallyjos 
Sally Jo 
Sorenson, 
Rurual MN blog-
ger 
Cit. rights Left 46 2584 
jvnord James Nord 
Staff writer for 
@MinnPost 
Hybrid me-
dia 
Non 45 4462 
mnbeeractivists 
MN beer activ-
ists 
Educating consum-
ers of beer, etc.. 
Leisure Non 45 975 
mnhousedfl 
Minnesota 
Democratic 
House Caucus 
#BeerOnSunday 
#SundaySalesMN 
Political Left 44 4408 
stowydad Brian Bakst 
MN-based A.P. 
journalist 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 43 4320 
mnsrc 
MN Senate  
Republican 
Caucus 
MN political or-
ganization 
Political Right 42 3390 
repryanwinkler Ryan Winkler, 
MN State Repre-
sentative 
Political Left 42 3038 
epmurphy Eric Murphy 
MN State Repre-
sentative 
Political Left 41 3,390 
jdavnie Jim Davnie 
MN State Repre-
sentative 
Political Left 41 3203 
minnesotadfl 
Democratic 
Party of Min-
nesota. 
MN political or-
ganization 
Political Left 40 7696 
abettermn 
Alliance for a 
Better Minne-
sota 
Progressive advo-
cacy org. 
Cit. rights Left 39 1178 
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jruha Jeffrey Ruha 
Political blogger, 
Democratic Social-
ists of America 
Cit. rights Left 39 2031 
mikehowardmn 
Communica-
tions Director, 
MN House 
DFL 
MN political oper-
ative 
Political Left 39 6571 
mn2020 
Minnesota 
2020 
Progressive think 
tank/blog 
Hybrid me-
dia 
Left 39 5046 
pgless Peter Glessing 
Communications 
Specialist, GOP 
Political Right 39 800 
patgarofalo Pat Garafalo US House Rep Political Right 37 1489 
zrodvold Zach Rodvold 
Director of Exter-
nal Affairs for the 
MN House DFL 
Caucus. 
Political Left 37 2780 
bgolnik Ben Golnik 
Public affairs/rela-
tions strate-
gist/Chair, MN 
jobs coalition 
Political Right 36 2898 
kenmartin73 Ken Martin 
Chair of the MN 
DFL 
Political Left 36 2755 
kstp KSTP TV 
Metro news organ-
ization 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 35 24,139 
occupymn 
Occupy 
Wallstreet - 
Minnesota 
Political organiza-
tion 
Cit. rights Left 35 10,709 
Tpt 
Twin Cities 
Public Televi-
sion 
Metro news organ-
ization 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 34 4438 
uptakemn The UpTake 
Metro news organ-
ization 
Hybrid me-
dia 
Left 34 7289 
alfranken Al Franken US Senator Political Left 33 3455 
kdaudt Kurt Daudt MN House Rep Political Left 33 665 
nickzerwas Nick Zerwas MN State Rep Political Right 33 231 
repmaryfranson Mary Franson MN State Rep Political Right 33 147884 
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twoputttommy 
Tommy  
Johnson 
Political bloger Cit. rights Left 33 3,536 
keithellison Keith Ellison US House Rep Political Left 32 49,146 
johnlivreynolds John Reynolds Citizen Cit. rights Right 31 6201 
mnhouseinfo 
Minnesota 
House of Reps' 
Public Infor-
mation Ser-
vices 
MN government 
organization 
Political Non 31 232 
pioneerpress 
St. Paul  
PiPress 
Metro news organ-
ization 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 31 31,356 
senatorbenson 
Michelle  
Benson 
MN State Senator Political Right 30 1548 
bbierschbach 
Briana 
Bierschbach 
Girl reporter for 
@PoliticsMN and 
the Capitol Report. 
Cit. rights Non 29 2390 
freedommn 
Freedom Foun-
dation of  
Minnesota 
Research org. that 
advocates limited 
government. 
Cit. rights Right 29 1531 
tptalmanac 
TPT  
Almanac 
Metro news organ-
ization division 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 28 4665 
carrielucking 
Carrie  
Lucking 
Executive Director 
- Alliance for a 
Better Minnesota 
Cit. rights Left 27 9864 
reperikpaulsen Erik Paulsen MN House Rep Political Right 27 2131 
repjohnkline John Kline MN House Rep Pol Right 26 9413 
senatordanhall Dan Hall MN Senator Pol Right 26 9,402 
minnpost MinnPost 
Online onliny 
news Twin Cities 
news org 
Hybrid me-
dia 
Non 25 26,567 
mn_chamber 
Minnesota 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
MN's largest busi-
ness advocacy org. 
Business Non 25 743 
mnjobscoalition 
MN Jobs  
Coalition 
Political  
committee  
dedicated to job 
creation. 
Cit. rights Right 25 24292 
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fedbullies #FedBullies Blogger Cit. rights Right 24 95 
jpkolb Jeff Kolb Blogger. Political Right 24 514 
politicsmn 
Politics in Min-
nesota 
A public affairs 
news service 
Hybrid me-
dia 
Non 24 1256 
richneumeister 
Rich  
Neumeister 
Citizen interested 
in privacy,  
government, and 
information policy. 
Cit. rights Right 24 10808 
fivehrenergy Dan Pollock 
Staff for the MN 
House Democrats 
Political Left 23 453 
kent_eken Kent Eken MN State Senator Political Left 23 305 
afscmemn5 
American Fed-
eration of 
State, County 
and Municipal 
Employees 
Labor union Cit. rights Non 22 59 
bmcclung Brian McClung  
Political PR spe-
cialist 
Political Right 22 428 
livingwagejobmn 
House Select 
Committee on 
Living Wage 
Jobs 
Examines ways to 
improve benefits, 
wages and local 
jobs. 
Cit. rights Non 22 270 
takeactionmn 
Take Action 
MN 
Working for  
racial/income 
equality 
Cit. rights Non 22 3202 
tjswift2 Unknown Unknown Cit. rights Right 22 735 
walterhudson 
Walter  
Hudson 
Political commen-
tator 
Hybrid me-
dia 
Right 22 3052 
amyklobuchar 
Amy 
Klobuchar 
US Sentaor Political Left 21 25,956 
keithsdowney Keith Downey Chaimna, MNGOP Political Left 21 1139 
larryrjacobs Larry Jacobs  
Political science 
professor 
Expert Non 21 1763 
paulthissen Paul Thissen MN State Rep Political Left 21 4,487 
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wrip1m 
Women & Pol-
itics 
Women's advocacy 
news outlet 
Cit. rights Left 21 1,076 
andypost1 Andy Post 
MN political oper-
ative 
Political Right 20 1541 
colbertreport Colbert Report 
National news sat-
ire 
Entertain-
ment 
Left 20 750,756 
mncapitol 
Minnesota 
State Capital 
Handles tours/his-
tory of capital 
Political Non 20 384 
reptonyalbright Tony Albright MN House Rep Political Right 20 441 
sclosmore 
Susan  
Closmore 
MN political oper-
ative 
Political Right 20 1600 
5percentmn 5 percent MN 
MN citizen rights 
group seeking 5% 
rate increase for 
home and commu-
nity based services 
in 2014. 
Cit. rights Non 19 725 
educationmn Education MN Teachers union Cit. rights Non 19 831 
henrycorp The Other 98% 
Watchdog group 
on gov’t/corporate 
corruption 
Cit. rights Left 19 1293 
rcchamberlain1 
Roger Cham-
berlain 
MN State Senator Business Right 19 604 
wbgleason Bill Gleason 
Chemist, teacher, 
scholarly  
researcher 
Expert Left 19 8137 
wgybmovie 
Film: Opera-
tion 
S.W.E.E.T. X-
mas 
A #Hollywood 
#Comedy #Movie 
Military veterans 
Leisure Non 19 85 
bettymccollum04 
Betty 
McCollum 
MN Political Left 18 3,935 
bspinmn 
Bluestem Prai-
rie blog 
Progressive rural 
blog 
Cit. rights Left 18 2055 
ctiedeman Chris Tiedman 
Political and Pub-
lic Affairs Consult-
ant 
Political Right 18 995 
dc4dfl 
Douglas 
County Demo-
cratic Party Di-
vision 
Political organiza-
tion 
Political Left 18 512 
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eric_pusey Eric Pusey 
Poitical commen-
tator for MN Pro-
gressive Project 
Hybrid me-
dia 
Left 18 1888 
kurtzellersmn Kurt Zellars MN House Rep Political Right 18 4161 
occupywallst 
Occupy 
Wallstreet - 
National 
News and Info 
about OWS 
Cit. rights Left 18 3717 
scotthonourmn Scott Honour 
Gubanatorial can-
didate, Business 
owner 
Political Right 18 1209 
sturdevant 
Lori  
Sturdevant 
Star Tribune edito-
rialist 
Incumbent 
media 
Non 18 1951 
willmorgan84 Will Morgan MN State Rep Political Left 18 1075 
 
6.6b RESULTS OF DATASET 3 
This dataset is set up mainly to address Research Question 2, which is the 
question of whether an event-centered social network will, compared to a news 
organization-centric network, have a greater diversity of network gatekeeper types. A 
highly varied mix of people and organizations are featured as influentials in the social 
network for Dataset 3.  In this network of 2,520 total vertices, the 100 top users by 
indegree centrality are just 4% of the total users in this network.  And yet these 100 users 
collectively are the receivers of more than 50% (51.6%) of the total mentions and replies.  
Furthermore, it is noted that just 10 % of the users in this network (the top 250 users by 
indegree centrality) are on the receiving end of 74% of the reply and mention tweets.  
These properties are indicative of a power law distribution in which a relatively small 
number of users in the network are the objects of a vast majority of the replies and 
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mentions. 
One notable feature of this social network is the balance of politically aligned 
users among the influentials.  Political orientation was determined either by virtue of 
users’ self-identification with a political party on their Twitter profiles, through a Google 
search of official webpages of various users, or through observation of political slant of 
the actor’s actual tweets.  38 of these top 100 influentials were coded as having a liberal 
or “left-leaning” political point of view, 35 were coded as having a conservative or 
“right-leaning” political point of view, and 25 were coded as having no political 
affiliation.  Overall, the liberals and conservatives have virtually the same collective 
indegree centrality scores (1355 and 1375, respectively), while nonpartisan users are not 
far behind with a collective indegree centrality score of 1,185.  These figures indicate that 
alongside the politically driven conversation on Twitter there is a significant influence 
from network actors that have no clear political agenda. 
39 of the 100 users among the influentials in Dataset 3 are political leaders, 
political party offices, or communication specialists who work for political parties.  
Further, Twitter users affiliated with political parties are very prominent in this network, 
taking up nearly half—49--of the spots on this list.  Given that the hashtag is #mnleg and 
thus refers specifically to issues relevant to the Minnesota State Legislature, it is not 
surprising that this network would feature so many politicians.   
Meanhile, just 11 of these vertices are from incumbent media organizations, a 
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highly significant drop from Dataset 1.  Twenty-eight nodes that I coded as “citizen 
rights” network actors also appeared in the network.  I defined these as any individuals or 
groups whose interest it is to advocate for non-elites, whether that be as bloggers, labor or 
teachers’ unions, or activists.  Finally, very few entertainment accounts appeared here, an 
indicator that hashtags like this political hashtag #mnleg are part of a framing process 
such in which Twitter users who employ this hashtag generally stay faithfully on 
message.   
Further, Twitter handles affiliated with political parties are very prominent in this 
network, taking up nearly half—49--of the spots on this list.  Given that the hashtag is 
#mnleg and thus refers specifically to issues relevant to the Minnesota State Legislature, 
it is not surprising that this network would feature so many politicians.  Notably, 23 of the 
politicians’ accounts are identified as conservative while 22 are liberal and 4 neutral.  
Liberal and conservative leaning politicians have nearly comparable collective indegree 
centrality scores as well, with collective indegree centrality scores of 876 for the liberal 
politicians and 1167 for the conservative politicians, indicating slightly more discussion 
around the #mnleg hashtag by conservatives. 
In both Table 6.5 for Dataset 1 and Table 6.9 for Dataset 3, I have a category I call 
“network gatekeeper type.”  I based the categories for the different network gatekeeper 
types in part on a taxonomy suggested by Meraz and Papacharissi (2013) in their 
“networked gatekeeping” study about the flow of information on social media during the 
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Arab Spring in 2011 around the #Egypt hashtag.  In that study, they categorized different 
influentials in the social network, with some they categorized as falling into an “elite” 
category and some falling into a ”non-elite” category. 
My similar categories as theirs include mass media institution (e.g., 
@startribune), mass media journalist (e.g., @RachelSB; aka Star Tribune political 
journalist Rachel Stassen-Berger), blogger (e.g., @eric_pusey; aka Eric Pusey, blogger 
for the Minnesota Progressive Project), activist (e.g., @paperrev – a Minneapolis-based 
group affiliated with Occupy Wall Street), digerati (e.g., ExiledSurfer), citizen journalist 
(e.g., @Zeniobia), new media (e.g., @Digg), celebrity (e.g., Minnesota Vikings 
professional football player Adrian Peterson), organization (e.g., @mayoclinic; aka Mayo 
Clinic), politician (e.g., @RTRybak; aka Minneapolis Mayor RT Rybak), and researcher 
(e.g., @Shadihamid). 
Like Meraz and Papacharissi, I was initially interested in understanding the 
distribution of elite and non-elite influence within the network gatekeeping process.  In 
the category of “nonelite influence,” they put bloggers, activists, “digerati,” and citizen 
journalists.  In the elite influence category, they had mass media institutions, mass media 
journalists, new media, celebrities, internet bots, organizations, politicians, and 
researchers.   
But a potential problem with these categories suggested by Meraz and 
Papacharissi for the present study comes in trying to distinguish “new media” and 
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“bloggers” as either elites or non-elites.  One example they use for an elite new media 
Twitter account is @Digg, the Twitter handle for the networked social media and news 
aggregator at www.digg.com.  It is notable that the content on Digg, however, is driven 
by a network-based algorithm that measures votes by nonelites as to which content on 
Digg is prominent.  Digg, in short, is a somewhat of a combination of elite and nonelite 
source. 
A related conflict comes up when considering a blogger such as Eric Pusey from 
the Minnesota Progressive Project.  Pusey appears as an influential in both Dataset 1 and 
Dataset 3, suggesting that he is influential in the discussion around the political hashtag 
#mnleg just as he is influential in the flow of messages that come from Twin Cities-based 
news organizations.  The Minnesota Progressive Project identifies as a blog—blogs 
started by small groups of individuals have generally been considered non-elite in 
popular and scholarly discussions of the media.  But as time goes on, do some bloggers 
become elites?  One could argue that any blog could represent a “Fifth Estate,” a sort of 
new branch of media that serves largely as a check on the traditional “Fourth Estate” 
media organizations.  But should we think of media workers from this Fifth Estate as 
surrogates or agents of the public, or are they a new kind of elites?  Or are they a little of 
both? 
It is clear from a comparison of Datasets 1 and 3 that there is a greater diversity of 
network gatekeeper types who are influential within event/issue centered networks—to 
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some extent this was expected as this phenomena is largely a product of the different 
choices for boundary specification.  Still, this comparison illustrates an important point—
that the networked gatekeeping process as it revolves around news instead of around 
news organizations is comprised of a greater assortment of public sphere types.  What is 
not clear, however, is whether these different types of influentials should be seen as any 
less ”elite” than incumbent mass media organizations or journalists affiliated who work 
for them.  These questions can and should be the subject of future research.  In my 
discussion below of Daniel Hallin’s (1986) spheres of influence on media content, I 
discuss the possible implications of these questions further. 
6.6c SOCIAL NETWORK VISUALIZATION OF DATASET 3, #MNLEG HASHTAG 
NodeXL offers a variety of different automated methods for producing a social 
network visualization of any of the social networks in this study.  One method is the 
Clauset-Newman-Moore algorithm (see Himelboim, Smith, and Schneiderman, 2013 for 
more information about using this method in NodeXL) in which the graph automatically 
attempts to put users into “groups” or clusters with other users that the program 
determines are “close” in a social network sense.  As Himelboim, et al. write, this reflects 
a consistent pattern in social networks in which the most prominent network actors tend 
to fall into a few relatively large “modules” which are essentially clusters of users that are 
calculated as being in relatively close and frequent contact with one another, contact that 
makes them somewhat isolated from other clusters by what Burt (1992) called “structural 
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holes” in the network..  One of the ways that this visualization method has been used is to 
look for signs of polarization in public communication. 
For Dataset 3, the #mnleg social network, I coded each of the Top 100 politically 
rightwing oriented nodes as red dots and each of the politically left-oriented nodes with 
blue dots.  In addition, I coded any politically neutral nodes among the top 100 to be 
visually represented as purple dots.  All of the 2000 plus nodes outside of the top 100 are 
illustrated as yellow dots.3  Figure 6.2 is the visualization of this social network based on 
this coding scheme.   
The data size of just 100 coded hubs for this visualization is limited for 
explanatory purposes.  However, given this limited data, it does appear that many of the 
right wing vertices are clustered together in the top left group while many of the left wing 
vertices are clustered together in group on the bottom left.  This indicates that more 
frequent communication via Twitter (through both replies and mentions) tends to occur 
among people with the same political persuasion.  However, given that there is some red 
and blue nodes in each of the largest groups in this network, this indicates that there is at 
least some discussion across political divisions.  Further, given that there are purple—or  
  
                                                 
 
3 These colors will not appear in any black and white reproductions of this dissertation 
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Figure 6.2 - Social network visualization of #mnleg hashtag 
 
 
Red - conservative-leaning nodes among top 100 by indegree centrality 
Blue – liberal-leaning nodes among top 100 by indegree centrality 
Purple – neutral nodes among top 100 by indegree centrality 
Yellow – nodes outside the top 100 by indegree centrality4 
*The Clauset-Newman-Moore algorithm separates the largest network clusters into modules that appear on 
the top and left three quadrants of the graph.  This algorithm groups all of the other nodes that are not 
cohesively clustered into small groups on the bottom right quadrant.  For the purposes for making a clean 
visualization, the algorithm may cut out some of the 2,000+ nodes that are not within the larger modules. 
                                                 
 
4 These colors will not appear in any black and white reproductions of this dissertation. The module with 
the cluster of mostly red nodes is on the top left; the module with the cluster of blue nodes is on the bottom 
left. 
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non-partisan—nodes in both primary groups and outside of them (mostly journalists or 
other general information nodes), there may be reason to think that these non-partisan 
nodes are acting as boundary spanning individuals.  That is, these could be the kind of 
individuals whose presence spans “structural holes” (Burt, 1992) in between otherwise 
disconnected groups of users. 
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CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION 
7.1 BY THE NUMBERS 
Several overarching ideas can be gleaned from this study.  For one, all of the 
social networks in this study had small world features.  For instance, the average geodesic 
distance (average degrees of separation between all nodes in the graphs) for each social 
network is all less than 5 total degrees of separation, as shown in Table 7.1.  Even the  
Figure 7.1 - Structural properties of datasets 1-3 
Dataset 
Average geodesic 
distance 
Maximum geodesic 
distance 
Graph Density 
1 4.56 15 0.000039976 
2 3.804 9 0.000112227 
3 3.796 10 0.001199606 
 
maximum geodesic distance (most number of “hops” between any two nodes in these 
social networks) is no greater than 15 among these networks.  Of note, because Twitter’s 
strict rate limits on data collection do not allow for the efficient collection of the follower 
networks for the nodes in these networks, these geodesic distances do not take into 
consideration that the density of the actual follower graphs of these nodes is most 
certainly more dense than their actual communication-based network.  This is because we 
know that the communication between these users is mostly based on communication 
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between people for which there is at least a one-way follower relation in place.  As such, 
from this we can deduce that within these networks news can be passed along to almost 
anyone in the network within a very small number of hops. 
 Another characteristic of these social networks is the property in which many of 
the nodes with low centrality, the “peripherals,” tend to have relatively high cohesiveness 
with other nodes and relatively high levels of edge reciprocation.  While these nodes with 
high network cohesiveness may not be part of cliques, their high cohesiveness and low 
centrality suggests that they are part of the marginal network entities in the long tail of 
the power law distribution of networked communication around these news organizations 
and topics.  
7.2 CHOOSING CONCEPTUALLY APPROPRIATE CENTRALITY METRICS 
One important question for the social network analyses conducted for this paper 
pertains to the issue of selecting appropriate centrality metrics for a particular study.  Like 
the suggestion by Borgatti and Halgin (2011) that boundary specification consideration 
should come from conceptual considerations that are relevant to particular research 
problem, the choice of one or more appropriate centrality metrics for a given study is also 
a decision that should derive from particular considerations of the research and types of 
networks in question.  Freeman (1980) developed a centrality metric that he called 
betweenness centrality that he suggested was analogous to the gatekeeper concept within 
a social network.  Borgatti and Everett (2006) have recently described Freeman’s 
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betweenness centrality metric as “the number of times that any actor needs a given actor 
to reach any other actor” (p. 474).  Knoke and Yang (2008) provide another definition, 
writing that “the betweenness concept of centrality concerns how other actors control or 
mediate the relations between dyads that are not directly connected” (p. 67).  The concept 
behind betweenness centrality, then, is that network actors with high betweenness 
centrality operate as intermediaries or brokers in a network—that they may have a 
particular power to bring together groups that are otherwise somewhat isolated from one 
another by structural holes (Burt, 1992).  This concept seems to be a potentially good fit 
for the kind of position that an effective journalist might occupy within a social network 
that has somewhat isolated clusters. 
However, Freeman developed betweenness centrality for undirected networks—
networks in which ties are inherently bidirectional.  But because actual communication 
on a social network site such as Twitter is inherently directed (some communication 
between nodes is not reciprocated), Freeman’s original calculation for betweenness in an 
undirected network does not apply to directed networks.  White and Borgatti (1994) have 
suggested possible mathematical means for calculating betweenness centrality for 
directed networks.  However, NodeXL uses betweenness calculators developed by the 
Stanford Network Analysis Project (SNAP) which automatically calculate betweenness 
centrality based on the assumption that the network under study is undirected. As of this 
study, it is not known if there is a way to calculate a betweenness centrality metric that 
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accounts for the one-way nature of ties that characterize directed networks. 
To understand the problem with using betweenness centrality for a directed 
network, we can consider a case in the #mnleg network, Dataset 3.  One Twitter user who 
is revealed by NodeXL to have very high betweenness centrality in this network is a user 
based in Minneapolis named @paperrev (Paper Revolution) who identifies as a 
representative of the Occupy Wall Street movement.  But a look at the full data for this 
network reveals that @paperrev is what one might call an “expansive” or a loud mouth—
a person who interacts to a lot of people in the network but who receives no reciprocal 
communication.  That is, he or she has very high outdegree centrality but zero indegree 
centrality.  With the way NodeXL calculates betweenness centrality, this network actor 
would be quite high on betweenness centrality because NodeXL’s betweenness metric 
effectively sees outdegree and indegree ties as undirected ties. But does it make sense that 
@paperrev should be called a kind of broker in a network in which he receives no 
communication?  Clearly not—he would not be on the shortest paths between any of the 
users in the network.  This problem indicates, then, the inherent fallacy in using and 
interpreting the betweenness centrality measurement used by NodeXL for the study of a 
directed network. 
As such, it was determined that the best available metric to use to calculate 
centrality in these networks is indegree centrality—a calculation of the number of times 
an actor is the receiver of a mentions or replies tweet.  Given that a high indegree 
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centrality score for an actor indicates that lots of people are aware of, communicating 
with, or “retweeting” the comments of his actor, indegree centrality proves a useful 
metric for indicating the centrality and/or influence of a given node.  
7.3 EVENT/ISSUE-CENTERED JOURNALISM 
Recently, in a move that surprised many observers of both the news media and the 
technology industry, the CEO of Amazon.com Jeff Bezos purchased the Washington 
Post.  The Post, given its location in the nation’s capital and its longstanding history for 
reporting some of the most significant US news stories of the last century, arguably 
stands alongside the New York Times as the two most important newspapers in the 
United States and certainly the Post is one of the most important news outlets around the 
world.  In a recent article called “Newspapers Should Be More Like Amazon,” former 
FCC Chairman Julias Genachowski along with media scholar Steven Waldman wrote the 
following about the evolving media environment and the place of public affairs journal-
ism within it: 
Newspapers, like TV stations, never got away from the artificial 
boundaries drawn by their distribution technologies: for newspapers, the 
reach of their physical distribution; for broadcasters, the reach of their 
antennas. Now they can imagine distribution patterns focused on topic or 
audience rather than just geography (para. 6). 
 This point by Genachowski and Waldman that the news must be more audience 
focused and focused on events, and that it should break out of traditionally drawn 
boundaries for what news organizations should cover, represents a part of what it means 
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for journalists and journalism organizations to do journalism as a networked process.  
Indeed, this idea hits directly at the heart of how the media system is changing and how 
media professionals, scholars, and citizens should think differently about it.  As I showed 
with my first Dataset, a news-organization centered news ecology biases the position of 
traditional incumbents in a position at the center of the media system.  On their own, 
these data are compelling from a strategic point of view for these news organizations in 
that they provide some evidence which informs media organizations which of their 
organizational Twitter handles, which of their journalists, and who are some of the non-
journalists who are influential as the most instrumental drivers of audience attention to 
their content.   
Conceptually, however, a view of the media system which conceives of news 
organizations as being the only centers of the networked gatekeeping process would be a 
continuation of the insistence by journalism professionals to “normalize” (Singer, 2005) 
the new media rather than to adapt.  Their normalization worked for traditional news 
organizations as long as the public was still relatively atomized even for the first decade 
plus of the internet’s diffusion.  But with the rise of social network sites and other more 
advanced Web 2.0 technologies (O’Reilly, 2004), it seems that the way that users can 
connect now allows for news to more naturally revolve around events and issues and not 
around mass media platforms.   
 In a media environment in which the journalism profession is being pushed at its 
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boundaries by various types of emerging journalists, a vital part of dealing with those 
blurred boundaries involves eschewing any conception of being in control and embracing 
the role of what Sunstein calls (2011) “general interest intermediaries.”  A practical 
means of going about recognizing that loss of control is to seek out information about 
topics that have emerged organically within the networked media environment and not 
necessarily starting with news reports from traditional news organizations.  Reporting 
about such events, often with ad hoc citizen participants in the gathering and reporting 
processes, can make the news by journalists more interesting and relevant to the public.  
In some cases, for some reporters this may mean moving beyond traditional objectivity 
expectations and instead being more open and honest even if that means stepping away 
from a traditional “view from nowhere.”  As Rosen (2013) puts it, some journalists may 
practice within a “politics none” model and others (such as Glenn Greenwald) may 
practice with a “politics some” model.  Neither method is wrong.  But to some degree, 
journalists won’t change themselves.  Journalism will change over time as young people 
who understand the technology better than their parents will better understand how to 
adapt to these technologies. 
One important component for staying relevant in a modern media environment, 
then, will involve journalists being aware of the public and other non-journalists as 
participants in a networked gatekeeping process.  As such, a news organization or 
individual media workers could get great benefits from at the very least getting a basic 
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one-time picture of who the various “influential” or “networked gatekeepers” are in the 
networks that might revolve around various topics of interest.  In my casual observation 
of Twitter, many journalists did not seem to engage in the use of hashtags.  However, 
perhaps hashtags could become significant for use in identifying networks of discussion 
around certain topics.  That said, it is also important to find creative ways to specify 
social network boundaries for social network analyses using topics that may not be part 
of hashtag-based networks.  That is, specifying a social network based on keywords for 
certain topics might be apt to better capture organic, un-framed conversation rather than 
the kind of framed conversation that is expected to appear in hashtag-centered networks.  
It could further be useful for journalists and news organizations to engage in 
ongoing tracking of relevant networks of conversation that some modern social network 
analysis tools can offer.  Given the rise of what is now being called “data journalism” 
which involves any imaginable use of computer technology to tell the news, it would 
seem that news organization could benefit especially from bringing network analysis 
software into their data reporting toolkits.  The NodeXL software used in this study offers 
a relatively easy to use methodological toolkit that journalism organizations could 
implement as a storytelling aide for identifying new events that they can and should 
report.  Given that Twitter, Google, and other internet-based news and information portals 
are structured as social networks, it seems imperative that emerging media organizations 
increasingly understand network structure. 
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It’s worth remembering here that when Lewin (1947) conceived of his field 
theory and the idea of gatekeepers, his motivation was to find a way to influence people 
to make particular decisions and develop certain habits.   In his case, one of his major 
findings was that that housewives were in a position as “gatekeepers” for a family when 
it comes to buying food.  As such, he found that housewives could significantly influence 
the food consumption habits of her family.  This finding was important for the war effort 
during World War II when there were food shortages.  It was determined through this 
research that persuasive messaging to encourage thoughtful decisions on food 
consumption should be directed primarily at housewives. 
In a related way, a news organization today looking to be relevant for modern 
media consumers should fully recognize and take advantage of just what it means that the 
news they produce can be “retweeted” or otherwise shared by people not affiliated with 
their news organization.  Thus is, these media organizations should view the multitudes 
of network actors in a social network as their partners in news distribution and discussion 
around their news.  News organizations and journalists looking to be relevant within such 
a media environment should look to identify other “network gatekeepers” that have local 
relevance and interest in their news content.  These other network gatekeepers might be 
considered as something like vessels through which news can and will be distributed.  
But this cannot happen through forced or faked means.  It requires engagement between 
the influential within the network, an ongoing acknowledgement by journalists that they 
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now share the major places of influence in the gatekeeping process alongside non-
journalists or non-traditional journalists. 
7.4 THE JOURNALISTIC VIEW OF DEMOCRACY 
Another important part of understanding the changing media environment is to 
recognize the point made in various ways by scholars like Schudson (1998) and Gans 
(1998) that information and journalists are not, as it is sometimes claimed, at the center of 
democracy.  New technologies that have nothing to do with the traditional press system 
have developed and, in the process, the economic model for the incumbent media system 
has been severely degraded.  And yet as Schudson (2008) suggests, it could be that the 
greatest changes for society could happen only outside of the media such that citizen-
driven kinds of journalism can have a significant and sustainable influence on the 
gatekeeping process. 
According to a sociology of professions perspective of journalism, the journalism 
profession can currently be viewed as going through a period of significant struggle at the 
boundaries that define what counts as journalism.  The development of the internet and its 
associated technologies are primarily responsible for opening up a once essentially closed 
system of media in which journalists—through their affiliation with a relatively scarce 
number of major media outlets—had control over deciding the news that would reach the 
public.  To the extent that the general nature of media reporting was relatively consistent 
across mass media outlets in the 20th century media model, this was due to a set of 
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influences on the content of described within Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) hierarchy of 
influences model.    
According to political scientist Daniel Hallin (1986), it is through the various 
sociological influences inside and outside of journalism organizations that there have 
long been ideological boundaries for the kinds of issues and perspectives that could be 
discussed within the news media.  Objectivity and balance within journalism practice, 
Hallin suggests, result in boundaries for a “sphere of legitimate controversy”—“the 
region of electoral contests and legislative debates, of issues recognized as such by the 
major established actors of the American political process" (p. 116).  Outside of the 
sphere of legitimate controversy is the “sphere of deviance”—the people and ideas that 
would generally not be included in mainstream news coverage (see Figure 7.1 for a 
visual depiction of Hallin’s spheres). 
According to media scholar Jay Rosen (2009), one important development during 
the evolution of an internet-based media environment has been an expansion of the 
sphere of legitimate controversy.  This is in large part, Rosen says, because the formerly 
atomized, passive audiences that had unidirectional communication ties to media of the 
public sphere in the 20th century media model now have the potential for two-way public 
communication ties between anyone in the world.  As Rosen puts it, because of “the 
falling cost for like-minded people to locate each other, share information, trade 
impressions and realize their number,” there has been a trend to “to establish that the  
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Figure 7.2 - Hallin's (1986) spheres 
 
From: Hallin, D. (1986). The uncensored war: The media and Vietnam. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
 
 
‘sphere of legitimate debate’ as defined by journalists doesn’t match up with their own 
definition” (para. 19).  
7.5 SPORTS JOURNALISM ON TWITTER 
One of the basic findings from both Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 was the relative 
prevalence of sports and/or entertainment journalists in the conversation on Twitter 
compared to other types of journalists.  Perhaps it has always been this way that sports 
news has been a major part of the draw by audiences for traditional news organizations.  
But it becomes very clear through the observable flow of information on Twitter that 
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sports and more generally entertainment-based news and conversation is highly 
instrumental in attracting attention to the websites from major news organizations.  This 
finding has a variety of potential implications for our analysis of the overall Twin Cities 
news ecology, which I will discuss in a series of sections. 
7.5a SPORTS AND THE SPHERE OF CONSENSUS 
Robert Putnam (2001) saw the decline of participation in group social activities in 
the latter half of the 20th century as a strong indicator of decline social capital in society.  
Further, Putnam fretted that the internet might become a tool for entertainment more than 
a tool for becoming engaged in the “serious” news that is considered directly relevant to 
our capacity for engagement in democracy.  But Schudson (2006) problematizes 
Putnam’s premise, suggesting that Putnam’s view that only certain kinds of social 
activity can be considered valid embodiments of social capital fails to account for the 
“varieties of civic experience” that can be understood to count as meaningful. 
In another article, Schudson (2001) notes that the discussion of local sports teams 
lies inside of the sphere of consensus (Hallin, 1986) such that nearly everybody with an 
interest in sports at the local level are in general agreement about their feelings of 
attachment to their home team.  Beyond the basic enjoyment that people get from sports 
then, perhaps one explanation for the intense discussion around sports on Twitter 
compared to other kinds of media is likely that this consensus of feelings around local 
sports teams provides a sort of social lubricant that may engender discussion among 
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diverse individuals.  In other words, sports are easy to talk about with people compared to 
other topics that might have more divisiveness, including politics.  In this sense then, this 
discussion of sports, especially local sports teams, could facilitate conversation across 
barriers that may have a tendency to block conversation about other topics.  Perhaps the 
common recommendation not to discuss politics and religion at the dinner table is at least 
partly true on social media as well.  That is, people often avoid discussion about these 
controversial topics because it highlights their differences from others or can turn 
negative.  If discussion of charged political issues such as abortion rights or gay marriage 
rights are wedge issues that tend to breed polarization of social discussion, perhaps topics 
like the local sports teams are the issues that help to preserve some basic cohesiveness in 
our social structure  
Moreover, the common notion that sports represents mere frivolous activity 
should be questioned.  This is not to say that engagement with sports replaces being 
informed for making voting decisions about elected officials or being civically engaged 
with one’s community.  Rather, for one, understanding that sports and other leisure 
activities represent an important part of life for the modern citizen recognizes points 
made by Schudson (1998) that modern citizenship and democracy can work reasonably 
well with “monitorial citizens” who are generally not fully informed about many current 
political events but who are nevertheless aware enough to become engaged when some 
issue of interest for them arises.  These monitorial citizens, it would seem, could be the 
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kinds of people who often read the news to hear about their local sports teams but who 
also scan the other sections of the news as well.  Given that a social network site like 
Twitter allows users to see sports news and public affairs news streaming alongside one 
another, it is in this way that we can see Twitter as an awareness system working 
reasonably well for democracy with many monitorial news observers.  Twitter, in a sense, 
can enable a kind of serendipity or incidental exposure to news that a reader may not 
have otherwise seen were it not for his interest in some other kind of content.  Further, the 
data telling us that engagement with sports journalists is high also tells us that many 
people are likely being exposed to the public affairs news that comes across their Twitter 
feeds but perhaps people are less likely to directly actively engage with this hard news 
compared to the soft news. 
Furthermore, whether it is sports journalism, business journalism, political 
journalism, pop culture journalism, or some other kind of journalism, it can all have value 
not only for a media organization but also for the public.  As Schudson (2008a) puts it: 
The press should be understood as multiform and multipurpose, a mixed-
bag of an institution.  There is nothing pure or refined about it.  It is the 
same organization that sells consumers investigative reporting, the 
weather, recipes, and crossword puzzles in a single daily bundle.  It is the 
same organization that may take great pains in one section to be even-
handed and detached, say, in covering candidates for political office, and 
in another section cover the local sports team with partisan fervor and, 
when he team is winning, evident glee.  And I am still talking about a 
single news product, not the differences among news organizations that 
may conceive their tasks in quite different ways from one another (p. 8). 
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7.5b SPORTS JOURNALISM: THE “TENT POLES” OF TODAY’S JOURNALISM INDUSTRY? 
In the film industry, it has long been understood that certain blockbuster films are 
the “tent-poles” for movie studios. These are the films that are expected to make a lot of 
money for the studio to pick up the slack for other smaller films which, while possibly 
more attractive to critics and more niche audiences, will make little to no money.  Thus, 
in the metaphor, these kinds of blockbuster films are the tent poles that hold up the tent 
for the entire film company, allowing movie studios to fund smaller project that would be 
buried under the tent without the larger films.  In the news industry, it is probably not a 
surprise to media organizations that sports journalism is driving traffic around their 
brands.  But the Twitter data showing a lot of popularity for sports content means that this 
kind of entertainment news can be understood as at the very least a kind of tent-pole for 
the investigative and public affairs journalism that inform the public about sometimes 
serious issues for engagement in democracy. 
Sports journalists have some advantages that other kinds of journalists do not 
have that makes them popular.  For one, sports journalists tend to have access to official 
sources within major athletics organizations.  Compared to other kinds of journalists, this 
exclusivity of access to players and other officials from major sports teams preserves 
their place in a position of greater control over information than most journalists have 
today.  Indeed, in many cases, local athletes, coaches, or other officials from sports 
organizations use the local media as a form of public relations vehicle that is part of the 
tacit agreement that grants sports journalists exclusivity of access.  In addition, as 
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Schudson (2008a) writes, local sport journalists have a freedom from objectivity that 
derives from the reality that discussion of their team falls within the sphere of consensus.   
7.5c NEWS BEATS AND THE POWER LAW DISTRIBUTION 
In Hindman’s (2011) study of the news ecologies of the top 100 largest 
metropolitan areas in the United States, he found a moderately concentrated distribution 
of audience traffic across all websites for news organizations in the Twin Cities 
metropolitan area.  Although Hindman does not reveal in his study which news 
organizations from the Twin Cities were included in his study, he does mention that he 
included 20 news outlets from the Twin Cities in his study that he said had at least a 1% 
market share of audience exposure.  By my count, however, a comparison across 20 news 
organizations is inherently problematic in that there does not seem to be even 10 news 
organizations in the Twin Cities that attempt to do all major forms of news including 
public affairs news, business news, sports news, entertainment/leisure news. 
The Twin Cities Business Journal, for instance, would likely have above 1% 
market share among all news organizations in the Twin Cities metro area and thus, it 
would be included in Hindman’s study of local news organizations.  But does it make 
sense to compare the audience traffic of such niche news organizations with that of the 
Star Tribune, as Hindman’s metric apparently implicitly does?  The data which shows 
that some organizations in the Twin Cities and likely other cities get a lot of audience 
interest through their entertainment content suggests that categorizing both the Star 
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Tribune and Fox Sports North as the same kinds of news organizations is problematic 
from a measurement standpoint.  It is presumed that across Hindman’s study of the 
exposure diversity for the top 100 DMAs in the United States, he included all general 
interest and niche interest local news organizations in his study of the exposure diversity 
of local news overall.  This measurement choice seems questionable given the clear 
differences in the target audiences of general news versus niche news publications. 
 
7.6 MORE ON THE POWER LAW OF EXPOSURE TO ONLINE MEDIA OUTLETS 
 Political scientist Matthew Hindman (2009; 2011) has found compelling data 
showing that online audience use of media outlets follows a power law distribution.  
Traditional metrics that media regulators have used for determining whether or not there 
is unhealthy market concentration suggest that developments during the ongoing 
evolution of the internet are worsening the concentration of audience attention.  The 
current research study, however, identifies several problems with this thesis. 
 First, Hindman begins with a baseline that focuses almost exclusively on audience 
exposure concentration online as a one-dimensional problem and finds the current level 
to be inadequate.  He does not go so far as to say that the evolving media environment is 
making things worse for democracy but he does suggest that the filtering effects of media 
aggregators and other phenomena are essentially having the effect of reinforcing elite 
power.  His data is clear—network structures (not to mention human-developed 
algorithms) perpetuate preferential attachment such that a small number of people and 
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organizations get far more attention than others. 
But Hindman’s data and my confirmation of a power law distribution of the 
indegree position of the nodes in my datasets can be interpreted differently.  That is, for 
one, the phenomena in which many nodes (people) are at the margins—in the "long tail" 
of a power law distribution—should not be necessarily declared a problem of inequality.   
These people at the margins of the network can be thought to have high cohesiveness/ 
clustering with their acquaintances in the network but low centrality.  In the 20th century, 
these were the millions of atomized people or molecularized "primary groups" with 
"opinion leaders."  People who were once relatively isolated from one another in the 
sense that there could be no public communication that could occur across time and 
geographic space are no longer molecularized and thus, they have some potential for 
direct feedback opportunities and contributions into the gatekeeping process.   
We can view these clusters in contrast to the "network gatekeepers," who 
characteristically have high centrality but low overall cohesiveness to the rest of the 
network.  The sort of fringe position in the network of the clusters of small subgraphs 
relative to the "network gatekeepers" is what helps to explain how the power law 
distribution occurs such that while network gatekeepers are at the head of the distribution, 
most of the audience in the long tail.  As Benkler (2006) notes then, as a seemingly 
naturally occurring pattern of network structures, this kind of power law distribution 
cannot be avoided or regulated against.  Indeed, we cannot compel people to consume 
  
                 221 
 
certain media sources. 
A reasonable conclusion from Hindman’s data might be that because the structure 
of networks favors certain media outlets much more over others, this might conclude us 
to say that this decreased exposure diversity requires subsidies for news organizations or 
other interventions in attempts to preserve the smaller news organizations that are at the 
tail end of the power law distribution.  That is, some might be inclined to see such 
developments as a need to preserve media diversity rather than to allow the larger media 
organizations to increasingly acquire and consolidate with smaller media organizations 
consolidate. 
In my view, our analysis of these concerns must first consider the rationale behind 
the idea that a normatively better media system is one in which exposure diversity is 
greater.  That is, is it inherently problematic that the audience share of attention to media 
outlets in the modern media market are inequitably distributed, perhaps more so than in 
the past?   In the 20th century, a major reason why it was so important to have diversity in 
the represented voices in the media environment was partly based on the understanding 
that the public had no real direct voice for being heard.  Political elites had a voice in that 
media environment as media organizations had various incentives to represent the voices 
of political elites, perhaps too often uncritically.  Journalists, media organizations, and 
various companies and major interest groups had a voice in that system as well. 
In the 21st century media environment, it cannot be provably stated that the 
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internet has democratized the media.  However, the public now have a direct voice into 
the media of the public sphere at least through their influence as marginal nodes of a 
network on which voices get “voted up” to the top.  In some cases, this means that 
alternative voices are better heard such that the sphere of legitimate controversy may 
expand somewhat. 
But Hindman’s look at the power law aspect of internet audience traffic is flawed 
because he looks at that one quantitative dimension without looking at some of the other 
underlying network dynamics of internet-mediated communication.   Whereas Hindman 
sees the power law distribution of the internet as an inherent problem today, I suggest that 
this "exposure diversity" dimension is limited as a metric for actually evaluating the 
structure of the evolving media environment.  The characteristic of most any real social 
network in which lots of regular citizens are on the fringes of the network are connected 
together but not central fits within the "monitorial citizen" model of citizenship. Some 
citizens are still highly engaged and there’s a place in the network for them too.  It might 
even be that the journalists are among the most informed and ideally the most non-
partisan citizens, oftentimes serving as surrogates for the public for public engagement.  
But really, it is the collective intelligence and awareness of the network as a whole that 
truly provides a media system that seemingly can work to fulfill the media’s democratic 
purpose in a modern world. 
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7.7 A HETERARCHY OF INFLUENCES? 
 According to van Dijk (2012), an evaluation such as Hindman’s of the evolving 
media environment fails to recognize that new technologies and other forces are having 
the effect of restructuring the media environment according what he calls a heterarchical 
structure rather than hierarchical structure.  By this van Dijk means that there are still 
features of hierarchy in this modern media environment but there are also overlaps across 
once divided hierarchical levels that did not exist in the past.  While a single citizen may 
not often be able to get the attention of elites even today, the collective force of private 
interest groups like bloggers and/or activists serve as a kind of citizen driven, organic 
type of check and balance on the traditional media.  Further, the very filtering up of 
content produced by professional journalists or politicians does not emerge simply 
because other elites are sharing it.  That is, the influentials in a network do not become 
influential merely as a product of being among the elite.  Rather, the evidence suggests 
that there is a filtering effect from the margins of the network such that many small 
clusters of users have influence on the common emergence and influence of certain 
voices in the networked gatekeeping process. 
Finally, it appears that individual journalists—or at least some of them—may 
have more individual agency today to make decisions about how to do their work.  Again, 
in a sense, this kind of development suggests a gatekeeping process that is structurally 
changing not only through practices but also through the kinds of constraints that a cash-
strapped publisher can have on the decisions a reporter makes in a 24-hour news cycle. 
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As Keith (2011) puts, it, journalism routines today are very much in a state of transition 
within this different milieu for doing journalism.  Keith suggests that as a transition, this 
shifting of routines is temporary, that new routines are forming to replace the old ones.   
This may be true that journalism routines are going through a period of transition, 
or it may be that the idea of a hierarchy of influences on the production of media content 
permanently loses some of its meaning within a networked gatekeeping process.  Instead, 
perhaps it may make sense for the hierarchy of influences on media content to move 
towards what I would call a heterarchy of influences model.  That is, it seems problematic 
to simply refer to the influences on media content production and dissemination as being 
part of a hierarchical process today.  Rather, the idea of heterarchical structures in which 
there is overlap across traditionally discrete power divisions may provide a better 
structural model for understanding how the gatekeeping process is truly changing.  In 
what ways might we see this occurring? 
For one, not all journalists can be seen as being on equal footing in a networked 
media environment.  While some journalists may have more Twitter followers and greater 
network influence than the primary organizational page of their employers, other 
journalists have a small social media footprint.  This seems to mean that different 
journalists would likely have constraints that come from routines while social media may 
empower at least some traditional journalists to make more personal judgments about 
how to engage in what Jarvis (2009) calls journalism as a process.    
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Furthermore, if some people such as bloggers or other interest groups who are not 
traditional "elites" are now major influencers in the gatekeeping process, then they are 
what embodies at least some non-elites truly having opportunities to have their voice 
better heard today.   
Importantly, this is not necessarily to say that the shift to a heterarchical model of 
influences means the new media environment is better, more democratic.  Indeed, we 
might also suggest that non-traditional media elites that have influence on copyright or 
other media policy could be part of a new elite gaining greater power.  But whatever the 
changes, it seems to be true that the traditional hierarchy of influences on media content 
are no longer hierarchical in a traditional sense.   
Now that traditional news media are not essential to the process of receiving the 
daily news, the strategy for news organizations needs to focus on audiences and events.  
That is, for one, journalists need to regularly be on the same platforms where audiences 
are and engaging some of them.  Jeff Bezos, as the founder of Amazon, knows well the 
importance of using network-based algorithms to show users products that are relevant to 
their lives.  This is one of the basic ideas behind targeted advertising online that has made 
internet-mediated advertising such an improvement in efficiency over traditional mass 
media.  The ability of advertisers to use the referral algorithms develop principles 
essentially amounts to an approach which moves away from the mass model of 
homogenous audiences.  Instead, the modern media business has moved towards a model 
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which recognizes that mediated communication today is a much more participatory 
process that involves recognizing the heterogeneous nature of audiences in a networked 
gatekeeping process.  The way forward for the reconstruction of journalism, then, must 
continue to involve a better understanding of the networked structure of the 21st century 
networked gatekeeping process.  The ongoing creative application of social network 
analysis methods applied to the study of the place of journalism and of news diffusion 
within this process will continue to be an important project for media scholars and media 
businesses.  Most importantly, our ability to empirical study and understand mediated-
communication within a networked structure is essential towards efforts to improve how 
journalism’s democratic role can continue to evolve with this changing media 
environment. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Understanding the impact of the internet and its associated technologies on the 
development of the modern media system involves a delicate balance between 
recognizing the reemergence of old patterns while understanding what is truly new.  It is 
easy to see the similarities, for instance, between two technologies like the telegraph and 
the radio, each one reducing the time it took for messages to reach people.  But it is more 
important to understand the differences between any two communication technologies.  
In the case of the internet and the development of social network sites, viewed within the 
context of gatekeeping theory we can see that on the one hand, one thing has not 
changed.  That is, the internet does not flatten hierarchies or enable the average citizen 
the same opportunities as a politician or a professional journalist for being heard in the 
public sphere.  There are still “gatekeepers” in the networked public sphere the sense that 
some voices are more influential than others.  There are still journalists who are among 
the gatekeepers.  But these gatekeepers no longer have the control they once had over the 
media messages that the public can access.  It is in this latter sense, in which control over 
the dissemination of information is removed from the equation, that a quite new and 
potentially better system of communication has the potential to develop. 
 The future development of the changing media environment, including how well 
the media system will work for the functioning of democracy, will likely hinge upon 
several different policy issues.  Of all of the different policy issues that will continue to 
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face regulators in their ongoing obligation to preserve a media system that can uphold 
“the public interest, convenience, and necessity,” some seem more worthy of attention 
and concern than others.  The economic decline for traditional media organizations has 
almost certainly lead to a degradation of the overall quality of journalism produced by 
news organizations (Anderson, Bell, and Shirky, 2012).  But there is much that is 
challenging and potentially problematic about the media system of the 20th century.  As 
such, it does not seem to make sense to take on bold progressive-minded initiatives such 
as creating a subsidy system for news organizations.  After all, as Schudson (1999) notes, 
meaningful media reform that could truly benefit the public as a whole is not likely to 
happen through the efforts of journalists who are not compelled to adapt to the changing 
media environment.  The sociology of professions literature suggests that in many ways, 
the impact of the development of the internet on traditional journalism can be good for 
better pushing journalists to make news that responds to what the networked media 
environment calls for. 
One issue that will seemingly continue to have importance is the problem of the 
digital divide.  The digital divide persists as a potential problem such that people of lower 
economic status, various minorities, and people in underdeveloped countries around the 
world lag behind others in the basic technological and economic resources for efficient 
access to being engaged in the networked public sphere.  Some evidence has suggested 
that a knowledge gap (Tichenor, Donahue, and Olien, 1970) exists in society such that 
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better access to information among higher socioeconomic classes serves to widen the gap 
between elites and non-elites and between the rich and the poor.  Some scholars argue 
that this knowledge gap may worsen when there are access gaps to internet-mediated 
communication (see Van Deursen & van Dijk, 2011; Jeffres, Neuendorf, and Atkin, 
2012).  On some level, as Peters (1999) notes, voluntary disengagement from public 
sphere deliberation should be viewed as a free choice for people living in a representative 
democracy.  As such, given a heterogeneous public in a network society, a randomly 
divided knowledge gap in public affairs knowledge is tolerable.  But when the digital 
divide breaks down by social class, this could present a problem for democracy.   
 Given that the particular evidence of a knowledge gap involves the effect of 
socioeconomic status on knowledge, there should be real concern that the new media 
environment could worsen the knowledge gap and further diminish access to 
representation in the public sphere for those from lower economic statuses.  Therefore, 
when it comes to the debate over net neutrality—the question of whether a law should be 
made to prevent internet service providers from further monetize the conditions for 
efficient communication between different users—it is difficult to deny the possibility 
that the loss of network neutrality could truly serve to exacerbate already existing social 
and economic inequalities (Ammori, 2013).   
When Tim Berners-Lee gave his idea for the World Wide Web away for free, 
wanting it to become a public resource that could enable a freer media system for all, he 
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envisioned a communication resource that would make life better for people around the 
world (see Berners-Lee and Frischetti, 2000).  On the one hand, the efficiency that can 
come from pooled wealth concentrated in the hands of large media or technology 
companies can be useful to an extent for driving technological innovations that can make 
our systems of communication work better.  To an extent, Google is a good example of a 
company that has seemingly managed to contribute positively to the development of a 
media environment that is more open than it has been in the past while still seeing 
unparalleled economic growth during the evolution of the internet (Vaidhyanathan, 2011).   
But Berners-Lee is among many voices in the public sphere who have called out 
efforts by large companies to control patents and copyrights in ways that may stifle the 
freedom information and the development of new innovations by entrepreneurs.  In a 
networked gatekeeping process, these companies can still gain significant control if they 
are able to excessively leverage the benefits of network structure.  Network structure is 
indeed unequal by its nature.  By enforcing policy that would ensure the equality of 
access to communication and development on the internet by anyone, the density of our 
large internet-mediated social network can grow stronger.  But if we allow certain 
companies to gain excessive influence within the conditions for accessing media today, 
the same networked media environment can become no better or worse than it has ever 
been at serving the media’s basic role in society enabling the information and 
communication functions of society. 
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